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Why do countries have different levels of employment protection that make dismissals difficult?  
The recent comparative political economy literature is divided over whether labor protection is 
an outcome of class struggles or employers’ rational choices.  This dissertation provides an 
alternative explanation focusing on the role of counter-majoritarian political institutions.  While 
theories and empirical evidence do not support the argument that some employers may support 
employment protection as government regulation, the power-of-labor-resources model is also 
limited because it does not explain the deviant cases where politically weak labor co-exists with 
strong employment protection.  This study offers an analytical model in which vote-maximizing 
politicians respond to the popular pressure to establish employment protection that mainly comes 
from organized labor and/or the rising risk of middle-class job loss.  It is argued that even if the 
popular pressure is strong, political institutions designed to limit the rule by the many – 
federalism and judicial review – constrain the popular demand for employment protection to 
become legislation.  The empirical chapters examine the United States as a weak-employment 
protection case, Germany as a strong-employment protection case, and South Korea as a 
moderately strong-employment protection case.  They demonstrate that the American political 
system where political power is dispersed to different branches and levels of government 
forestalled the rise of employment protection, while South Korea’s highly concentrated political 
system responded to the public perception of declining job security by maintaining restrictions of 
 iv 
layoff. Germany represents a distinct model of federalism where labor legislation is centralized 
and subnational governments rely on extensive measures of fiscal equalization. In this type of 
federalism voters can readily attribute the responsibility of providing job security to the central 
government. Therefore, the German federalism has not provided effective checks on the popular 
pressure for employment protection.        
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 WHY STUDY EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION? 
Job security is a prominent topic of debates among experts in labor markets and comparative 
political economy around the world at the turn of the twenty-first century.  In the United States, 
where the wave of deindustrialization during the 1970s and 1980s displaced millions of workers 
from their jobs, there is a growing concern that global outsourcing of brains is now threatening 
the job security of even high-income, professional workers.  Between January 2001 and 
December 2003, 5.3 million American workers whose job tenures were three years or longer 
were laid off (Butcher and Hallock 2006).  Academic research confirms the public perception 
that the job insecurity of American workers has significantly deteriorated between the 1970s and 
1990s (Cappelli 1999; Schmidt 2000; Valletta 2000).  Uchitelle (2006: iv) ruefully says, “the 
permanent separation of people from their jobs, abruptly and against their wishes, gradually 
became standard management practice in the United States.”   
Although individual workers’ jobs are less secure, the United States has recently 
outperformed Continental European countries with respect to unemployment as an aggregated 
labor market outcome.  As Figure 1 shows, the U.S. unemployment rate since the early 1990s has 
been significantly lower than the average unemployment rate of eleven West European countries 
and especially Germany.     
 1 
Large-scale layoffs have been rare in the Continental Europe for the most of the last 
century.  Houseman and Abraham (1995)’s seminal work shows that while American firms 
primarily resorted to flexible layoffs as a response to overcapacity during 1973-1990, German 
firms maintained employment security through spreading available work or reducing work hours.  
When there was compelling need for a permanent reduction of workforce, German firms 
accomplished job cuts through natural attrition instead of firing redundant workers.  Major 
German firms have been very conservative in executing layoffs.  Thus, a Volkswagen employee 
said: “VW tries never to lay off” (Shlaes 1994: 114).1   
Although this VW employee seems much better off than American auto workers, the 
pitfall of this strong job security seems to be that “it’s much harder in Germany than in the U.S. 
to find a new job if you lose one.”2  Unemployment has progressively increased in Germany 
since the 1970s (See Figure 1).  It finally reached a postwar record in March 2005 when 5 
million working-age people or 12.7 percent of civilian labor force were jobless in seasonally 
unadjusted terms (Federal Statistical Office of Germany).  Commentators have named this high 
and persistent unemployment a “German disease” (Werner-Sinn 2003; Wall Street Journal 
2005), and labor market reforms to reduce unemployment are one of the top policy agenda. 
                                                 
1 Recently Germany’s flagship companies such as Siemens and Volkswagen have planned large-scale job cuts.   In 
June 2004 Siemens sought to move 2,000 jobs producing mobile phones from North Rhine-Westphalia to Hungary.  
The company eventually aborted the plan but instead it forced IG-Metall, Germany’s largest industrial union, to 
accept extended weekly working hours without overtime pay (“Siemens Deal Launches Debate on Longer Working 
Hours.” European Industrial Relations Observatory Online. Accessed November 11, 2006. 
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/07/feature/de0407106f.html>).  As large German employers finally began to 
exercise a long-foregone option, that is, relocating their production sites to low-labor-cost countries in Eastern 
Europe, it appears that the job security of German workers is being eroded.  The recent survey data from the German 
Socio-economic Panel Study shows that the confidence of employees in job security declined between 2001 and 
2003 (“Working and Employment Conditions in Germany.” European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions. 2006. Accessed February 25, 2007. 
<http://www.eurofound.eu.int/ewco/surveys/DE0503SR01/DE0503SR01_7.htm>).  This raises questions of whether 
German employers are copying the American employers’ cost-cutting strategy of shedding redundant workers and 
whether the German capitalism will eventually converge with American capitalism.   
2 “The German Disease.”  Wall Street Journal.  New York, NY.  January 10, 2005, p. A12 
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Figure 1 Price of Job Security?: Cross-country Comparisons of Unemployment Rates 
Note: The statistics are seasonally adjusted.  EU-11 includes Belgium, Germany (West Germany before 
1991), Spain (since 1977), Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, various years. 
 
Economists have paid attention to the role of employment protection to explain these 
striking cross-Atlantic differences of job security and other labor market behaviors. 3   
                                                 
3 Here I define employment protection as legal restrictions on employers’ right to terminate employment relations at 
the employer’s discretion.  Therefore, employers’ voluntary retention of employees is excluded from the definition 
of employment protection for this study.  OECD (2004) provides the most reliable source of comparative data about 
employment protection across OECD members and I draw from the OECD definition of employment protection.  
OECD (2004) constructed a composite index of employment protection legislation (EPL) for regular employees 
under permanent contracts based on procedural inconveniences, advance notice and severance pay requirements, and 
difficulty of dismissal.  While the EPL index used here mainly refers to the statutory protection against dismissals 
provided by the government, it also includes protection through the collective agreements to which governments 
provide a quasi-legal character.  The OECD data excludes public sector employees because their employment status 
tends to be governed by public administration laws distinguishable from private labor laws.  I also exclude the 
regulation of temporary workers that the OECD data cover because countries tend to deregulate the use of temporary 
workers in an attempt to eschew, not to deal with, the reform of firing restrictions on permanent workers.   
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Employment protection clearly distinguishes the United States from Germany: the level of 
employment protection in the United States is lowest among twenty-eight OECD countries while 
Germany provides the sixth-strongest employment protection in the same group (OECD 2004).4  
Some economic literature suggests that employment protection increases firing costs and 
therefore induce firms to refrain from adjusting employment to changes in demand through 
layoffs (Bentolila and Bertola 1990; OECD 1999).  Although the effects of employment 
protection on overall labor market behaviors are still debated (See Buechtemann 1993),5 experts 
tend to agree on the following arguments.  First, employment protection weakens business 
demands for labor and therefore deters job creation in private sectors (See Garibaldi and Mauro 
2002; Siebert 2004).  Second, once adverse shocks give rise to high unemployment, employment 
protection makes high unemployment persist (See Blanchard and Summers 1988; Blanchard and 
Wolfers 2000).  Finally, strong employment protection will induce firms to resort to atypical 
types of employment to avoid legal dismissal restraints, and this choice will encourage the 
differentiation of labor markets into two segments between the one for regular, full-time workers 
with decent pay and greater job security and the other for part-time, temporary low-skilled 
workers with low wages and weak job security (See Lindbeck and Snower 1990; Saint-Paul 
1996).  
Restrictions on layoff have become a political controversy in South Korea since the mid-
1990s.  In the time before the mid-1990s Korean big business provided lifetime employment and 
therefore layoffs were implemented mostly in small-medium firms.  Lifetime employment as an 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the OECD measure of German employment protection does not consider the effect of 
codetermination through the company board on layoffs.  If this codetermination rule is considered, the strictness of 
German employment protection will increase. 
5 For example, Lazear (1990) and Scarpetta (1996) argue that employment protection increases unemployment, 
while Nickell and Layard (1999) find that their relationship is not statistically strong. 
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implicit corporate practice was weakened as economic growth was diminished during the 1990s 
and it was finally dismantled as the 1997 economic crisis ended the belief that chaebols, Korean 
business conglomerates, were too big to fail.  Since the 1997 economic crisis, chaebols have 
become increasingly interested in adjusting the level of employment to increase corporate 
profits.  The idea of working-time reduction widely accepted by German employers has never 
gained popularity among Korean employers (Cho 2004).  However, chaebols have used early 
retirement plans rather than redundancy dismissals as a principal means to reduce workforce, 
which is distinct from the American case (Jung and Cheon 2006: 466).  
South Korea provides a fairly stringent legal protection of standard workers against 
dismissal, which is stronger than the OECD average (OECD 2004).  Although there has been 
little scholarly research about the economic effect of this regulation of dismissal in South Korea, 
business groups and the International Monetary Fund that provided bailouts in the 1997 
economic crisis have put the relaxation of the regulation of dismissal as a condition for creating 
new jobs and halting employers’ increasing use of nonstandard workers whose job security is 
rarely protected by law (FKI 2004; IMF 2004).      
Despite the policy significance of employment protection and heated debates over its 
labor market effects, there has been surprisingly limited effort to answer where the employment 
protection came from.  This study has been motivated to fill this theoretical gap.  Based on the 
theoretical explanations this study draws on, it also aims to provide implications for whether and 
how Korean employers’ preferences for long-run employment have been affected by the recent 
economic crisis and whether the cutback of employment protection regulations in South Korea 
will be likely in the foreseeable future.  In this dissertation, I develop and apply a political 
institutional approach to explain the rise of employment protection in the United States, 
 5 
Germany, and South Korea by using comparative case studies, that is, comparing a few cases.  
But a simple cross-country comparison is inadequate to explore the origins of employment 
protection.  Therefore, I will combine cross-case comparisons with within-case comparisons to 
determine when employment protection was first established in each case.  This longitudinal 
approach will also increase the number of observations and hence help discriminate between 
competing hypotheses.  
1.2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
This study is firmly rooted in the contemporary political economy literature about the welfare 
state.  Political scientists have long sought to answer the question of what accounts for the cross-
country differences of the welfare state.  A number of scholars have used a quantitative approach 
to find out whether domestic political variables affect government welfare spending against the 
effect of international economic integration since the early 1970s.6  One weakness of these large-
N studies is that their focus on aggregated government social spending as the dependent variable 
                                                 
6 The effect of globalization on social policy in advanced industrial democracies is a well-researched area.  Cameron 
(1978) and Rodrik (1998) emphasize the positive effect of economic openness on the expansion of welfare states.   
As a variant of this globalization approach, Garrett (1998) argues that the welfare expansion effect of economic 
openness is conditional on the domestic distribution of power, especially the strength of the political left.  But 
current research suggests that various domestic political factors have independent effects on government welfare 
spending.  The partisanship literature focuses on the role of left parties and Christian centrist parties (Hicks and 
Swank 1992; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001).  Political institutional 
explanations pay attention to the roles of different types of democratic political systems (Birchfield and Crepaz 
1998; Crepaz and Moser  2004), electoral institutions (Persson 2002; Iversen and Soskice 2006), and constitutional 
structures (Swank 2001; Castles 2004). 
   More recently, scholars began to study the effects of globalization and domestic politics on welfare states in less 
developed countries.  Rudra (2002) points to the negative impact of globalization on welfare spending, but she 
suggests that the political power of labor measured by the share of skilled labor makes a difference in welfare 
spending.  Another domestic political variable that scholars increasingly link to government social expenditures is 
the role of political regime types (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Brown and Hunter 1999, 2004; Avelino, 
Brown and Hunter 2005; Rudra and Haggard 2005).  Empirical findings show that democracies increase government 
social spending, especially on human capital formation.     
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disregards qualitative, structural traits of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19).  Even same 
levels of government social spending do not produce invariable social policy outcomes, but they 
are used to fund distinct configurations of welfare programs in different countries.  Esping-
Andersen (1990)’s classification of welfare capitalism into liberal, conservative, and social 
democratic welfare regimes conveys the idea that welfare states are not simply government 
expenditures, but they are institutions of the “ways in which welfare production is allocated 
between state, market, and households” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 73).  Similarly, Hall and 
Soskice (2001)’s influential work on comparative capitalism provides a broader distinction of 
welfare capitalism embedding redistributive institutions into overall capitalist institutional 
arrangements.7  Hall and Soskice’s innovative contribution to the new political economy is that 
each type of capitalism comprises a cluster of interconnected social and economic institutions 
supporting each other.  This notion of institutional complemetarities makes a strong case for 
institutional stasis: globalization is not making varieties of welfare capitalism converge into a 
lean welfare-state model, but their institutional diversity will persist.8  
The continuity and change in welfare states remains a relevant research program.  
However, I argue that it should be complemented by research of where the institutional 
characteristics of existing welfare states come from.  There are quite a few political scientists 
interested in explaining the historical emergence of landmark social policy.  Skocpol (1992) 
explains the origins of social policy in the United States through the role of the World Wars.  
                                                 
7 Hall and Soskice do not distinguish Esping-Andersen’s conservative and social democratic welfare states but 
merge them into “coordinate market economies” as opposed to “liberal market economies.”  
8  While Hall and Soskice provides a functionalist system theory approach, Pierson (1996) and Moene and 
Wallerstein (2001) examine how different welfare-regime types shape the political support for social policy.  They 
find that the median voters in the welfare regimes based on universal social citizenship rights will support their 
existing welfare programs against the globalization pressure for welfare retrenchment because they see welfare 
cutbacks hurt them.  In contrast, median voters in welfare regimes targeting benefits to low-income people are likely 
to tolerate welfare cutbacks because they perceive welfare cutbacks will hardly affect them.    
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Swenson (2002)’s pioneering contribution to the employer-side account of welfare states 
addresses the puzzle of why the Swedish welfare state developed later than the American welfare 
state in spite of its strong social democratic politics.  Similarly, Mares (2003) explains the 
adoption of major institutions of social insurance in France and Germany from a cross-class 
alliance perspective.  Thelen (2004) finds that cross-class alliances played an important role in 
the establishment of skill formation systems in Germany and Japan, but not in Britain and the 
United States.  But she also notes that characters of political regimes conditioned the political 
settlement between industrial workers and their employers.       
This study builds on the research tradition focusing on the origin of social policy and 
extends the locus of analysis to labor market policy.  The major difference between social policy 
and labor market policy is that the latter directly regulates transactions in labor markets, while 
the former aims to ameliorate social consequences of such labor market transactions ex post.  
The current political economy literature about welfare states stresses the linkage between social 
policy and labor market policy (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kolberg and Esping-Andersen 1992; 
Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2001; Bonoli 2003).  They highlight 
varied ways of delivering employment and income security to wage-earners other than traditional 
social transfers.  For example, employment protection could be seen as functionally equivalent 
with unemployment insurance because employment protection reduces unemployment risk.  
However, there are few works on the origin of employment protection done explicitly by 
political scientists.  I will examine to what extent existing theories developed in the comparative 
welfare state literature can be applied to explain the rise of employment protection in Chapter 2.   
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1.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: THE 
ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
The current comparative political economy literature emphasizes that formal political institutions 
provide incentives and constraints that induce political actors’ policy choices (Persson and 
Tabellini 2002; Hallerberg 2004).  Drawing from this approach, this study provides a political 
institutionalist explanation for the rise of employment protection.   
The main argument of this dissertation is that employment protection is a product of the 
interplay between popular pressures and counter-majoritarian political institutions (CMPIs).  
Popular pressures are a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for employment protection: 
strong CMPIs limit politicians’ choice for employment protection.  CMPIs are political 
institutions constitutionally designed to constrain the rule of the many and the policy-making out 
of democratic impulses.  The notable examples are federalism and judicial review.  These 
political institutions lead to territorial and functional fragmentations of political power.  As a 
result, it becomes very difficult for the political majority in the national legislature and the 
majority public opinion in the country to control policy-making processes under strong CMPIs.   
The reason why institutional mechanisms to counteract the power of the majority matters 
for employment protection is that political elites may well attempt to regulate layoffs for the 
purpose of winning or maintaining political power.  Historically countries experienced the kind 
of employment relations in which the state did not provide protection of workers against 
dismissal but the master-and-servant perspective was prevailing: the employer’s right to fire 
employees was not regulated by political power.  It was through industrialization and the 
formation of urban working classes that political elites faced popular pressures to intervene in 
labor markets to protect workers’ job security.   
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Drawing upon the median voter literature, I argue that the consent of middle-class 
workers comprising white-collar workers and high-skill blue-collar workers is a crucial political 
condition for those who support employment protection to become the majority.  Traditionally, 
these middle-class workers – especially white-collar workers – have been characterized by 
greater identification with management and economic privileges such as greater job security, 
higher earnings, and corporate welfare benefits that were unavailable to low-skill blue-collar and 
service workers.  While the effect of employment protection is unambiguously positive for the 
lower-class workers, it is double-edged with respect to the middle-class workers.  Employment 
protection could marginally strengthen their job security, whereas it could bring cutback 
pressures on their privileges indirectly through strengthening the organizational base of lower-
class workers and increasing compensation to the proletariats in the same firms.  Employers will 
be forced to adjust the privileges provided to the middle-class workers to maintain profit levels if 
they face wage increases for the lower-class workers.   
My argument is that the organizational power of middle-class workers and/or the risk of 
their job loss are the two major factors that facilitate the alliance between middle- and lower-
class workers on employment protection.  If white-collar workers and craftsmen are well-
organized, the fear of middle-class workers of the boomerang effect of employment protection 
on their traditional privileges will be reduced because they expect their own unions will play as 
checks against potential cutbacks.  The strong union activism among middle-class workers likely 
reflects the overall labor power in the country, considering that middle-class workers, especially 
white-collars, are less prone to unionize than lower-class or blue-collar workers because of their 
greater identification with management and greater mobility between firms and jobs (Oskarsson 
2003: 620).   
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Unemployment shocks that affect the job security of middle-class workers are also 
expected to encourage the cross-class alliance between the workers differentiated by occupations 
and skills.  If the national economy suffers mass job losses and the public perception of job 
insecurity is severely worsened, the marginal utility of employment protection for middle-class 
workers will increase.  The result is higher demand for employment protection among middle-
class workers.   
However, the cross-class alliance for employment protection within labor is not the end 
of our story.  The empirical chapters of this book demonstrate that unitary political systems as in 
South Korea are more likely to be penetrated by popular pressures for stronger employment 
protection when one of the two conditions for a cross-class coalition within labor.  In contrast, 
two kinds of CMPIs that originated from the United States play significant roles in channeling 
the popular pressure for greater employment protection to political systems.   
First, federalism may work against the establishment of employment protection, but it 
depends on what type of federalism the political system has.  The American-style, competitive 
federalism forestalls employment protection because interstate bidding for business investment 
in a federal system hampers the state ability to adopt legislation restricting the management right 
to layoff.  Interstate competition also keeps the central government from making comprehensive 
regulations of layoff because of distributive conflicts between states winning and losing jobs 
resulting from corporate migration.  In contrast, the German-style, interlocked-jurisdictional 
federalism is permissive of policy-making out of democratic impulses.  In this political system, 
strong central legislative power reduces the prisoners’ dilemma that would result in the race to 
the bottom among constituent states.  In addition to the centralization of labor legislation, the 
fiscal federalism based on the pooling of tax revenues and interstate fiscal equalization makes 
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comprehensive national labor market policy more likely because poorer states will not oppose 
federal efforts to level out interstate differences of employment protection.  Such interstate fiscal 
arrangement distorts the incentive structure of federal employment protection legislation for 
states in different economic conditions because it makes poorer states underrate the potential cost 
of strict federal employment protection legislation on regional economic development in the 
expectation of interstate compensation.   
Second, a politically independent judiciary will be able to override employment 
protection legislation and to protect the freedom of contract and enterprise through judicial 
review of the constitutionality of employment protection legislation.  However, the extent to 
which a judiciary can actually constrain legislative actions by democratic government depends 
on the prevailing ideologies of judges and founders of the constitution the judges seek to protect.  
If judges are leftist, they are more likely to deliver decisions sympathetic to labor.  Also, if the 
creators of a constitution intended labor legislation to be centralized and recognized government 
intervention for the protection of labor, the judges are likely to accept employment protection as 
constitutional.   
The CMPIs framework is applied to define the different types of democratic political 
systems and therefore confronts a measurement problem for dictatorships.  Dictatorships are not 
necessarily associated with either weak or strong CMPIs.  One might argue that dictatorships 
have a counter-majoritarian character in that the preference of dictators can prevail over those of 
the majority citizens in making public policy.  Yet dictatorships concentrate political power in 
the hands of one or a few and hence lack the degree of division of power that could warrant 
CMPIs.  I argue that the effect of dictatorship on employment protection depends on the 
preference of dictators and the degree of political openness allowed in the regime: all other 
 12 
things being equal, employment protection is likely to be weakest in a hard dictatorship with 
rightist leaders and strongest in a hard dictatorship with leftist leaders.     
1.4 PLAN OF THE BOOK 
Chapter 2 critically reviews existing approaches and presents the main theoretical framework for 
this study.  I will create a hypothesis from this theory and elaborate the research method to test 
the hypothesis.   
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the case of the United States.  The ease of firing workers under 
the employment-at-will law has been a distinctive feature of American employment relations.  
Although few employers over the world welcomed government interference with the managerial 
right to dismissal, the peculiar hostility of American employers toward employment protection 
can be seen as a result of the institutional characteristics of American capitalism: preeminence of 
securities in the American corporate finance, weak firm-based skill formation, and fierce 
competition in product markets, as the varieties-of-capitalism argument explains.  Moreover, the 
cross-class alliance for employment protection within labor has been relatively weak in the 
United States.  Although the organizational power of American blue-collar workers grew rapidly 
during the World War II, the growth of unions for their white-collar colleagues retarded.  
Craftsmen were often co-opted by management to become supervisors who were not allowed to 
join unions by law.  However, the United States could have had a degree of employment 
protection when there were serious middle-class job losses such as in the Great Depression and 
massive closures of establishments during the 1970s and ‘80s.  This chapter demonstrates that 
the American federalism characterized by inter-governmental competition and the politically 
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independent judiciary claiming the authority of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation 
checked the popular pressure arising from mass job losses for regulating dismissals from being 
legislated.   
Chapter 5 looks at the German case.  Germany provides an important counter-case 
against the United States.  First, since the Weimar Republic, German middle-class workers 
showed greater propensity to organize than the American counterparts except for the Nazi 
period.  White-collars have their own independent unions and craftsmen played a central role in 
strengthening industrial unions.  Thus, the cross-class alliance for employment protection within 
labor has been much stronger in Germany than in the United States.  Second, although Germany 
is nominally grouped with the United States in the federal state, these two federal systems are of 
different kind.  The centralization of legislative power and the fiscal equalization scheme makes 
the German federalism way part with the American federalism.  Chapter 5 demonstrates how this 
political institutional difference failed to preclude the popular pressure for employment 
protection from influencing policy outcomes in Germany.   
Chapter 6 focuses on the case of South Korea, where large firms traditionally provided 
lifetime employment.  The right-wing dictatorships during the 1970s and ‘80s provided 
employment protection through administrative guidelines that implicitly compelled chaebols not 
to implement mass layoffs in major economic crises.  In 1987 South Korea became a democratic 
political system, which had a strong unitary character.  Entering the 1990s, chaebols began to 
perceive lifetime employment to be a liability rather than an asset in response to challenges from 
international market competition and rising domestic labor costs.  However, layoffs were being 
regulated by the conditions that the Supreme Court had introduced in 1989 and the government 
codified them in early 1997.  Although the 1997 financial crisis eventually turned chaebols 
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against lifetime employment, politicians have been reluctant to cut back employment protection 
because of the public concern about job security.   
Chapter 7 summarizes the cross-case comparisons and within-case comparisons 
elaborated in the previous chapters and highlights how empirical evidence fits the hypothesis of 
this study.  Finally, it presents a future prospect for the Korean economic system from the 
varieties-of-capitalism perspective and provides a policy implication for employment protection 
reform in Korea. 
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2.0  COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
2.1 REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORIES 
I examine three major theoretical arguments about employment protection in the field of 
comparative political economy: power resources of labor, cross-class alliances, and the varieties-
of-capitalism.  The latter two represents an employer-centered approach that runs counter to the 
power-resources-of labor model.  A major distinction between them is that the cross-class 
alliance approach focuses on sectoral differences of business preferences for social protection, 
while the varieties-of-capitalism perspective emphasizes national variations of business 
preferences for social protection.  The main critical focus of this study is on the varieties-of-
capitalism perspective. 
2.1.1 Power resources of labor   
The power-resources-of-labor theory is that well-organized labor and politically strong left 
parties are necessary for the development of labor protection because capitalists a priori oppose 
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it.9   Quite interestingly, however, empirical evidence does not fully support this antagonistic 
theory of capital-labor relations.  The power of labor measured by union density and the degree 
of centralization is found to be irrelevant to employment protection in seventeen OECD 
countries.10  In Figure 1 of Appendix A, the impact of union density on employment protection 
is statistically indifferent from zero.  In Figure 2 of Appendix A, the explanatory power of 
centralized bargaining is better than union density, but it is still insignificant at .10 level.11  As 
shown in Figure 3 of Appendix A, when we take the political power of left parties as an average 
percentage of cabinet portfolios accounted for by left parties over the 1980s, its relationship with 
employment protection is still insignificant at .05 level.12  These figures call into question the 
claim that well-organized labor is necessary for employment protection; even if the labor class is 
not powerful, strong employment protection could be established.  For example, Korean labor 
lacks traditionally important labor factors such as high union density, centralized bargaining 
structures, and a strong social democratic party.  Yet regular employees under permanent 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, two ideologically contrasting perspectives reach an agreement on this empirical issue.  The class-
based perspective’s claim is that labor protection is a product of class struggle between capital and labor, assuming 
that working classes are the driving force of establishing labor protection against free markets (Korpi 1983; Korpi 
and Palme 2003).  The government is often considered to be more favorable to labor groups’ demand for social 
protection as its economy is more open to international markets (Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985).   
     The conservative perspective based on the rent-seeking theory (Tullock 1967; Stigler 1971; Krueger 1974; 
Posner 1974) argues that employment protection stems from the pressures of powerful interest groups seeking 
monopoly gains, or “rents” in the public choice term, which result from the government regulation of entry to the 
labor market.  Inspired by the insider-outsider theory of unemployment (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), the rent-
seeking behavior literature typically depicts insiders, who are currently employed, or labor unions representing the 
interests of insiders as doing the rent-seeking because they want their jobs to be safe from unemployment (Saint-
Paul 1997, 2000).   
10 The 17 OECD countries are USA, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia.  For employment 
protection data I used OECD indicators of the strictness of employment protection for regular employment in 1989 
(OECD 1999).  Labor unions data come from Data Repository for the Golden-Wallerstein-Lange Project on Unions, 
Employers, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations for 16 OECD Countries, 1950-1995 (Downloadable 
from http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data).   
11 In both figures, Spain may be seen as an outlier because Spanish labor groups are not well-organized but the job 
protection in this country is very strong.  However, using robust regressions does not affect the result.   
12 The power of left parties data are from Duane Swank’s Comparative Parties Dataset, which is downloadable from 
http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm. 
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contracts in South Korea enjoy fairly strict legal protection against dismissal among OECD 
countries (OECD 2004).  How is it possible to have strict employment protection in the absence 
of strong social democratic parties and well-organized labor groups?  
2.1.2 Large firms and cross-class alliances 
While the previous theory provides a labor-side approach to welfare states, the cross-class 
alliance theory is basically an employer-side approach.  Scholars in this approach seek to explain 
when and why employers will favor social policy.  Firm size is regarded as the most influential 
factor shaping employers’ social policy preferences.  Mares (2000, 2003) explains that as price-
setters large employers can shift the cost of social insurance onto consumers.  But Swenson 
(2002) also emphasizes the role of employers’ organizations in labor markets in shaping welfare-
state outcomes: the lack of strong employers organizations to police low-wage, low-benefit 
competitors in the United States made large employers support a minimalist social security 
system to reduce downward pressures of cutthroat competition on wages and benefits during the 
Great Depression.  In contrast, the more generous welfare state of Sweden was established 
during the postwar economic boom when corporate welfare benefits were exploded to induce 
skilled labor.  Swedish employers supported social legislation enforcing ceilings on wages and 
benefits.    
The employer-side theory may be useful to explain why some employers are willing to 
contribute to social security.  And yet, it is a limited account for the question of employment 
protection.  According to the standard economic literature, giant corporations will keep the prices 
of their products from falling even during economic recessions because they have market power 
to set the prices and frequent changes in prices increase menu costs for firms (Mankiw 1987; 
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Rotemberg and Saloner 1987).  Therefore, they may have to cut production and employment to 
maintain their profit levels because the prices are stable.  If we hold the assumption that firms 
seek to maximize short-term profits, this economic theory will correctly predict that monopoly 
firms will prefer the flexible adjustment of employment level in response to business cycles to 
the protection of employees against dismissals and, hence, oppose any government regulation 
limiting flexible employment adjustment.    
Social security contributions are generally considered as less cumbersome on employers 
because they do not conflict managerial prerogatives over employment and production.  The 
heavy industries of Imperial Germany are a good example.  Although they supported 
Bismarckian social security legislation, they sought to maintain a strict control over workplace 
issues.  Employers might be reluctant to fire skilled workers, but employment protection 
legislation will necessarily constrain the business freedom to cut back unskilled workers as well 
as skilled workers.   
2.1.3 The varieties-of-capitalism argument 
Recently a new institutionalist approach to welfare capitalism has drawn much scholarly 
attention.  The whole thrust of this approach is that there are different kinds of capitalisms that 
have thrived in nationally-varied institutional contexts and employment protection is best 
explained by other economic institutions linked to it (Hall and Soskice 2001).  According to this 
varieties-of-capitalism argument, employers will accept (or oppose) employment protection if 
they face institutional arrangements that reward (punish) long-term employment relations.   
Thus, the varieties-of-capitalism literature draws upon the following complementary 
economic institutions to explain the difference of employment protection between Germany and 
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the United States, two major opposites in the capitalist world.  First, Germany has a bank-based 
financial system in which banks and industries are bonded with each other.  Banks may reduce 
layoffs in their client firms not only because their financial commitment enable firms to be less 
worried about market pressures to cut back labor costs, but also because they protect their client 
firms in firm markets against mergers.  Second, product market competition arguably weakens 
employment protection because the downward pressure on commodity prices are likely to force 
companies to save on labor costs.  However, German companies in the same industry are 
interlocked through cross-shareholdings and coordinated by employers’ associations instead of 
being mired in cutthroat competition.  Finally, the varieties-of-capitalism school has pointed to 
the role of skill formation systems in shaping the business preferences for employment 
protection (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001).  Thelen notes:  
 
In fact, one recent strand of scholarship sees skills and skill formation systems as causally central to 
the development and articulation of social policy preferences generally, and thus foundational for the 
development and maintenance of different systems of social protection across the developed 
democracies (Thelen 2004: 4).   
 
The works on the formation of skills suggest that different types of skills are associated 
with different product market strategies, which affect how employers perceive employment 
protection.  The postwar German vocational training system has been based on the 
apprenticeship designed to certify high craft skills and employers’ strong commitment to in-plant 
training of workers.  This system has produced abundant workers with firm-specific skills to 
pursue a high-quality product market strategy.  Thus, German employers see it economically 
beneficial not to freely lay off workers they trained because employment insecurity can damage 
workers’ willingness to invest in firm-specific skills and the product market strategy based on 
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this type of skills.  Hall and Soskice underline the benefits employment protection brings to 
German employers as follows: 
 
The complement to these institutions at the company level is a system of works councils composed 
of elected employee representatives endowed with considerable authority over layoffs and working 
conditions.  By providing employees with security against arbitrary layoffs or changes to their 
working conditions, these works councils encourage employees to invest in company-specific skills 
and extra effort (Hall and Soskice 2001: 25). 
 
However, Hall and Soskice (2001) left unaddressed the origin of economic institutions.  
We do not know yet much about where Germany’s employment protection legislation came 
from.  More specifically, it has not been examined when the “package” of economic institutions 
the varieties-of-capitalism literature emphasizes was historically formed in Germany and 
whether the degree of employment protection publicly mandated significantly varied in 
association with the formation of German capitalism.  Furthermore, although the varieties-of-
capitalism theorists tend to argue that major German employers would not be interested in the 
fundamental cutback of current employment protection system because their industrial 
competitiveness is based on stable employment relations (Thelen 2000; Thelen and Van 
Wijnbergen 2003), they do not explain why the same German employers vehemently opposed 
the policy change that would enable works councils to interfere with managerial prerogatives 
over employment and production during the Weimar Republic, why they subverted the industrial 
relations system by supporting the Nazi regime, and why in 1951 they sought to undo the parity 
codetermination set to the statute by the Occupied Allies, although the economic conditions the 
varieties-of-capitalism literature considers as important for employment protection were already 
in place.      
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The critique of the varieties-of-capitalism argument is two-fold.  First, Hall and Soskice’s 
institutional complementarity thesis provides a strong explanation for why it is hard to retrench 
strong employment protection in CMEs, but it does not perform as well in explaining the rise of 
employment protection because they left unaddressed the origin of employment protection.  
From the varieties-of-capitalism argument, we still do not know when and how the national 
pattern of employment protection was formed.  One possible strategy to fill this theoretical gap, 
which Hall and Soskice failed to deliver, is to examine when the “package” of economic 
institutions the varieties-of-capitalism literature emphasizes was historically formed in a country 
and whether the degree of employment protection publicly mandated significantly varied in 
association with the formation of capitalist institutions in that country.   
The second critique is empirical.  The varieties-of-capitalism argument does not explain 
how the United States came to have extraordinarily weak employment protection, often called 
“employment at will,” in contrast to other LMEs.  This employment-at-will regime is not 
generally found in LMEs.  For example, the United Kingdom, another LME case, traditionally 
required reasonable notice for no-fault dismissal, whereas the United States embraced the at-will 
employment law in lieu of the English rule (DeGiuseppe 1981, 4-6).  The divergence between 
these two Anglo-American countries increased when the United Kingdom created a series of 
employment protection legislation after World War II.13   
                                                 
13 The Redundancy Payments Act 1965 required employers to provide financial compensation for those severed 
from jobs due to mass layoffs (Root 1987).  The Contracts of Employment Act 1972 strengthened the term of notice 
to be observed before dismissals (C.D.D. 1972).  The Employment Protection Act 1975 introduced employers’ duty 
to consult with labor unions over redundancies (Freedland 1976; K.W.W. 1976).  These three laws were 
consolidated into the Employment Protection Act 1978.   
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2.1.4 Political institutionalist argument 
The political institutionalist approach to social and labor policy is a relatively recent 
development in comparative political economy.  Comparative political scientists in this approach 
stress the importance of political institutions in making some countries redistribute more than 
others.  Major political institutional variables comparative works on this subject take are the 
difference between majoritarian and consensus political systems (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; 
Crepaz and Moser 2004), electoral systems (Persson 2002; Iversen and Soskice 2006)) and 
centralized versus decentralized constitutional structures (Swank 2001; Castles 2004).  Also 
there has been an increasing effort to apply the veto players theory to analyze social and labor 
policy (Bonoli 2001; Tsbelis 2002), although the veto players theory is more useful to explain 
the magnitude of changes in existing policies rather than their origins.  In the context of less 
developed countries, Rudra and Haggard (2005) focus on the effect of a democratic political 
regime where redistributive policy is determined by majority rule, based on the insight from 
Meltzer and Richards (1981).   
However, the current research with a political institutional approach focuses on 
redistributive issues.  The roles of political institutions in the establishment of employment 
protection have been little studied.  The crucial difference between employment protection and 
redistributive policies is that the latter requires government’s financial commitment because it 
aims to transfer incomes from the rich to the needy through taxation, but the former does not.  
Employment protection aims to reduce the risk of becoming unemployed by limiting the 
manager’s right to fire workers, while unemployment compensation seeks to relieve the hardship 
of being unemployed.  Therefore, although the assumption of taxation plays an important role in 
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explaining redistributive policies by the existing literature based on the median voter theory (See 
Iversen and Soskice 2006), taxation does not matter in the politics of employment protection.   
Further, the current literature about the effect of constitutional structures on welfare states 
does not consider how different types of federalism affect social and labor policy outcomes.14  
For example, although American federalism is clearly distinguished from German federalism for 
students of comparative federalism, the current political institutional literature about welfare 
states rarely considers this important distinction in explaining welfare states.  This study seeks to 
bridge between the political economy literature about welfare states and the study of comparative 
federalism.  
2.2 THE ROLE OF COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS   
2.2.1 Definition of CMPIs 
This study focuses on the role political institutions play in shaping employment protection.  I 
build on the institutional literature about the development of American welfare states to develop 
a theoretical framework to explain the origin of employment protection.  I argue that counter-
majoritarian political institutions (CMPIs) constrain the rise of employment protection.  CMPIs 
are constitutionally designed to limit the rule by the majority or the government policy-making in 
response to popular pressure.  Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn (2001: 9) said: “Opportunism by 
the national government is best constrained by fragmenting power at the national level.”  The 
                                                 
14 One notable exception is Obinger, Leibfried, and Castles (2005). 
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fragmentation of national power may be accomplished in three ways: the horizontal division of 
power, the territorial division of power, and the delegation of specific policy authority to experts.   
The horizontal division of power introduces checks and balances between different 
branches within the national government.  But particularly important in the counter-majoritarian 
context is the division between political branches (executive and legislative bodies) and the 
judiciary, or an independent judiciary, because the same political majority may control both 
executive and legislative bodies following elections.   
The territorial division of power relates to federalism.  It provides divisions of power 
between levels of government, that is, between the national government and state governments.  
One of the major institutional characteristics of federalism is that different levels of governments 
rule the same people in the same territory.  The conventional definition of federalism strictly 
divides the jurisdictions of different levels of governments, emphasizing elements of regional 
self-rule (Wheare 1964).  However, the contemporary definition tends to see that elements of 
shared-rule between different levels of governments are also essential to federal arrangements 
(Riker 1975; Watts 1996).15    
Finally, a political system may create CMPIs by delegating specific policy authority to 
bureaucratic institutions.  This is increasingly found in the area of monetary policy in which 
politically independent central banks composed of financial experts decide on the supply of 
money and credit to the economy.  However, this kind of CMPI has not been found in the area of 
social and labor policy.      
                                                 
15 Riker says, “Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between 
regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on 
which it makes final decisions… the essential institutions of federalism are … a government of federation and a set 
of governments of the member units in which both kinds of governments rule over the same territory and 
people and each kind has the authority to make some decisions independently of the other” (emphasis in bold 
and italic added by author) (Riker 1975: 101) 
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 I will use federalism and an independent judiciary as indicators of CMPIs.  I take these 
two institutional factors together because the current political institutional literature suggests that 
there is a close association between federalism and an independent judiciary (Lijphart 1999: 187-
188; Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn 2001; Tsebelis 2002: 143).  The reason might be that a 
federal system necessitates an independent judiciary to resolve jurisdictional disputes among 
multiple centers of power.  Yet the analysis of why federal systems tend to produce greater 
judicial power is not an objective of this research. 
2.2.2 Theoretical background of CMPIs 
Modern political thinkers dealt with judicial independence and federalism as important 
constraints on the power of the majority.  Montesquieu first argued in his Spirit of the Laws that 
the judiciary should be independent of both the executive and the legislative branches to 
constrain the “momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the state” 
(Montesquieu 1989, 2-4).  While Montesquieu contemplated the division of power in a 
monarchical system, later thinkers focused on the roles of independent judiciary and federalism 
in a democratic political context.  James Madison raised a fundamental concern about the 
mischief of democracy in The Federalist No. 10:   
“Complaints are everywhere heard … that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is 
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and measures are too often decided, not according to the 
rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and 
overbearing majority.” (p. 54) 
 
As a cure for this defect of democracy, Alexander Hamilton espoused the need for the 
power of judicial review in The Federalist, No. 78.  He argued that the independence of the 
judiciary from the other branches and its power to declare legislation in violation of the 
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constitution to be void are essential to protect minority rights against the majority controlling the 
legislative and executive branches.  Later, Tocqueville also explicitly recognized the role of 
strong judiciary in mitigating democratic vices.  In Democracy in America he saw the strong 
judiciary as a bulwark against the tyranny of the majority and a stabilizer of political order in the 
United States.     
In the same vein, Madison suggested the use of federalism designed to provide a check 
against the tyranny of the majority.  In The Federalist, No. 10 he supported a large republic, by 
which he meant a federal system, over a small republic as a way to prevent the majority faction 
of the society from monopolizing the popular government to advance its own interests.  In The 
Federalist, No. 51 he explicitly mentioned the counter-majoritarian nature of federalism.  He saw 
that federalism would provide an enhanced security for civil liberty against the government via 
checks and balances between different levels of government in addition to those between 
different branches within the government.  He also argued that a federal system was superior to a 
unitary system in constraining the majority because it absorbed such diverse and divided social 
interests that it would be very improbable to form a unified majority of the whole.   
The horizontal and territorial divisions of power became the major character of American 
political system.  When Dahl (1956) dubbed this political system Madisonian democracy as 
opposed to populistic democracy, he considered the prevention of the tyranny of the majority to 
be a basic rationale for the fragmentation of power characterizing the American political system.  
Pioneering works were done by researchers of American political development who paid special 
attention to the constraining effect of fragmented constitutional structures on the development of 
American welfare state.  Their research presents how federalism (Lowi 1984; Gordon 1994; 
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Pierson 1995; Robertson 2000) and the strong judiciary (Orren 1991; Hattam 1993) hampered 
the legislative efforts to bring comprehensive regulations of national labor markets.   
More recently, comparative political scientists began to study explicitly CMPIs (Lijphart 
1999; Armingeon 2002).  Lijphart uses the executives-parties dimension and the federal-unitary 
dimension to classify democratic political systems.  Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension is 
closely related with Dahl’s distinction between Madisonian democracy and populistic democracy 
because it comprises major CMPIs such as federalism, judicial review, and central bank 
independence.  On the contrary, his executives-parties dimension mainly concerns electoral 
systems and has little to do with CMPIs, although political scientists often dub the first-past-the-
post (FPTP) electoral system as a majoritarian system.  Pure democracy means majority rule 
(Meltzer and Richards 1981), whether power is exercised by a single party under the FPTP 
system or coalition parties under PR.  The role of CMPIs is to constrain this majority rule.     
2.2.3 Social preferences of employment protection 
Who supports employment protection and who opposes it?  In distributive politics, the old 
political economy literature focused on the conflict between capital and labor (Korpi 1983; 
Esping-Andersen 1990).  However, the new political economy literature pays attention to the 
divergent interests of employers (Mares 2000, 2003) or the cleavage inside labor comprising 
workers with different levels and types of skills (Iversen 2006).  Do these within-class divisions 
matter for employment protection?  If so, how do they matter? 
I argue that the divergent-interests-thesis on employer’s side is misleading because it 
does not distinguish employment protection as government regulation of labor markets from 
employers’ voluntary retention of skilled workers.  As the new political economy literature 
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argues, employers tend to restrain layoffs if they actively invest in the skills of their employees 
because they want to keep skilled workers they trained from wandering off during downturns.  
However, their preferences for long-term employment relations do not necessarily ensure their 
support for the government regulation of layoff.  First, employment protection protects low skill 
workers as well as high skill workers, although employers tend to see the employment of the 
former as fluid and replaceable.  Second, private employers may well see employment protection 
as the government interference with their right to manage because employers’ control over 
employment matters is critical to their control over workplaces and also determines the ability of 
employers to initiate changes in production technologies and locations.   
The final reason why employment protection gives more harms than benefits even to 
employers who invest in the skills of their employees is that employment protection creates a 
division between incumbent workers (the “insiders”) and job seekers (the “outsiders”) in labor 
markets (Lindbeck and Snower 1988; Saint-Paul 1996; Rueda 2005).  Employment protection 
strengthens the bargaining power of insiders over outsiders in wage negotiations because of 
firing costs, and it increases wage pressures.      
On the contrary, the division-within-labor hypothesis provides an important insight to 
understand how workers differentiated by occupations and skills would see employment 
protection.  Table 1 draws from Iversen’s classification of types of workers.  Low-skill industrial 
workers would most strongly support employment protection because they are most vulnerable 
to job loss during downturns.  They are easily replaceable due to their low skills, and once they 
are displaced their firm-specific skill profiles limit their chances of finding jobs in other firms 
and may bring them into to long-term unemployment.  Low-skill service workers tend to have 
greater mobility between firms and jobs, but they would also support employment protection 
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because they expect that employment protection will not only improve their job security but also 
raise wages and benefits by making it difficult to fire them.  High-skill industrial workers dislike 
layoffs because the kind of skill they have invested in is firm-specific.  However, their gains 
from employment protection might not be significant because they already enjoy greater job 
security and higher wages than their low-skill colleagues.  Finally, demand for employment 
protection will be lowest among white-collar workers such as administrative and managerial 
workers and engineers because their jobs are relatively secure and also they tend to have strong 
identification with their employers.   
 
Table 1  Types of Workers in the Private Sector 
Source: Iversen (2006: 4) 
                  Level of skill (income) 
  Low High 
Specific Low-skill industrial workers 
High-skill 
industrial workers Type of skill 
General Low-skill service workers Managers and  professionals 
 
Political support from low-skill workers is not a sufficient condition for bringing 
employment protection in a democracy.  In a democratic political system, where employment 
protection is determined by majority rule, the middle class will play a crucial role as a decisive 
voter (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2006).  The meaning of the middle class 
varies among scholars, but they tend to agree that white-collar workers are central to the middle 
class (Mills 1953; Kocka 1980).  Traditionally, blue-collar workers were not considered as 
middle-class.  In terms of income, however, high-skill industrial workers might belong to the 
middle class as well.  In Table 1, therefore, the level of skill or income distinguishes the middle-
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class workers from the lower-class workers.  The former includes high-skill blue-collar workers 
and white-collar workers, while the latter encompasses low-skill blue-collar and service workers. 
Business and labor historians show that employers traditionally provided greater job 
security, higher earnings, and generous corporate welfare benefits to white-collar workers than to 
blue-collar workers (Kocka 1980; McColloch 1983; Speier 1986).  White-collar workers were 
paid by salary and therefore their jobs were less dependent upon market fluctuations than waged, 
blue-collar workers.  In the United States before the Great Depression, white-collar workers were 
exempt from layoffs and enjoyed paid vacations and pensions that were unavailable to blue-
collar workers (Jacoby 1997: 11).  These privileges of white-collar workers were not simply 
compensations for their skills, but they were also the inducements for these workers to play as 
shields against industrial proletariats.  In Germany before World War II, for example, middle-
class workers tended to have antipathy toward socialism even in favor of Nazism (Speier 1986; 
Suh 2002: 115).16  White-collar workers with a blue-collar social background regarded their 
positions as an ascent (Speier 1986: 55).   
Iversen and Soskice (2006) suggest that the middle class has dual incentives on 
redistribution: they want to ally with the poor to exploit the rich but they also want to ally with 
the rich to exploit the poor.  Likewise, white-collar workers could make alliance with blue-collar 
workers on employment protection to increase their job security.  However, the marginal utility 
of introducing employment protection is not significant to middle-class workers because their 
employment is relatively secure.  Instead, middle-class workers could oppose employment 
protection because it could empower proletariat organizations, raise blue-collar wages and 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that the division between clerks and other white-collar workers at higher levels became rigid 
during the 1950s and ‘60s because skill-biased technological changes such as office automation increasingly 
routinized clerical jobs.  The result was that most clerical and administrative workers were degraded to low-skilled, 
white-collar proletariats (Crompton and Jones 1984).    
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benefits, and eventually give downward pressures on white-collar earnings and benefits.  
Therefore, the solidarity across the collar and skill lines is not always achieved although it 
crucially affects the degree of popular pressures for employment protection.    
Building upon Iversen and Soskice’s argument, I argue that the strategic alliance for 
employment protection between middle-class and lower-class workers is likely to emerge if one 
of the following two conditions is met.  First, strong labor unions for white-collar workers and 
craftsmen will play an important role in reducing middle-class workers’ antipathy toward 
employment protection.  If middle-class workers are better-organized, they will worry less about 
the boomerang effect of employment protection on their salaries and benefits because their 
independent unions will constrain white-collar cutbacks.  In addition, strong left parties will help 
integrating labor movements across collar and skill lines.  The key to the success of integrating 
labor movements consists in the party’s ability to facilitate the negotiated outcome between 
white-collar and blue-collar labor organizations in which the former provides support for 
employment protection and the latter gives up the socialization of firms.   
Second, if economic downturns hit only low-skill workers, middle-class workers would 
not have a need for employment protection.  However, massive unemployment shocks that affect 
middle-class workers as well will deteriorate their perception of job insecurity and increase their 
marginal utility of introducing employment protection.  Therefore, the rising risk of middle-class 
job loss will induce these workers to support employment protection.   
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2.2.4 CMPIs and employment protection: The hypothesis 
The 1896 German Civil Code that required employers to give advance notice before firing 
workers is one of the oldest employment protection laws in history, although its degree of 
protection was very weak compared with contemporary standards.  In most industrialized 
countries, the government protection of workers against dismissal has existed for a period not 
longer than a century.  Historically, countries had times when the employer’s right to fire 
workers was not regulated by political power.  It was through industrialization and the formation 
of urban working classes that political elites began to face popular pressures for the government 
intervention in labor markets to constrain the employer’s right to fire workers.   
However, the degree and timing of introducing employment protection varied across 
countries, although different countries faced similar pressure to regulate dismissals.  For 
example, although white-collar labor movements were weak, craft unions withered away, and 
social democratic parties failed to threaten the two-party system in the United States, 
unemployment shocks have occasionally jeopardized the job security of the American middle 
class.  The Great Depression affected white-collar jobs, although it hit blue-collar workers 
harder.  During the few decades between the New Deal and the early 1970s, layoffs were largely 
inflicted upon low-skill blue-collar workers, executed based on a seniority rule, and they were 
only temporary layoffs in which the date for a recall to work was specified.  When the postwar 
economic boom ended, however, layoffs increasingly became permanent job losses hurting even 
high-skill blue-collar workers and white-collar workers found themselves no longer immune to 
layoffs (Time 1970; McColloch 1983: 156).  As American firms were entangled in the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions linked to the rise of maximizing shareholder values since the 1980s, 
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managerial and professional workers finally became victims of mass layoffs widely accepted as a 
standard strategy in American business (Uchitelle 2006).   
Nevertheless, the United States currently provides only minimal legal protection against 
layoffs to workers.  The advance notice requirement in the 1988 federal legislation is too modest 
and has too many exemptions to reduce permanent layoffs.  Unlike German employers, 
American employers still have no legal obligation to bargain with workers on plant-closing 
decisions and they are not compelled to bargain with non-unionized workers on layoff decisions.    
Politicians might introduce employment protection to win elections when there are 
popular pressures to regulate the business freedom of layoffs, no matter how hard business may 
oppose.  But the extent to which the logic of electoral politics affects government regulation of 
layoff depends on the characters of political system that either amplify or reduce popular 
pressures to curb employers’ freedom of layoff.  Strong CMPIs produce a high degree of 
fragmentation of powers and prevent any political groups who aspired to winning majority votes 
in elections from pushing through popular policies.  As I previously discussed, the degree of 
popular pressures for employment protection depends on the power resources of labor and/or the 
risk of middle-class job loss.  Thus, CMPIs are a condition variable constraining the power 
resources of labor AND the job security of middle-class workers.  My working hypothesis is that 
the stronger political power of labor and the greater risk of middle-class job loss lead to stronger 
employment protection, but only if CMPIs are weak.  Figure 2 highlights these causal 
relationships in my model.  I consider federalism and judicial review as two major elements of 
CMPIs.  I will show how these institutions affect employment protection in the following 
discussion. 
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 Figure 2 The Theoretical Model 
 
2.2.4.1 Varieties of federalism and employment protection 
Unitary political systems concentrate political power in the central government, while federal 
political systems disperse it to constituent states.  Therefore, if the strategic alliance between 
blue-collar and white-collar workers is formed on employment protection under unitary systems, 
the policy preference of this political force will be a powerful predictor of employment 
protection because political parties representing this policy preference will constitute the 
majority in the national government.  However, even if workers are united for employment 
protection, the national majority based on united workers will be constrained if labor legislation 
is decentralized.  
There is abundant literature showing that if labor legislation is decentralized to states of a 
federation and capital is mobile across the states, there emerges a collective action problem that 
forestalls state-level regulations of labor (Pierson 1995; Weingast 1995; Thomas 2000).  
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Business investment is important to state policy-makers because it catalyzes industrial 
development, reduce unemployment, increase per capita income, and raise state tax revenues.  
Since mobile capital can choose states that do not limit the managerial freedom of making 
dismissals, individual states would have the incentive not to establish employment protection so 
that they can induce more business investment.  Thomas (2000: 9) says, “The cost of not offering 
location subsidies when other jurisdictions are doing so is lost investment.”  Likewise, the cost of 
introducing employment protection when other states are not doing so might be lost investment.  
Therefore, this inter-state competition for capital makes it unlikely that employment protection is 
introduced at state levels.    
In addition to the decentralization of labor legislation, fiscal sovereignty compounds the 
problem of inter-state competition for capital.  Rodden (2006: 8-9) points out how different 
structures of intergovernmental fiscal relations affect the fiscal behaviors of subnational 
governments.  He argues that fiscal institutions focusing subnational governments’ independent 
local taxation will prevent them from having bailout expectations and therefore will help 
establish fiscal discipline in the overall federal system.   
This fiscal federalism literature has an important implication for inter-state competition 
for capital.  The fiscal federalism emphasizing fiscal sovereignty of subnational governments 
provides both incentives and tools for inter-jurisdictional competition for capital.  Fiscal 
sovereignty will embolden the disutility of low business investment for state policy-makers 
because they rely on independent tax bases for providing public goods to their constituents.  
Moreover, fiscally sovereign units can use lower corporate taxes and location subsidies to attract 
business investment.   
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However, if states lack independent tax bases and rely on grants and revenue sharing, 
they will be less interested in inter-state competition for capital because their expectation of 
bailouts from the center will reduce the disutility of low investment.  Further, states will not have 
effective fiscal instruments to use in competing with other states for capital without independent 
tax bases.       
While the decentralization of labor legislation and fiscal sovereignty promote inter-state 
competition for capital, these two elements are not commonly found in all federal systems, but 
they are characteristics of a specific type of federalism.  Students of comparative federalism 
suggest that there are two different types of federalism (Braun 2000; Obinger, Castles, and 
Leibfried 2005; Burgess 2006).  The Anglo-American type (“competitive federalism”) is based 
on a jurisdictional division of power in which constituent states possess executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers semi-autonomous from the central government.  Therefore, the central 
authority and the state authority are parallel under the Anglo-American type, and subnational 
governments have independent tax bases underpinning their policy autonomy.  On the contrary, 
the Continental European type (“interlocked federalism”) promotes a functional division of 
power in which the central government has the power to decide and the constituent states possess 
the power to implement centrally chosen decisions.  But it should be noted that the constituent 
states may directly participate in the decision-making at the central level through the federal 
chamber of the national legislature.  The central authority and the state authority are not parallel 
but interlocked, and extensive revenue sharing schemes have been developed to finance 
operations under interlocked jurisdictions.   
To sum up, the national majority supporting employment protection is not constrained 
under unitary systems.  Federal systems could constrain the rise of employment protection 
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through inter-state competition for capital, which is effective only under the Anglo-American 
type of federalism.    
2.2.4.2 Judicial review and employment protection 
The politically independent judiciary is another pillar of CMPIs.  Alexander Bickel (1962) 
pointed to the “countermajoritarian difficulty” judicial review created, when he wrote:  “when 
the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it 
exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it” (Bickel 1962: 16–17).   
Recently, there has been criticism that the U.S. Supreme Court, traditionally conceived as 
a counter-majoritarian institution, has in fact made decisions in response to public opinion 
(Mishler and Sheehan 1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004).  However, this critique is limited 
because it does not empirically show that public opinion has direct AND contemporaneous 
effects on Supreme Court decisions.  Mishler and Sheehan’s justices follow public opinion with 
average 5 years’ time lag.  This long time lag weakens their claim that Supreme Court decisions 
reflect popular influence on the Supreme Court.  McGuire and Stimson find a contemporaneous 
effect of public opinion, but they fail to determine the extent to which the effect of public 
opinion is mediated by the political appointment of the Court justices and the change in the 
prevailing ideology on the Court.   
But the effect of the independent judiciary on a specific policy issue such as employment 
protection is complex.  It cannot be determined without considering additional factors.  First, it 
has been established that the ideologies of U.S. Supreme Court justices profoundly affect their 
decisions (see Segal and Spaeth 1993).  If judges are rightist, they are more likely to use judicial 
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review to bust pro-labor legislation such as employment protection.  But if leftist judges prevail 
in the court, the independent judiciary will support employment protection.   
Another factor that influences the choices of judges with the power of judicial review of 
employment protection legislation is the prevailing ideology of the founders of the constitution 
they seek to protect.  If the constitution is based on free market liberalism, the judges will be able 
to use their power of judicial review to limit employment protection when they face a left or 
populist government.  In contrast, if the constitution recognizes the legislative power of 
government for the protection of labor, even the independent judiciary will have few options but 
to accept employment protection legislation as constitutional.      
2.2.5 Democracy, dictatorship, and employment protection 
Are democracies prone to greater employment protection than dictatorships?  Because 
employment protection has the effect of redistribution of income between workers and their 
employers, this question might be examined in view of the vast literature about the political 
regime type and redistribution.  The current political economic literature inspired by the median-
voter theory (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and the rent-seeking theory (Tullock 1967) tends to 
associate greater redistribution from the rich to the poor with democracies than dictatorships.  
Recently Rudra and Haggard suggest, “electoral competition and, particularly, interest group 
pressures might drive democracies to be more concerned than nondemocracies about the poor” 
(Rudra and Haggard 2005: 1042).  By contrast, defining “redistribution” in a non-conventional 
way, Wintrobe argues that dictatorships tend to redistribute more than democracies because their 
political base of support is typically insecure and they do this in a regressive term by “adopting 
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measures which transfer rights over the control of labor from labor to capital” (Wintrobe 1998: 
161).   
The argument that democracies are more prone to employment protection than 
dictatorships implicitly assumes that dictatorships are counter-majoritarian by nature.   The 
institutional characteristics of dictatorships might be seen to suppress the majority demand for 
employment protection.  Dictatorships are political systems in which the policy preference of one 
or a few always prevails over other citizens’ preferences.  Further, dictators either eliminate or 
control electoral competition to avoid real challenges from oppositions.  Dictators do not commit 
themselves to the majority rule, although it could be possible that they mobilize political support 
from a majority of citizens for the dictatorship regimes as in the origin of the German Nazi 
regime.   
However, I argue that dictatorships are not necessarily associated with either weak or 
strong CMPIs although dictators have greater capacity to act against the will of many than 
democratic leaders do.  If dictator’s policy position deviates from the rest of people, the 
dictatorship is more likely to behave as a CMPI.  However, it is also possible that a dictator seek 
to win loyal support from a majority of citizens by giving them rewards.  In that case, the 
preference of the majority backed by the dictator will be forcefully implemented without 
considering minority interests.  Therefore, dictatorships could be extremely majoritarian at times. 
Since the relationship between dictatorships and CMPIs is mixed, the difference that a 
dictatorship makes on employment protection will hinge upon the preference of the dictator for 
employment protection and the degree of political openness of the dictatorship regime.  First, 
right-wing dictatorships will provide less employment protection than left-wing dictatorships.  
Employment protection is likely to be weaker (or stronger) in a rightist (leftist) dictatorship than 
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in a pure democracy where employment protection is determined by the majority rule, but a 
strongly counter-majoritarian democracy might have employment protection as weak as a right-
wing dictatorship.   
Second, dictatorships vary in terms of the level of oppression (Wintrobe 1998; Linz 
2000).  In totalitarian regimes where the official state-party led by the dictator purges the 
political scene of contenders political power seeks to penetrate into even the private sphere of 
individuals.  But, bureaucratic authoritarian regimes allow limited political competition and tend 
not to interfere with private freedoms.  The more oppressive the dictatorship is, the less 
constrained the influence of the dictator on employment protection will be.  Therefore, greater 
oppression will further reduce employment protection in the right-wing dictatorship, while it will 
bring greater employment protection in the left-wing dictatorship.  A right-wing totalitarian state 
such as Nazism will have weaker employment protection than a left-wing totalitarian state such 
as communism.   
2.3  METHODOLOGY 
I trace the origins of employment protection in the United States and Germany since the late 
nineteenth century and in South Korea since the 1960s.  Students conducting this kind of small-n 
research confront two major methodological questions.  The first question is whether the cases 
chosen are free of selection bias.  King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 128-149) warn that selecting 
observations on explanatory variables, dependent variables, or both explanatory and dependent 
variables will bias the result.  I choose these three countries because they represent three worlds 
of capitalism.  Hall and Soskice (2001) selected the United States and Germany to represent 
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liberal market capitalism and coordinated market capitalism respectively.  I build upon Hall and 
Soskice’s case selection in order to test the causal validity of the varieties-of-capitalism 
argument on employment protection.  But I add South Korea because my preliminary 
information of the country shows that Hall and Soskice’s dichotomy of capitalism does not 
account for the kind of capitalism that has prevailed in the country for the most of its history (See 
Table 23 of this dissertation).  South Korea before the 1997 financial crisis deserves to be labeled 
as “statist capitalism” because the role of state in building capitalist institutions from corporate 
finance to skill formation was overwhelming.  It is of great interest to see how the state as an 
entrepreneur and planner of the economy dealt with employment protection that might have 
potentially hurt business competitiveness and also to see where this kind of capitalism is going 
after it was attributed to the 1997 financial crisis.  
The second methodological question is whether comparing the three countries evokes the 
problem of underdetermination: a situation where there are more inferences to make than 
observations.  King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 221) provide a useful suggestion to increase the 
number of observations, especially by making multiple observations over time within a case.  I 
follow exactly this strategy.  A simple cross-country comparison would not be able to 
discriminate between competing hypotheses, especially the varieties-of-capitalism argument.  To 
examine the causal validity of the varieties-of-capitalism argument it is necessary to compare 
different time periods within each case because this method will show whether there was a 
fundamental change in employment protection while the nation’s basic capitalist economic 
institutions were constant.  Therefore, this study uses both cross-case and within-case 
comparisons.  The American case includes three observations: pre-New Deal period, the New 
Deal period, and the 1970s and ‘80s.  The German case also provides four observations: the 
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Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the immediate postwar period, and the 1970s.  The 
Korean case consists of three observations: dictatorship periods (1961-1987), the decade after 
democratization, and the post-1997 economic crisis period.   
Are these observations independent?  If there are perfect feedback effects of initial 
observations within individual countries, making multiple observations over time will be of no 
use because the initial observations are the only observations needed to make causal inferences.  
Although it is possible that there might be a degree of feedback effect, my research design does 
not expect complete dependency among observations because the observations made under the 
study are distinguished by major historic events such as economic crises, wars, and political 
regime changes.  But I will demonstrate that employment protection at tn is not determined by 
employment protection at t0, but it is a result of the interplay between cross-class coalitions and 
political institutions at tn in the empirical chapters. 
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3.0  THE RISE OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED 
STATES BEFORE WORLD WAR II 
Anchoring its control over wages and hours, as over all labor matters, was management’s absolute 
right of discharge.    --- Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism, 1991. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The labor-management relations are at the heart of a capitalist system.  Laws governing 
employment relationships are divergent across industrial countries and they shape capitalist 
systems of different types.  From a comparative point of view, what is peculiar to the American 
experience throughout the twentieth century is that American firms implemented layoffs for 
flexible labor market adjustment, while German and Japanese firms sought to stabilize the level 
of employment through spreading available work (Houseman and Abraham 1995; Jacoby 2005).   
The established practice of flexible reduction of workforce in the United States coincides 
with the lack of legal protection of workers against layoffs with only a few exceptions.  
American employers have legally fired workers without advance notice for a good reason, a bad 
reason, or no reason at all, unless the dismissal violates labor contracts or provisions of specific 
statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Civil Rights Act.  This employment-at-
will law, a common-law theory peculiar to the United States, has governed the employment 
relations in the United States for more than a century.  The employment-at-will law constitutes 
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an important part of the so-called American exceptionalism in which the United States is 
standing apart from the employment practices of other industrialized democracies. 
The employment-at-will as a practice had existed since the making of the United States 
(Orren 1991), but it became a predominant rule governing the termination of employment after 
Horace Wood articulated this rule in 1877 (Shapiro and Tune 1974; Feinman 1976; DeGiuseppe 
1981).  Many scholars have argued that the American labor movement in the late nineteenth 
century was politically active as much as the European labor (Foner 1984; Wilentz 1984; 
Montgomery 1987; Hattam 1993; Voss 1993).    Labor groups such as the Knights of Labor 
pushed for progressive labor legislation that would change the hostile environment to labor 
movement.  Further, even after the American labor movement took the current pattern of 
development at the turn of the century, American workers could still influence politicians by 
electoral votes to enact a degree of legal restrictions on the termination of employment at will.  
In fact, the U.S. Congress and state legislatures were not entirely hostile to labor on the issue of 
labor discharge.    
The puzzle to be explained, then, is why the employment-at-will doctrine became the 
fundamental principle of employment relations in the United States as it did by the early 
twentieth century.  This paper seeks to answer how the United States has established the most 
laissez-faire system of employment protection among industrial countries by examining the 
American history from the 1870s through the 1930s.  My argument is that the adoption of the 
employment-at-will doctrine can be best accounted for by the two strong counter-majoritarian 
political institutions, the federal political system based on inter-state competition and the 
politically independent judges in the Supreme Court who were imbued with free-market 
capitalism.   
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The regulatory prowess of the U.S. federal government was severely constrained during 
the period until the mid-1930s.  The constitutional division of power placed labor at a further 
disadvantage compared to employers.  The American federalism has been underpinned by a 
written constitution and politically independent judiciary claiming the authority of reviewing the 
constitutionality of legislation.  This unique political structure provided a useful opportunity for 
employers to make void federal and state legislation limiting their freedom to dismiss workers 
through litigation.  In response to employers’ litigation, the judges of federal and state courts 
determined to promote business interests consistently busted government intervention in labor 
markets.  The role of courts as the defender of freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise 
narrowed the policy agenda for labor law reform in the New Deal period, forestalling the 
Roosevelt government from challenging the core of employment-at-will doctrine.    
3.2 THE RISE OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE, 1877-1914  
It was in 1877 that Horace Wood published a treatise presenting the basic idea of employment-
at-will.  It was the year when the Great Railroad Strike occurred.  Before Wood wrote his 
treatise, the employment-at-will had not been a well-established legal doctrine in the United 
States.  Unlike Wood’s claim, court decisions on employment termination were inconsistent and 
rules governing the termination of employment were still in the air (Shapiro and Tune 1974, 340-
341; Feinman 1976, 126; DeGiuseppe 1981, 6).17  However, after his treatise was published, his 
                                                 
17 Ballam (1996) opposes the traditional view, arguing that Wood’s rule reflected the legal practice of the day.  As 
Jacoby (1982) suggested, however, Wood may genuinely have omitted a few court decisions that did not accept the 
employment at will.  On this debatable issue, it would suffice to note that courts’ views before 1877 were at most 
nebulous and the employment-at-will doctrine became clearly predominant later on.    
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rule gained judicial support and almost every state court adopted his rule by 1909. 
 There is literature that employment protection in the Unite States is weak because it is a 
common law country like United Kingdom (Djankov et al. 2004).  Yet Wood in fact suggested 
the employment-at-will doctrine in order to distinguish the American rule from the English rule.  
He wrote: 
 
“In England it is held that a general hiring, or a hiring by the terms of which no time is fixed, is a 
hiring for a year… With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a 
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to 
establish it by proof… unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a 
certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either 
party.” (Wood  1877: Section 134) 
 
Unlike the English rule that indefinite contracts were presumed to have one-year term 
and therefore reasonable notice of termination was needed, Wood suggested, the law in the 
United States presumed any indefinite term contract to be terminable at will by either employer 
or employee.  This American rule of employment-at-will became the primary doctrine governing 
employment termination in almost every state by the beginning of the twentieth century (Shapiro 
and Tune 1974, 342; DeGiuseppe 1981, 6).  For example, New York Supreme Court adopted the 
rule by citing Wood as follows: 
“The decision on this point in the lower courts have not been uniform, but we think the rule is 
correctly stated by Mr. Wood and it has been adopted in a number of states…. It follows, therefore, 
that the hiring of the plaintiff was a hiring at will and the defendant was at liberty to terminate the 
same at any time.”18     
  
While state courts accepted Wood’s rule, federal and state legislatures enacted legislation 
limiting the employer’s right to terminate employment at will.  In 1887, the State of New York 
enacted legislation that imposed criminal penalties on employers who discharged employees 
                                                 
18 Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). 
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because of union membership.  Twenty-one states followed New York to pass similar legislation 
outlawing discriminating against union members (Jacoby 1982, 122).  Congress also passed the 
Erdman Act in 1898 to punish interstate railroad companies that discharged workers due to union 
membership.   
However, the state and federal supreme courts declared all these laws unconstitutional in 
cases between 1895 and 1924 (Jacoby 1982, 122).  Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions are 
noteworthy because they present the rationale of the employment-at-will doctrine.  In Adair v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the 1898 Erdman Act. 19   
Subsequently in Coppage v. Kansas, the Court declared unconstitutional state legislation that 
forbade employers to require their employees not to be members of unions.20  In those cases, the 
Court upheld the employment-at-will doctrine on the basis of freedom of contract and freedom of 
enterprise as the essence of individual property right and further foreclosed federal legislation to 
limit employer’s right to dismiss employees.   
In sum, American workers in railroad industry and in many states were granted the legal 
protection against discharges because of being union members during the late nineteenth century.  
By the end of the First World War, these legislative measures were almost removed and the 
United States had a laissez-faire system of employment relations.  The constitutional principle of 
judicial review were used to reverse any legislative success in limiting the employment-at-will 
by a few judges, which frustrated labor groups in the United States and led them to adopt a 
strategy of business unionism. 
                                                 
19 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
20 Coppage v. Kansas, 136 U.S. 1 (1915). 
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3.3 ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
What are the interests of American firms underlying the employment-at-will doctrine like?  The 
recent political economy literature suggests that different political economic systems, classified 
as liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs), nurture 
different types of capital which adopt divergent business strategies toward labor (Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  According to this variety-of-capitalism literature, employers in CMEs tend to 
follow a production strategy based on long-term employment, while employers in LMEs tend to 
hire and fire workers more flexibly.  This section will examine the institutional characteristics of 
American capitalism in the early twentieth century and see whether and how capitalist 
institutions complement employers’ extensive resort to flexible layoffs.  
3.3.1 Inter-firm relations 
The varieties-of-capitalism literature stresses that institutions governing inter-firm relations 
induces firms to adopt different product-market strategies (Hall and Soskice 2001).  In Germany, 
firms resort to non-market coordination mechanisms in which inter-firm collaboration and strong 
industrial associations play a central role.  By contrast, firms in the United States seek market-
oriented strategies based on innovative product development and price competition (Casper 
2001: 389).   
The institutional foundation of the inter-firm relations as we currently observe in the 
United States was first laid down at the turn of the nineteenth century.  After the Civil War, the 
United States had embarked on a large scale of industrialization, moving from basic need 
industries based on small proprieties to heavy industries consisting of gigantic corporations.  
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Whereas the first industrialization in the early nineteenth century led to the rise of textile 
manufacturing predominantly in the New England region, the second industrialization in the 
latter half of the century transformed the American economy in terms of technology and 
production scale.  The railroad industry became the first nation-wide capital at the end of the 
1860s.  As Chandler (1977) suggested, the expansion of railroads integrated segregated local 
markets into the single national market and brought in large industries based on economies of 
scale.  In 1871, John D. Rockefeller established Standard Oil.  In 1875, Andrew Carnegie 
founded steel works near Pittsburgh, which eventually evolved into the Carnegie Steel Company. 
Similar to Germany, the United States during the 1880s was a cartel-ridden country.   
Major cartels with the purpose of setting prices were found in petroleum refining, cotton oil 
refining, linseed oil refining, whiskey distilling, sugar refining, and lead smelting and refining 
(Navin and Sears 1955).  However, as the U.S. federal government enacted a series of anti-trust 
laws underpinned strict interpretation by courts, American firms became entangled in cutthroat 
competition with their rivals in the same industry.  The Sherman Act of 1890 that prohibited 
cartels was a watershed in the U.S. competition policy.  Although firms were still able to merge 
into larger entities as a way to reduce competition, this strategy also became restricted by other 
key legislation enacted in 1914, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.  The 
rigorous U.S. anti-trust laws have prohibited various forms of non-market coordination from 
price-fixing agreements, mergers-and-acquisitions to exercise market dominance, interlocking 
boards of directors, to industrial associations with strong legal competencies.     
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3.3.2 Skill formation 
The United States did not develop systems of training for manual workers with firm-specific 
skills, but the U.S. government efforts to enhance education primarily focused on college-bound 
schools (Thelen 2004: Chapter 4).  As a result of the industrialization in late-nineteenth-century 
America, firms in the United States suffered the increasing scarcity of skilled workers as in other 
industrial countries.  Craftsmen, most notably machinists, were able to negotiate with employers 
over work rules and production processes until the early twentieth century (Montgomery 1979).  
However, while Germany developed an occupational training system based on skill certification 
in reaction to skill shortage, the United States sought to “rationalize production and reduce 
dependence on skilled labor” (Thelen 2004: 177).  Frederick W. Taylor introduced to the public 
the idea of scientific management in 1911, which enabled managers to take control of the 
workplace by rationalizing the production process.  Skilled workers were coopted into 
management hierarchies as lower-level supervisors or “foremen” who oversaw their unskilled 
crews in the rationalized production system (Thelen 2004: 149).  As the Taylor method became 
widespread, the American industry entered a new phase characterized by the mass production of 
consumer products.  A key factor in this industrial trend was the changing nature of immigration 
after the 1890s, which brought huge numbers of peasants from southern and eastern Europe 
(Thelen 2004: 185).  Thus, American workers had a virtually infinite supply of unskilled 
workers.   
The rise of mass production system raised a sore problem to ordinary workers in the 
United States. With the trend toward simple, mechanized processes, skilled craftsmanship 
became less relevant and the great mass of industrial workers was more easily replaced.  Skill-
displacing technology increased the risk of unemployment and compounded the economic 
 51 
insecurity of industrial workers.21  As Figure 3 shows, the level of employment in manufacturing 
industries was volatile in correspondence with business fluctuations. 
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Figure 3 Employment in U.S Manufacturing Industries 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1940 (U.S. Government Printing 
Office: 1941), p. 340. 
 
3.3.3 Financial system and corporate governance 
The historical difference between American and German financial systems appears to be 
obvious. While with industrialization German concerns had a long-term relationship with a few 
large commercial banks which “accompanied the industrial enterprises from the cradle to the 
grave” (Gerschenkron 1962: 14), the markets for industrial securities in the United States became 
of age at the turn of the nineteenth century (Navin and Sears 1955).   
During most of the nineteenth century, the markets for industrial securities in the United 
States were not well-developed.  Most of companies during the three quarters of the century were 
                                                 
21 Cyclical depressions doubled in frequency between the periods of 1825-84 and 1884-1920 (Feldman 1925: 11). 
During the 1920s only, the American economy experienced three economic recessions in 1921, 1924, and 1927. 
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not publicly held modern corporations but they were sole proprietorships or partnerships (Haber 
1991).  Although the cotton textile industry in New England was benefited from the Boston 
Stock Exchange during the antebellum period, the subscription to the capital stock of textile 
industry was limited to a small group of local investors (Florida and Samber 1999).  People with 
excess capital were reluctant to invest their money into industrial securities except for those 
issued by railroads because numerous industrial companies were not well-established as railroads 
and people questioned the stability of the securities of those companies.  
After the 1880s, however, the growth of big business in the American economy brought 
about structural changes in markets for industrial securities.  In this period, the development of 
securities markets was stimulated by two major events in the U.S. financial history: the trust 
movement in the 1880s and the great merger movement between 1898 and 1902 (Navin and 
Sears 1955).22  Trusts and mergers provided for a good deal of stable securities marketable to the 
public, which expanded and deepened U.S. securities markets to a great degree.  As Figure 4 
shows, firms in the United States during the interwar period had more advanced securities 
markets than any other industrial country, in terms of the ratio of corporate bonds and stock to 
national financial assets.  This meant that American firms were dependent upon securities 
markets for corporate finance while countries such as Germany and Japan had financial systems 
based on loans from commercial banks.   
                                                 
22 According to Navin and Sears, the six industries with major trusts were petroleum refining (1882), cotton oil 
refining (1884), linseed oil refining (1885), whiskey distilling (1887), sugar refining (1887), and lead smelting and 
refining (1887).  After the U.S. government prohibited these cartels by the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, American 
firms adapted to their inability to collude by merging into single, dominant corporations (Robertson 2000: 24).  
Major mergers between 1898 and 1902 included the creation of U.S. Steel, Consolidated Tobacco, International 
Harvester, and Du Pont.  For the detail of the great merger movement, see Richard B. DuBoff, Accumulation and 
Power: An Economic History of the United States (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989).   
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Figure 4 International Comparison of Financial Systems, 1850-1980 
  Source: Goldsmith (1985).  
 
Based on the market-oriented financial system, the United States developed the corporate 
governance system characterized by high concentration of managerial control in the executive 
and dispersed corporate ownership (Roe 1994).  While in German firms corporate control is 
shared by the executive board consisting of managers and the supervisory board representing a 
wide range of stakeholders including shareholders, client banks, and employees, in the United 
States the executive board solely exercises corporate control.  Instead, the performance of 
managers is evaluated by securities markets based on the quarterly balance sheets and publicly 
available information of the firm (Hall and Soskice 2004: 29).  In Germany’s bank-based system, 
commercial banks are not only providers of corporate loans but they are also large block-
shareholders of their corporate clients.  By contrast, in the United States the development of 
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German-style universal banks was restricted by the Glass-Stegall Act of 1933 that kept banks out 
of the stock market. 
Although few employers over the world welcomed labor’s control over employment, the 
peculiar hostility of American employers toward employment protection can be explained partly 
by the preeminence of securities in the American corporate finance.  While large firms in 
Germany and Japan had close relationships with banks guaranteeing long-term finance and 
protecting the firms against mergers, large American firms raised funds through securities 
markets lacking financiers’ long-term commitment.  The dominance of securities markets in the 
United States encourages American employers to use labor flexibly.  The standard business 
behavior of large corporations at that time was to maximize investors’ short-term interests 
because if they failed to maintain dividend and interest payments, the market value of the firms 
would shrink and then they could be taken over by other firms.  The American employers’ focus 
on the market value of their companies was at odds with employees’ interests in higher wages 
and stable employment tenure. 
3.4 POLITICAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
3.4.1 Weak power-resources of labor  
Strong labor unions and labor parties representing labor’s interests are two major organizations 
that workers can rely on as a way to protect themselves against the managerial right to terminate 
employment at will.  Compared with German workers, however, American workers suffered 
limited power resources especially in the period before the New Deal.  First, the United States 
 55 
was a laggard in terms of union membership.  As Figure 5 shows, the percentages of workers in 
blue-collar and white-collar unions in the United States were substantially lower than those in 
Germany as of 1932.   
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The weakness of labor party also hindered the adoption of progressive labor legislation.  
Although Socialists fared better at local and state levels (Robertson 2000: 24), they did not gain 
enough votes to participate in the government at either federal or state level.  By contrast, the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany was the largest party in the Reichstag and participated in 
several state governments in 1920.  Lowi (1984: 37) phrased a puzzle about this relative 
weakness of American labor: 
History and theory inform us that the conditions of industrial capitalism in the United States 
beginning at some point during the nineteenth century should have produced a significant mobilization 
of labor around socialism in a Labor party or a Socialist party.  The fact that no such mobilization 
occurred is a source of fascination and consternation to all serious social scientists.  
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The classical American exceptionalism literature tends to claim that American labor was 
qualitatively different than European labor from the beginning of class formation in that 
American workers lacked class consciousness and therefore did not create a socialist party based 
on the class line.  It provides various explanations for the classlessness of American labor 
movement, which include pervasive liberal values resulting from the absence of feudalism (Hartz 
1955; Lipset 1963; Burnham 1970), the relative affluence of American workers (Sombart 1974), 
and ethnic and racial diversity (Commons 1906).   
However, there have been attempts to re-interpret American labor history by uncovering 
the class-conscious behaviors of urban workers, at least, in late-nineteenth-century America 
(Foner 1984; Wilentz 1984; Montogomery 1987).  The counterclaim of these revisionist works is 
that American labor was as politically active and class conscious as European labor at certain 
point.  Recent research has sought to answer why the American and European labor movements 
since then developed along divergent paths by highlighting on the American electoral system 
discouraging a third party (Oestreicher 1988) and the constitutionally divided political structure 
making progressive labor reform extremely difficult (Hattam 1993; Voss 1993).    
3.4.2 The American federalism 
Riker defined federalism as a “political organization in which the activities of government are 
divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of 
government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Riker 1975: 101).  From this 
definition, we infer that federal systems should provide solutions, first, on functions for the 
government at each level to perform and, second, on fiscal arrangements to finance those 
functional activities.      
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In terms of federal-state responsibilities, the history of American federalism after the 
Civil War could be divided into two periods that displayed distinct patterns of inter-
governmental relations.  In the United States before the New Deal states were dominant players 
in national politics.  From property rights, banking, education, to labor, major legislative powers 
shaping the economic development at state levels belonged in the jurisdiction of states (Lowi 
1984: 46-47).  The U.S. Constitution limited the jurisdiction of the federal government to the 
matters related with commerce across states and a list of functions that the Constitution explicitly 
delegated to the federal government such as national defense, foreign affairs, internal 
improvements, subsidies, tariffs, public lands disposal, patents, and currency.23  Before the New 
Deal, the Supreme Court provided a very narrow interpretation of the “interstate commerce” 
clause, and therefore the federal competencies were very restricted compared with those of 
states.  But the New Deal brought about the intrusion of the federal power, especially in the area 
of regulation, into formerly states’ exclusive turfs via the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the 
interstate commerce clause.  As Peterson notes, “At first the courts retained remnants of the 
doctrine of dual sovereignty in order to protect processes of industrialization from governmental 
intrusion.  But with the advent of the New Deal, the constitutional power of the national 
government expanded so dramatically that the doctrine of dual sovereignty virtually lost all 
meaning.  Court interpretations of the constitutional clauses on commerce and spending have 
proved to be the most significant” (Peterson 1995: 11).        
                                                 
23 Grodzins claims that the division of power between federal and state governments has never been rigid and there 
was constant intergovernmental cooperation even throughout the nineteenth century, drawing upon various federal 
grants to states as evidence of such cooperation (Grodzins 1966: 32-37).  However, although the postwar 
development of power-sharing between the federal and state governments is conspicuous (See Elazar 1972: Table 8), 
Grodzins might have exaggerated the significance of intergovernmental cooperation in the period before the New 
Deal (See Riker’s comment on Grodzins in Riker 1975: 104).  The grant-making power of the federal government 
had already been recognized by the Constitution as one of the exceptional areas under the federal jurisdiction and 
therefore it did not challenge the states’ legislative supremacy over the federal government.           
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As the functions of the federal government have been significantly expanded over the last 
century, states were deprived of their monopoly power in many areas.  Therefore, the 
contemporary relationship between the federal and state governments is correctly depicted as 
“cooperative federalism” (Elazar 1991).  However, competition between governments at the 
same level appears to be a lasting feature of American federalism.  Breton (1991) and Chubb 
(1991) mention as evidence of interstate competition that American states have sought to lure 
business capital by providing tax breaks and other financial incentives.  In the last few decades, 
interstate competition seems to have become intensified as the United States underwent 
adaptation to the changing economic environment.  As Kincaid notes, “Today, the national 
government has comparable difficulties coping with the international economy.  Hence, state and 
local governments have entered the global economy on their own as direct competitors with 
jurisdictions worldwide.  Domestic interjurisdictional competition is being augmented by 
globalized interjurisdictional competition” (Kincaid 1991: 110).       
3.4.3 The judiciary  
American courts played a decisive role in sustaining the employment-at-will rule against pro-
labor legislation. In the late nineteenth century, democratic institutions in the United States – 
Congress and some state legislatures – sought to limit the employers’ freedom to terminate 
employees at will by reform legislation.  When democracy threatened the economic freedom of 
capitalists, the politically independent judiciary provided opportunities for employers to repeal 
legislation that encroached upon their freedom of terminating employment.  Especially, the 
Supreme Court was the bastion of laissez-faire capitalism in the United States during the period 
between the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment and its decisions on the New Deal legislation in the 
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late 1930s.24   
But, why did the Supreme Court make the decisions that they did on the termination of 
employment?  Researchers sought to explain why the Supreme Court was inclined toward 
laissez-faire capitalism in that period.  Twiss (1942) focused on the role of leading lawyers who 
propagated laissez faire in the interest of their corporate clients and who themselves were the 
future judges.  Miller (1968) saw that the Supreme Court succumbed to corporations because of 
their preeminence in American society in comparison with other interest groups such as labor 
unions.  Gillman (2002) attributed the laissez faire of federal courts to the social and professional 
background of most Republican-appointed federal judges who came with Reconstruction to 
promote a more unfettered national market.  Yet there still remains a question how the 
employment-at-will rule could be sustained despite the changes in the ideological composition of 
the Court over time and the fury of politicians and labor leaders toward the intransigent Court.   
I argue that the institutional foundation of American judiciary matters and they are its 
constitutional power and the norm of judges.  First of all, the stability of the employment-at-will 
rule can be attributed to the institutional capacity of the American judiciary founded upon the 
constitutional principle of division of power between different branches and across different 
levels of government.  As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist Paper 78, the power of 
politically independent judiciary to declare void all legislation contrary to the federal constitution 
was considered as essential to the preservation of limited government.  Although the U.S. 
Constitution did not mention this judicial review, the U.S. Supreme Court has exercised the 
power to declare a federal law unconstitutional since its landmark decision in Marbury v. 
                                                 
24 For major cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the freedom of contract either to contain labor’s collective 
action or to invalidate reform legislation, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Adair v. United States, 
208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
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Madison (1803).25    
The institutional capacity of the Supreme Court was not of static but dynamic nature 
partly contingent upon whether the political branches were ideologically united (Bednar, 
Eskridge, and Ferejohn 2001: 233).  While the preservation of divided power was the rationale 
for the Supreme Court, the political independence of the Court was facilitated by the 
fragmentation of power at the national level.  This was exemplified by the Supreme Court 
decision to uphold the National Labor Relations Act in 1937 after Democratic party won a 
landslide victory in both presidential and congressional elections in 1936.  
But institutional capacity is insufficient to explain why the Court continued to prescribe 
the employment-at-will rule in periods when laissez faire was not the Zeitgeist any more.  
Political scientists have paid attention to the norm of stare decisis, a common-law principle of 
conformity to precedent, which discouraged a great departure from existing law in judicial 
decisions (Brenner and Stier 1996; Brisbin 1996; Knight and Epstein 1996; Songer and Lindquist 
1996).26  American lawyers are trained and experienced in stare decisis in a legal system where 
“the lawyers of today are the judges of tomorrow” (Twiss 1942, 150).  Thus, the common-law 
legal system as normative political institutions played a decisive role in locking the employment-
at-will rule in the American judicial system once the courts established it as precedent.   As 
Orren aptly put it, “by far the largest share of disputes before them [judges], they did in fact 
follow precedent… Judges by their ritual enforcement held up a structure of domination that had 
existed since time out of mind” (Orren 1991, 81).   
                                                 
25 As a result of this landmark decision, state supreme courts have routinely reviewed the constitutionality of state 
legislation (Berkowitz and Clay 2005, 79).   
26 For the alternative “attitude model” of judicial decision-making, see Segal and Spaeth (1996). 
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Although the employment-at-will rule was not set in stone and the Supreme Court did not 
always follow precedent in opposition to any modification of the rule, it continued to be a 
governing principle of American labor-management relationship.  The employment-at-will rule 
was circumvented in 1937 when the Supreme Court changed course and sustained the National 
Labor Relations Act, which legally protected the workers’ right to organize unions and prevented 
workers from being discharged for union activities.  And yet, this change fell short of the 
displacement of the employment-at-will rule.  The protection of union members against 
dismissal was merely an exception to the rule (Muhl 2001) and courts in many cases during the 
first three decades after World War II ruled in favor of employers’ discretion to dismissal 
(DeGiuseppe 1981).  Further, although unions bargained hard to control layoffs and to set up 
arbitration procedures in case of unfair dismissal, the impact of unions was limited because of 
the relatively low level of unionization in American workplaces.   
3.5   EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION DURING THE NEW DEAL  
3.5.1 Labor market situations during the Great Depression 
The 1929 Great Depression brought about a devastating impact on job security.  The 
unemployment rate skyrocketed from 3.2 percent to 24.9 percent between 1929 and 1933 
(Mitchell 2002).  Large companies were not exceptions to the reductions in workforce.  For 
example, the Ford Motor Company laid off all but 37,000 of its 128,000 workers by the fall of 
1930 (Zieger and Gall 2002, 50).  On March 7 of 1932, thousands of unemployed autoworkers 
paraded to the Ford River Rouge plant in Dearborn in Michigan, presenting a list of demands to 
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Henry Ford.  One of the demands presented was to rehire all laid-off Ford workers.27  But the 
Dearborn police quelled the parade with gunfire.  Four marchers were dead and nineteen other 
workers were wounded by the police gunfire in this Ford Hunger March.28   
Despite the employment crisis during the Great Depression, labor unions did not step up 
political struggles to bring in legislation making layoffs more difficult.  Frustrated by anti-union 
courts making null legislative successes, Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor 
insisted that American labor be staying away from political action, including lobbying and 
demands for pro-labor legislation (Hattam 1993).  Now the focus of labor strategy was on 
organizing skilled workers and taking back control of wages and working conditions though 
collective bargaining (Zieger and Gall, 24-25).  In doing so, labor unions limited their goal to 
incorporating a seniority-based layoff system into labor contracts because they expected it would 
prevent employers from laying off workers arbitrarily and it would also protect union leaders 
from losing their jobs (Schatz 1983; Golden 1997). 
3.5.2 Could American employers reduce layoffs? 
How did American employers respond to the increase in the irregularity of employment and the 
rising discontent of labor that cyclical depressions brought about?  Employers did not have 
incentives to restrict layoffs voluntarily because of the employment-at-will rule.  The business 
response to employment crises was very inadequate and limited to a temporary relief for 
displaced workers.    
                                                 
27 Maurice Sugar, “Bullets - Not Food - for Ford Workers,” The Nation, March 23, 1932; Robert L. Cruden, “Bloody 
Monday at Ford’s,” Unpublished paper, New York, NY: Labor Research Association, 1932, p. 31 [Copy at Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan]. 
28 Detroit News, 8 March 1932. 
 63 
As the irregularity of employment increased, workers in the mass production industries 
came to desire long-term employment relationship.29  However, a vast majority of American 
workers’ employment hinged upon the will of their employers.  Under the employment-at-will 
rule, executing layoffs did not incur any substantial business cost to the employer because he was 
legally free to dismiss workers at any time without having to consider any relief measure for the 
unemployed.  Therefore, most of employers did not feel it necessary to prevent layoffs. 30   
Although prior to 1929 there were progressive managers who set up voluntary plans providing to 
their employees a degree of employment protection such as advance notice, severance pay, 
employment guarantee, and work-sharing, these voluntary plans were extremely limited in 
application.31   
As the Great Depression forced a lot of companies to close plants and to execute mass 
layoffs,32 more companies began to adopt voluntary compensation plans for dismissed workers 
in emergencies (Schwenning 1931).  However, voluntary dismissal compensation plans were not 
a generalized business practice.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey in 1932, 
only 8 percent of the 224 plants sampled in the survey paid some sort of severance pay to men 
                                                 
29 A huge decrease in labor turnover between the 1910s and 1920s reveals the growing preference of American 
workers for stable employment.  For example, Ford’s turnover rate peaked at 370 percent in 1914 (Zieger and Gall 
2002:11), but in 1924 the average turnover rate in American industries plunged to 45.2 percent (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1929: 64-65).  
30 One survey on 248 companies employing about 750,000 wage earners reported that approximately 75 percent of 
the companies laid off workers in 1927 although the 1927 recession was not major.  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Monthly Labor Review, (Sep., 1930), pp. 19-25. 
31 The earlier examples of companies with a formal plan for the protection of workers against dismissal were 
Dennison, Firestone, General Electric, Proctor & Gamble, and U.S. Rubber.  But the number of those progressive 
employers was very small and the degree of protection provided by the most generous plan was relatively weak 
compared to provisions in other countries.  For example, although the Dennison plan made almost every employee 
eligible regardless of length of service, dismissed employees received only two weeks’ notice or pay at most.  
Whereas Firestone paid one month’s salary to dismissed workers having 5 years’ service, the German government in 
1926 required employers to give 3 months’ advance notice or to pay salary for the notice period to dismissed 
workers with the same length of service.  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review (Apr., 1930), pp. 1-
5; G. T. Schwenning, Dismissal Legislation, American Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1932), pp. 241-260.   
32 The number of establishments in manufacturing industries declined from 210,959 in 1929 to 141,776 in 1933.  
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review (Aug., 1935), pp. 431-432. 
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who were laid off through no fault their own and these plants accounted for only 15 percent of 
the total number of employees on their pay rolls.33  It was also reported that as of December 
1931, at most 226,000 employees out of more than 4 million workers on payrolls were eligible to 
some sort of company unemployment benefit plans.34   
Why were American employers so reluctant to provide even rudimentary protection 
against protection to their employees?  The available data show that American employers sought 
to protect investors’ interests at the expense of employment and wage security.  Figure 3 
indicates that the American economy suffered three economic depressions during the 1920s: one 
severe depression in 1921 and two less severe ones in 1924 and 1927.  Although the level of 
employment in manufacturing industries fluctuated in correspondence with business cycles, 
Figure 6 shows that dividend and interest payments paid to investors steadily increased in every 
single year over the 1920s except in 1921 when returns to investors were only slightly reduced 
despite the major depression.   
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Figure 6 Dividend and Interest Payments in the United States, 1918-1928 
                                                 
33 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review (Nov., 1932), pp. 1005-1017. 
34 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review (Dec., 1931), pp. 1295-1310. 
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Notes: Included are industrial and traction companies, banks and trust companies, the National 
Government and the New York City government. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts, Various years. 
 
Another source of data confirms that the flexible adjustment of labor costs through 
layoffs and wage cuts was the effective method of stabilizing the incomes of investors.  
According to Table 2, the average annual income of wage-earners decreased by $16 per capital 
in 1924 from 1923 and by $12 per capital in 1927 from 1926.  But, net dividends on common 
stock increased steadily both in 1924 and 1927 in spite of business recession.        
 
Table 2 Average Annual Wages v. Estimated Net Dividends on Common Stock, All Industries 
Year Wages Dividends
1920 1273 2337 
1921 983 2217 
1922 1012 2026 
1923 1150 2672 
1924 1134 2863 
1925 1176 3337 
1926 1217 3823 
1927 1205 4233 
Notes: Wages are in dollars and dividends are in million dollars. 
Source: King (1930). 
  
 The Great Depression hit severely investors as well as workers because of the collapse of 
stock markets and great business failure.  But again the economic depression unevenly affected 
investors and wage-earners.  As Figure 7 shows, the incomes of investment fluctuated less than 
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the incomes of labor.  Whereas total wages plunged by maximum 56.5 percent between 1929 and 
1932, stock dividends and interest payments decreased by maximum 38 percent between 1929 
and 1933.         
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Figure 7 Capital Income v. Labor Income, 1929-1939 
Notes: Industries covered here are mining, manufacturing, steam railroads, pullman, railway 
express, and water transportation. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts, Various years. 
 
3.5.3 Policy agenda on the table: Employment stabilization versus income stabilization 
The business commitment to the freedom of dismissal was underpinned by the importance of 
equity markets in the American corporate finance.  Since American employers were generally 
hostile to the protection of workers against dismissal, the policy agenda for the government 
intervention in labor-management relations were limited to the measures that would minimize 
the restrictions on the manager’s right to dismiss. 
Since the end of the First World War, scholars began to introduce ideas based on 
European experiences to limit the employment at will.  Until the early 1930s, at least three ideas 
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were known to the American public as restrictions on the employment at will: employee 
representation, mandatory severance pay, and collective bargaining led by independent unions.35  
The idea of employee representation as embodied in the 1920 Works Councils Law of the 
Weimar Republic in Germany was to require employers to obtain the consent of the works 
representative body before giving notice of dismissal.  But this idea was not brought to any 
serious policy debate at either federal or state level because employers thought it was a menace 
to employers’ right to manage and labor unions also criticized it for a rival of trade unionism 
(Leiserson 1929).  The other two ideas – mandatory severance pay and union recognition – 
became policy agenda in the New Deal, but it was only union recognition that was finally 
adopted for legislation.   
Severance pay is money that an employer gives to an employee when the employee is 
laid off or fired without his fault.  Since the financial burden of severance pay increases in 
correspondence with the frequency of dismissal, severance pay provisions may reduce layoffs by 
providing to employers the incentive to keep unemployment down to the unavoidable minimum.  
Mandatory severance pay places the cost of layoff completely on individual companies from 
which workers are displaced and therefore it is distinguished from the compulsory 
unemployment insurance designed to redistribute unemployment risk among different employers 
and industries.   
                                                 
35 There is a plethora of interwar-period literature about American trade unionism and I will not repeat them here.  
For employee representation, see Walter G. Merritt, Employee Representation as a Step toward Industrial 
Democracy, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 90, Industrial Stability (Jul., 
1920), pp. 39-44; Emil Frankel, The German Works Councils, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 5 (Oct., 
1923), pp. 708-736.  For mandatory severance pay, see Edward A. Ross, A Legal Dismissal Wage, Monthly Labor 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Mar., 1919), pp. 15-19; Royal Meeker, Industrial Hazards, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 9, No. 
3 (Sep., 1919), pp. 1-8; Ernest G. Draper, A State Dismissal Wage Act, The Survey, Vol. 6 (Jan. 15, 1931), pp. 426-
427; G. T. Schwenning, The Workers’ Legal Right to His Job, The American Federationist (Jan., 1932), pp. 26-32.  
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In the United States, the debate over mandatory severance pay took the form of 
contestation between two different views on the legitimate type of unemployment compensation 
that should be enacted.  The "Wisconsin plan" led by John Commons, was that each employer 
was required to make all contributions to his own separate company reserve, from which 
compensation was dispensed to the workers he laid off (Commons 1930).  Employees were not 
forced to contribute under this plan.  The primary goal of the Wisconsin plan was to prevent 
layoffs by making each employer charged with the cost of compensation payable to the workers 
he laid off. Thus, the unemployment compensation under the Wisconsin plan was functionally 
equivalent to mandatory severance pay in that this plan sought to penalize employers who freely 
laid off workers.   
The alternative “Ohio” plan formulated by William Leiserson, Chairman of an Ohio 
Commission on Unemployment Insurance, was that all contributions from both employers and 
employees were commingled into one single state-pooled fund and payments of compensation 
were made from this common fund.  Leiserson’s claim was that the Wisconsin idea of 
employment stabilization was not a realistic goal and many workers would actually fail to 
receive benefits because company reserves were likely to be exhausted.  Therefore, he argued 
that it was desirable to focus on stabilizing the level of income of workers regardless of 
economic fluctuations by enlarging the pool of unemployment risk (Leiserson 1931). 
While the Ohio legislature failed to pass Leiserson’s proposal, the plan for separate 
company reserves as Commons advocated was adopted in Wisconsin in 1931.  In late 1934 
Washington, Utah, New York, and New Hampshire enacted unemployment insurance laws 
following the Ohio plan.  However, prior to the 1935 Social Security Act, either idea did not gain 
nation-wide support because of the fear that the establishment of unemployment insurance would 
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put the local industry of the state at a competitive disadvantage with industries of other states 
which did not have such systems.36  Federal legislation was needed in order to establish some 
sort of nation-wide unemployment compensation systems. 
3.5.4 A federal, but limited treatment of the unemployment crisis  
After Roosevelt set up the Committee on Economic Security to make recommendations on the 
three aspects of social security including old-age pension, workers’ compensation, and 
unemployment compensation in June 1934, the most heated controversies over unemployment 
compensation were federal control versus state autonomy and pooled funds versus company 
accounts.37  The 1935 Social Security Act solved these conundrums by allowing each state to 
choose and administer its own unemployment compensation system, whether a state-wide pooled 
fund or a separate company account.  At the same time, however, the Roosevelt administration 
failed to introduce legislation embracing the idea of employment stabilization in its entirety.  
When the Committee on Economic Security was created, there were a few progressive 
employers participating in the Advisory Council to the Committee who favored the Wisconsin 
plan instead of the Ohio plan.38  These corporate liberals close to the Roosevelt administration 
were already good at stabilizing employment and therefore they expected that the Wisconsin 
plan would level the competitive playing field with the low-standard employers who treated 
labor as a highly variable factor (Swenson 2002: 203, 227).   
                                                 
36 Statement of Sen. Byron Harrison, U.S. Congress, Senate, Floor Debate on Social Security, 1935, 14 June, p. 
9271 [Available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/senate2.pdf]. 
37  Edwin E. Witte, Major Issues in Unemployment Compensation, Feb. 1935 [Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces1witte1.html]. 
38 The business members in the Advisory Council were Gerard Swope of General Electric, Morris E. Leeds of Leeds 
& Northrup, Sam Lewisohn of Miami Copper, Walter C. Teagle of Standard Oil, and Marion B. Folsom of Eastman 
Kodak. 
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However, it is questionable that the Wisconsin plan gained support from most employers.  
Although those corporate liberals close to the Roosevelt administration liked the unemployment 
reserves, the business community represented by the National Association of Manufacturers was 
generally opposed to any type of unemployment compensation. 39   The final report of the 
Committee on Economic Security and the Economic Security Bill President Roosevelt submitted 
permitted states to choose the pooled unemployment-insurance, the separate reserve account, or 
the mixture of both. While the House passed a bill requiring states to establish pooled 
unemployment insurance, the Senate passed an amendment to the House bill, restoring states' 
discretion to choose any type of plan, because the House bill would force Wisconsin to change 
its existing law.  Further, the Senate anticipated that the House bill that deprived states of the 
freedom to choose their own unemployment compensation plans would not pass the 
constitutional review by the Supreme Court.40  
The Social Security Act levied a 3 percent unemployment tax on payrolls, but allowed 
employers to offset 90 percent of that tax by contributions they had made under a state 
unemployment compensation law.  This device was to induce state legislatures to pass laws 
providing for unemployment compensation in accordance with federal requirements.  By May 
1937, unemployment compensation had been adopted by 45 states, the District of Columbia and 
Alaska, covering a total of about 18.5 million wage earners while bills were pending in Florida, 
Illinois and Missouri.41   
                                                 
39 Statement of James A Emery, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 
Economic Security Act,  74th Cong. 1st sess,  pp. 1020-1036 [Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/hr35emery.pdf]. 
40 Statement of Sen. Robert La Follette Jr., U.S. Congress, Senate, Floor Debate on Social Security, 1935, 15 June, 
pp. 9359-9360 [Available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/senate3.pdf] 
41 For the state adoption of unemployment compensation laws I heavily depended upon the following article: George 
H. Trafton, State Unemployment Compensation Laws, American Labor Legislation Review (Jun., 1937), pp. 53-58.  
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The distribution of state unemployment compensation laws in 1937 suggests that the 
Wisconsin idea of inducing employers to minimize layoffs was generally rejected by the States 
that feared the Wisconsin idea could drive out business.  As Table 3 shows, only Wisconsin and 
Nebraska adopted a separate establishment account plan in its entirety, although all but a few 
states included definite provisions for the promotion of stabilization through merit-rating.  The 
merit-rating provisions on employers were introduced to adjust individual employers’ 
contributions according to their actual unemployment experiences.  However, the merit-rating 
system was an inadequate measure to stimulate employers’ efforts to minimize layoffs first 
because the upper bound on unemployment compensation tax rates made it possible for many 
high-unemployment-risk firms to make layoffs without incurring additional charges, once they 
were at the maximum tax rate.  Secondly, many layoffs were not charged to the layoff firm but 
instead to a common pool if workers were laid off for reasons outside of employer’s control 
(Burgess and Low 1992).  As a consequence, the U.S. unemployment compensation system 
provided an incentive for employers to lay off too many employees, as unemployment 
compensation became subsidy to layoff firms (Feldstein 1978).   
Table 3 State Adoption of Unemployment Compensation Laws, May 1937 
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Separate reserves (2) Wis., Neb. 
Separate reserves complemented by 
auxiliary pooled funds (4) Ind., Ky., Or., S.D. 
State-pooled funds with employers’ 
option to withdraw under certain 
conditions (3) 
Calif., Idaho, Mass. 
Each employer free to choose either (1) Vt. 
State-pooled funds for benefit purposes 
and separate reserves for merit-rating 
purposes only (22) 
Ariz., Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., Iowa, Kan., 
La., Mich., Minn., Miss., N.H., N.J., N.M., 
N.D., Ohio, Okla., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Utah., 
Wyo. 
State-pooled funds with definite merit-
rating provisions (7) 
Ala., D.C., Mont., Nev., Wash., W. Va., 
Alaska 
State-pooled funds without merit-
rating (8) Ga., Me., Md., N.Y., N.C., Pa., R.I., Va. 
Source: Trafton (1937). 
3.5.5 Roosevelt and the Supreme Court 
While the American unemployment compensation system was basically a relief measure for the 
maintenance of income and lacked substantial restrictions on layoffs, American labor got a 
degree of protection against the employment-at-will through the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) of 1935 or the Wagner Act.  Reminiscent of the 1898 Erdman Act, this act legally 
protected workers’ right to organize unions and prevented workers from being discharged for 
union membership.   
However, the NLRA was not the first New Deal legislation affecting the employment-at-
will rule.  In 1933, the Roosevelt government adopted the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA), which delegated to President the authority to rationalize industries for dealing with the 
problem of overproduction and falling prices.  While the NIRA was basically an industrial 
regulation code, it also declared workers had the right to collectively bargain with employers 
through representatives of their own choosing.  However, employers could live with and exploit 
the NIRA because it lacked the real authority to enforce labor protection (Harris 1982: 20-21).  
Moreover, the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan42 and 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States.43  The Court held that Congress had 
exceeded its authority to delegate legislative powers and regulate interstate commerce in 
enacting the NIRA. 
                                                 
42 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
43 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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After the NIRA was declared unconstitutional, the Roosevelt government immediately 
passed the National Labor Relations Act that included more definite and stronger provisions 
protecting union members against discharge and empowering the federal government to 
adjudicate upon labor disputes.  Although a majority of employers were compelled to accept 
unions as a fact after strong opposition, many employers still anticipated the Supreme Court 
would invalidate the act (Harris 1982: 23-32).  
As the 1936 elections resulted in a landslide victory for Democratic party as in Table 4, 
tensions grew between the Supreme Court and the Democratic government controlling the 
executive and both chambers in Congress.  In February 1937, shortly after his landslide 
reelection, President Roosevelt submitted a bill to Congress that would empower him to appoint 
additional justices to the Supreme Court in an attempt to change the ideological position of the 
Court hostile to the New Deal legislation.  Although even Democratic-controlled Congress did 
not support Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing Plan,” Roosevelt insisted on the bill being passed and 
launched a personal campaign on behalf of this bill. The bill was defeated by a Senate vote of 70 
to 20 in July 1937, but in the meantime Roosevelt got what he wanted for the New Deal 
legislation.  The Supreme Court capitulated to President’s threat when it upheld the 
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act by a vote of 5 
to 4 between April and May 1937.44   
Table 4  Unified Government after the 1936 Elections 
Party 
Electoral votes 
cast for 
President 
House Seats Senate Seats 
Democratic 523 331 76 
Republican 8 89 16 
                                                 
44 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937). 
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Other 0 13 4 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, 
Part II, (Washington D.C., 1975), Chapter Y. 
 
In sum, the Roosevelt government did not attempt to establish comprehensive restrictions 
on the employment at will.  Instead, anticipating the judicial opposition to more fundamental 
federal regulation of the at-will termination of employment, the Roosevelt government adopted a 
very modest form of legislative changes.  Even the New Deal legislation might not have been 
upheld, had it not been for the extraordinary political situation in the late 1930s, which gave 
Democrats a landslide electoral success.  Thus, the scope and degree of state effort to limit the 
employment-at-will rule were constrained by the long-standing policy of the Supreme Court 
toward free-market capitalism.   
3.6  STILL THE CENTURY OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT? 
Orren (1991: 29) and Mettler (1998: 47) claimed that the National Labor Relations Act displaced 
the employment-at-will rule bringing the workplace within the reach of legislative activity. 
However, the NLRA only added one statutory exception to the employment-at-will rule. 
Although the NLRA eroded the employment-at-will rule by protecting union members from 
dismissal, the impact of the New Deal legislation on the employment-at-will rule was limited.  
Although labor unions won recognition, it remained a question whether they would be able to 
limit the broad management right to layoff in the collective bargaining process.   
The employment-at-will was not displaced but instead it continued to affect labor-
management relations.  First, although labor unions got legal recognition, they had to get over 
hostile employers to take control over layoff decisions.  To make layoff more difficult was the 
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last thing that labor unions would expect to gain from the employers determined to preserve their 
right to manage.  This was well illustrated by a clause in the 1937 contract between the Steel 
Workers Organizing Committee and the U.S. Steel Corporation: 
The management of the works and the direction of the working forces, including the right to hire, 
suspend, or discharge for proper cause, or transfer, and the right to relieve employees from duty 
because of lack of work, or for other legitimate reasons is vested exclusively in the company, provided 
that this will not be used for purpose of discrimination against any member of the Union (Cooke and 
Murray 1940: 84). 
 
Secondly, American courts applied the employment-at-will rule in many postwar cases 
where dismissals were disputed.  State courts have upheld the employment-at-will rule where 
employees had reported employer kickbacks, refused the sexual advances of their employer, 
refused to take psychological stress tests, filed workmen compensation claims, indicated their 
availability for jury duty, filed unemployment insurance claims, expressed concern about the 
safety of the employer’s product, and filed complaints with governmental regulatory agencies 
concerning allegedly improper conduct by their employers (DeGiuseppe 1981: 9-10).  After the 
early 1980s, however, a greater number of courts began to consider the common-law exceptions 
to the employment-at-will such as the public-policy exception and the implied-contract exception 
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing” exception (Muhl 2001).  I will discuss this 
development in more detail in the next chapter. 
Finally, while collective bargaining became available to American workers as a way to 
limit the employment at will, the power of labor unions increasingly became depoliticized and 
ghettoized during the postwar era because the Taft-Hartley Act passed in 1947 restricted 
bourgeoning labor activism (Lichtenstein 2002: 117).  It outlawed the closed shop that required 
employers to hire only union members and permitted the union shop that required the newly 
hired to join unions within a certain amount of time on the condition that a majority of the 
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workers must vote for it.  It also authorized states to adopt “right-to-work” laws that prohibited 
the union shop.  Sooner than later, most of the states in the South and the Southwest became 
right-to-work states not least to gain competitive advantages against the industrial North.   
Another important anti-union clause in the Taft-Hartley Act was the removal of legal 
protection for labor unions of managerial workers.  Before the Taft-Hartley Act, the National 
Labor Relations Board and the U.S. Supreme Court held that the definition of “employees” under 
the Wagner Act included foremen and therefore the legal protection against dismissal under the 
Wagner Act was also available to foremen’s unions (Witney 1949: 176-177).  However, the Taft-
Hartley Act excluded these first-level supervisors from the definition of employees, allowing 
employers to fire them for their union activities (Voos 2005).  Therefore, this law critically 
restricted the growth of labor unions for managerial and professional workers in the United 
States.   
Although the long-run effect of the Taft-Hartley Act should be scientifically tested, the 
anti-union offensive in the immediate postwar years appeared to succeed in limiting the 
organizational power of American labor.  As Figure 8 shows, the U.S. union membership has 
been declining since the early 1950s.  Now, approximately 13.5 percent of workers in the 
combination of private and public sectors joined labor unions.  This means that a vast majority of 
American workers still can be dismissed regardless of length of service without advance notice 
or severance pay.    
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 Figure 8 The Decline of U.S. Union Membership over the Postwar Era 
Source: Data Repository for the Golden-Wallerstein-Lange Project on Unions, Employers, Collective 
Bargaining and Industrial Relations for 16 OECD Countries, 1950-1995 (Downloadable from 
http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data).   
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4.0  THE REGULATION OF LAYOFFS IN THE POSTWAR UNITED STATES: THE 
CASE OF PLANT-CLOSING LEGISLATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter shows that the United States had established exceptionally liberal rules 
governing the termination of employment relations compared to other industrialized countries 
before World War II.  Regulations widely adopted in Western Europe and Japan such as 
mandatory severance pay and employee participation in layoff decisions are largely unknown to 
the American public.  While most industrialized countries introduced the employer requirement 
of pre-notification of layoff before the late 1960s, the United States adopted in 1988 the Workers 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, which was the first federal legislation 
requiring employers to give advance notice to workers affected by plant closings and mass 
layoff.   
This chapter addresses the question of why the WARN Act was enacted as late as 1988, 
although numerous attempts had been made in the U.S. Congress to pass legislation regulating 
mass layoff since 1974.  Much of what has been written about the WARN Act focused on the 
100th Congress in which the law was passed.  This one-snapshot approach is limited because it 
does not account for why previous Congresses did not pass plant closing legislation although the 
conditions that it claims explain the adoption of the WARN Act had existed prior to the 100th 
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Congress.  This paper addresses this gap in the literature by using both a detailed historical 
analysis since the first bill was introduced in 1974 and a statistical analysis of congressional 
votes on plant-closing bills during the 100th Congress. 
When the first federal plant-closing bill was introduced in 1974, it required employers to 
provide at least 2 years’ notice to affected workers before closing plants.  It also provided the 
federal government with the authority to investigate individual plant-closing cases and to deny 
federal benefits to employers who have closed plants against the will of the federal government.  
While the mandatory notice period proposed was reduced year after year, proponents sought to 
mandate severance pay and consultation with labor unions to limit plant closings and mass 
layoffs.  However, the 1988 WARN Act finally adopted put no other requirements on businesses 
than 60 days’ advance notice for firms with 100 employees and more, which is extraordinarily 
weak by OECD standards (OECD 2004).   
How could the United States end up with the most permissive rule of layoff among 
industrialized countries after the tidal wave of plant closings during the 1970s and 1980s?  The 
answer lies not in the opposition from American capitalists and their allied politicians, although 
their opposition was truly vehement, nor in the anti-big-government culture among American 
citizens.  The role of political institutions designed to limit and counteract majority rule is the 
explanation.  The division of powers characterizing the American political system prevented the 
swift adoption of comprehensive plant-closing legislation in a couple of ways.  First, the 1988 
WARN Act could not possibly contain other provisions more restrictive than the employer 
requirement of advance notice prior to layoff because the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981 overruled 
the National Labor Relations Board’s decision that employers were required to consult with 
labor unions regarding plant-closing decisions.  With the managerial prerogative of allocating 
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capital being untouched, the remaining option for legislators was to minimize the impact of job 
loss on affected workers.  
However, even the requirement of advance notice did not make it out of committees in 
either Houses of the Congress until 1985 because of the distributive effect of potential plant-
closing legislation on the competitive advantage of each state.  Plant closures during the 1970s 
unevenly affected states.  Between 1969 and 1979, only 14 out of 50 states experienced net job 
losses in manufacturing sectors and most of them were located in the Northeastern region.  
Although plant closures and mass layoffs increasingly became a nation-wide problem during the 
early 1980s, variations of net job loss remained considerable among different regions.  
Therefore, proponents of plant-closing legislation were forced to water down their bills to soothe 
members of the Congress from states that reaped relative gains from corporate migration.   
Understanding the legislative history of the WARN Act helps control competing 
hypotheses.  The U.S. Congress spent 14 years to pass plant-closing legislation since the first bill 
was introduced in 1974.  This time span is sufficient to examine the validity of other 
explanations for the WARN Act.  For example, various efforts have been made to explain the 
adoption of plant-closing legislation in terms of large-scale domestic job losses in manufacturing 
industries (U.S. Congress Senate 1987), labor unions’ effective political actions (Dark 2001), or 
the impact of the election year politics in 1988 (Susser 1988).  And yet, all these explanations are 
limited.  The deindustrialization hypothesis does not address why the U.S. government did not 
respond to massive job dislocations engendered during the 1970s in the same fashion as 
European countries that substantially strengthened the government regulation of layoff.  The 
strategy of labor is also irrelevant because it does not explain why the U.S. Congress passed 
plant closing legislation as late as 1988 although American labor would have been better served 
 81 
during the late 1970s with the Democratic administration and greater union membership, 
compared to constrained union resources under the Reagan administration.  Finally, although 
Democrats successfully engineered the WARN Act by framing it as their primary election issue 
in 1988, the election-year-politics hypothesis ignores the question why they were not successful 
in previous election years.    
4.2 PLANT CLOSURES: THE EXTENT AND RESPONSES 
4.2.1 The end of prosperity with job security  
The two decades after the Second World War was a heyday of American capitalism, in which 
economic growth accompanied worker job security.  The United States emerged from the war as 
the dominant economic power in the areas of trade, money, and finance (Gilpin 1987).  Major 
American manufacturers dominate world markets, international monetary order was built on the 
U.S. dollar, and the U.S. was the largest creditor in the world.   
Against this backdrop, an implicit social contract between capital and labor was possible.  
After the National Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1935, labor militancy became a matter of 
great concern to American employers.45  However, after the Second World War ended, class 
struggle became increasingly negotiated and institutionalized between business and labor unions 
protected by the National Labor Relations Act.  Major unionized firms tended to provide their 
workers with higher wages and corporate welfare because they wanted labor peace for making 
                                                 
45 One notable example was the 44-day Flint sit-down strike in 1937, which led to the first United Automobile 
Workers contract with General Motors. 
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investments.  As can be shown in Table 5, increasing corporate profit during the 1950s and 
1960s made possible rent-sharing with workers.  Labor unions’ strategies were focused on 
greater economic benefits from business, while they deferred to the managerial decisions on 
“larger” issues such as shut-downs and cutbacks (Bluestone and Harrison 1982: 139).  They 
expected that layoffs would be temporary and those unemployed due to lack of work would be 
recalled sooner than later.  Further, they sought to make labor contracts that would require 
employers to lay off the people with the least seniority first.  Under the seniority rule, therefore, 
even temporary layoffs were inflicted on relatively young, less-skilled workers.  Core blue-collar 
workers in large corporations came to anticipate that their jobs would be held for lifetime, as 
indicated in the secular decline in manufacturing job separation between 1936 and 1958 (Dewey 
1960, 280).  Because skilled blue-collar workers and most white-collar workers were distant 
from the risk of job loss, the popular demand for introducing government regulation of layoffs 
was rarely heard.  Strikes over job loss almost never occurred in major unionized firms (Golden 
1997).   
 
Table 5  Rates of Return on Capital for Manufacturing Corporations, After-tax 
Years 1951-54 1955-58 1959-62 1963-66 1967-70 1971-74 1975-78 
Percent 6.9 6.8 7.7 11.4 8.5 6.0 6.3 
Source: Holland and Myers (1980: 321) 
 
This postwar boom of American economy ended during the early 1970s.  Between 1970 
and 1975, real gross national product increased only 2.1 percent per year, compared with 3.8 
percent during the 1960s.  Between these two periods, annual labor productivity growth in 
manufacturing sectors measured by output per man-hour was also reduced from 2.9 percent to 
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1.9 percent.  The slowdown of economic growth resulted in the rise of unemployment rates since 
1970.  Especially, U.S. manufacturing employment was serious affected.  As Figure 9 shows, the 
United States lost over 500,000 jobs in manufacturing industries between 1967 and 1972. 
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Figure 9  Changes in U.S. Manufacturing Employment 
Source: Roberts (1986: 9) 
Note: Establishments with greater than 19 employees 
 
The problem of plant closures and permanent layoffs posed a very serious threat to the 
job security of skilled blue-collar workers, rendering traditional job-security measures 
ineffective.  It also hurt union organizations.  Between 1973 and 1975, unions in manufacturing 
corporations lost 15 percent of their members, largely due to the decline of manufacturing 
employment (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003).  As a sign of major unions’ concern about this 
situation, a delegation of ten unionists from the United Auto Workers, United Steelworkers and 
International Association of Machinists visited Sweden, West Germany and the United Kingdom 
in 1978 to study policies and practices to cope with plant closures and mass layoffs.  The joint 
report of this Economic Dislocation Study Tour concluded: 
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Advance notice of impending layoffs, dismissals and plant shutdowns should be given to 
government, affected trade unions and individual workers as soon as the employer contemplates the 
decision.  Since in many cases in the United States the lag time between shut-down and a new startup 
or conversion of an abandoned facility is three to five years, and in many other cases conversion is 
never made, then a one-year mandatory prenotification period is not unreasonable.46
 
Organized labor began to change their strategies in response to the problem of economic 
dislocation.  Previously, the focus of union initiative had been on income security of workers.  
However, unions began to fight for general measures to limit the freedom of corporations to 
decide unilaterally where and how to produce, which included advance notice of plant closures 
or relocations and workers participation in managerial decisions (Beckman 1980).  They also 
began to recognize legislation as a supplement to collective bargaining in this struggle.  
Therefore, they provided strong support for the efforts by a group of Congressmen from 
Northeast and Midwest regions – William Clay, Silvio Conte, and William Ford – to pass plant-
closing legislation.47  
4.2.2 Legislative efforts to regulate plant closures and mass layoffs 
As a large number of plant closures and permanent layoffs affected major manufacturing 
industries, legislative efforts were made to put into effect the government regulation of plant 
closures driven by business reasons during the mid-1970s.  Although there were some states that 
adopted different types of plant-closing legislation in advance of federal action, state action was 
limited in number and minimal in scope.  Before 1988, Maine, Hawaii, and Wisconsin were the 
                                                 
46 Economic Dislocation: Plant Closings, Plant Relocations and Plant Conversion. Policies and Programs in Three 
Countries: Recommendations for the United States. Joint Report of Labor Union Study Tour Participants. May 1, 
1979. p. 33. 
47 Statement of Marc Stepp, vice president of UAW, in Hearings before the House Committee on Education and 
Labor on H.R. 76, 95th Cong. 1st sess. August 15, 1978. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.  Also, 
William Ford said that the proponents of plant-closing legislation had worked very closely with the UAW and its 
counsel in drafting this bill.  Ibid, p. 79.  
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only states that required employers to give advance notice of plant-closings to affected workers.  
These state laws stipulated 60-days’ advance notice, while Maine required severance pay as well.  
Connecticut did not require advance notice, but required non-bankrupt firms to maintain health 
insurance and other benefits for up to 120 days for workers plant closings affected.  
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Michigan had voluntary programs in which firms were urged to 
provide advance notice or to continue benefits (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment 
1986).  
At the federal level, plant-closing bills were introduced in every Congress except for once 
since 1974.  However, as Tables 6 and 7 show, those bills did not make it out of committees in 
either House until 1985.  In 1985, the Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act 
reached the House floor but it was defeated by a vote of 203-208.  In 1987, the Senate 
incorporated the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act into its version 
of Omnibus Trade Act, which was passed by both Houses but vetoed by Reagan in May 1988.  
After the Senate failed to override the veto, Senator Metzenbaum removed plant-closing 
provisions from the Trade Act and introduced them as the WARN Act.  Both Houses passed the 
new bill with vote margin to override the presidential veto.  The WARN Act was finally enacted 
without President Reagan signing on it.     
Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that proponents of federal plant-closing legislation had to 
significantly water down their bills to increase the possibility of passage.  The National 
Employment Priorities Act during the 1970s focused on empowering the federal government to 
judge the business decision to close plants by requiring justifiable reasons for plant shutdowns.  
After unsuccessful legislative campaigns to promote this bill, proponents of plant-closing 
legislation shifted their focus to the requirement of severance pay in 1979 and subsequently in 
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1985 to the employers’ duty of consultation with labor unions prior to plant closures.  None of 
these efforts were successful and after all 60-day advance notice was the only restriction on 
business when the Congress finally passed the WARN Act.48   
Although the WARN Act was certainly a victory for pro-labor groups, they had to make 
compromise to earn it.49  They reduced the notice period to 60 days compared with 90 days of 
the 1985 Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act.  The WARN Act raised the 
small business exemption from 50 to 100 employees and exempted layoffs in which less than 
one-third of the workforce was affected.  Moreover, the WARN Act put a provision exempt 
employers unable to comply the notice requirement because of unforeseeable business 
circumstances.  In the next sections, I will demonstrate how this legislative outcome was brought 
about by focusing on political institutional factors. 
 
Table 6  Major Plant Closing Bills Introduced in the House 
Employer requirements at time of last legislative action 
Congress Bill number Bill title 
Date 
introduced Sponsor Advance 
notice 
Consultation 
with unions 
Severance 
pay 
Justifiable 
dislocation 
Last legislative 
action 
93 HR 13541 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1974-03-
18 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(2 years)   X 
Referred to 
House 
Committee on 
Education and 
Labor 
94 HR 76 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1975-01-
14 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(2 years)   X 
Referred to 
House 
Committee on 
Education and 
Labor 
                                                 
48 It should be noted that while the provision of advance notice had been included since 1974, the length of notice 
was significantly reduced from the minimum 6 months under the 1979 bills to the flat 60 days under the 1987 bills.    
49 The original legislative compromise was made on the plant-closing provision in the 1987 Omnibus Trade Act, 
which basically re-appeared in the WARN Act.  For the legislative history of plant-closing legislation during the 
100th Congress, see Bureau of National Report. Plant Closings: The Complete Resource Guide. Washington D.C.: 
The Bureau of National Affairs. 1988. pp. 9-19. 
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95 HR 76 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1977-01-
04 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(2 years)   X 
Referred to 
House 
Committee on 
Education and 
Labor 
96 HR 5040 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1979-07-
31 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(6 
months 
~ 2 
years) 
 
X 
(52 
weeks) 
 
Referred to 
House 
Committee on 
Education and 
Labor 
98 HR 2847 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1983-05-
02 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(1 year)  
X 
(1 year)  
Subcommittee 
Hearings and 
Subcommittee 
Mark-up 
Session Held 
99 HR 1616 
Labor-
Management 
Notification 
& 
Consultation 
Act 
1985-03-
20 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(90 
days) 
Removed 
by 
amendment 
  
Failed of 
Passage in 
House by Yea-
Nay Vote: 203 
- 208 
HR 1122 
Economic 
Dislocation 
& Worker 
Adjustment 
Assistance 
Act 
1987-02-
18 
William 
D. Ford 
X 
(90 ~ 
180 
days) 
X   Reported to House 
100 
HR 3 Omnibus Trade Act 
1987-01-
06 
Richard 
A. 
Gephardt 
X 
(60 
days) 
   
Failed of 
passage in 
 Senate over 
veto by Yea-
Nay Vote: 61-
37 
Source: The Library of Congress. THOMAS. 
Table 7  Major Plant Closing Bills Introduced in the Senate 
Employer requirements at time of last legislative action 
Congress Bill number Bill title 
Date 
introduced Sponsor Advance 
notice 
Consultation 
with unions 
Severance 
pay 
Justifiable 
dislocation 
Result 
93 S 2809 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1973-12-
13 
Walter F. 
Mondale 
X 
(2 years)   X 
Referred to 
Senate 
Committee on 
Labor and 
Public 
Welfare 
96 S 1608 
National 
Employment 
Priorities Act 
1979-07-
31 
Donald W. 
Riegle, Jr. 
X 
(6 
months ~ 
2 years) 
 X(1 year)  
Referred to 
Senate 
Committee on 
Labor and 
Human 
Resources 
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S 538 
Economic 
Dislocation & 
Worker 
Adjustment 
Assistance 
Act 
1987-02-
19 
Howard M. 
Metzenbaum 
X 
(90 ~ 180 
days) 
X   
Senate 
incorporated 
this measure 
into S 1420 
S 1420 Omnibus Trade Act 
1987-06-
24 
Robert C. 
Byrd 
X 
(60 days)    
Senate 
incorporated 
this measure 
into HR 3 
100 
S 2527 
Worker 
Adjustment & 
Retraining 
Notification 
Act 
1988-06-
16 
Howard M. 
Metzenbaum 
X 
(60 days)    
Became 
Public Law 
No. 100-379 
Source: The Library of Congress. THOMAS 
4.3 THE ROLE OF COURTS  
4.3.1 The managerial prerogative  
The fundamental right of management to shut down or relocate plants must be viewed in the 
context of the employment-at-will doctrine.  As shown in the previous chapter, this doctrine 
states that employees without written employment contracts can be fired without for good cause, 
bad cause, or no cause at all.  It follows that there are no employer obligations to provide 
advance notice or compensation for dismissed workers.  This has been a long-standing rule 
governing the termination of employment in the United States since the last half of the 
nineteenth century (Shapiro and Tune 1974; DeGiuseppe 1981; Jacoby 1982).  It has limited the 
ability of politicians with serious fear of losing elections to launch legislation restricting the 
management right to layoff because it was enshrined in the decisions of high courts at both 
federal and state levels.  In the early twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court overrode federal 
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legislation that prohibited discharges for union activities based on the notion of employer’s 
freedom of enterprise.50  Although this ruling was overridden by the post-New Deal decisions,51 
the rise of organized labor the New Deal produced did not mean an end to the employment-at-
will doctrine.  The decision to lay off employees remained a managerial prerogative.    
During the heyday of American capitalism, organized labor did not attack this managerial 
prerogative.  Instead, it focused on extracting raises in wage and benefit.  Since the late 1970s, 
however, organized labor began to challenge this managerial prerogative, drawing upon unions’ 
right to bargaining in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act.  This law requires 
employers to negotiate with labor unions on conditions of work such as wages, hours, and 
benefits.  Labor unions argued that employer’s plant-closing decision was a mandatory 
bargaining subject under the National Labor Relations Act, drawing upon the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp v. NLRB that required bargaining on a 
decision to subcontract under certain conditions.52  
To labor’s chagrin, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1981 that employers had 
no obligation to bargain with unions over the decision to close part of its business, unless labor 
costs were an important factor in the decision.53   The Court limited the application of the 
National Labor Relations Act to plant-closing situations, based upon the theory that management 
decision fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise should be excluded from 
collective bargaining (Irving 2000).     
                                                 
50 Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
51 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 
(1941). 
52 Fireboard Paper Products Corp. v N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
53 First National Maintenance Corp. v N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981).   
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This Supreme Court decision undermined organized labor’s new strategy for the 1980s.  
It weakened the union drive to gain control over plant closures through collective bargaining.  To 
make matters worse to unions, the National Labor Relations Board reversed itself in 1984, 
finding no duty to bargain over operational changes.54  Organized labor and its allied politicians 
then sought to legalize the mandatory consultation with unions prior to plant-closures in the 1985 
Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act.  Many legislators were reluctant to pass 
the consultation requirement because they saw this proposed measure as overhauling the 
American industrial relations system established by the National Labor Relations Act and the 
Supreme Court decision in First National Maintenance.  Republican Representative Jim Jeffords 
testified to this: 
 
I think it is important to point out that, under existing labor law, bargaining or consulting in this area 
would be limited to issues involving labor costs. That is the law as I understand it, and I do not believe 
that there is any substantial disagreement on this.  Nor do I believe there is any disagreement with the 
fact that this bill intends to change that basic labor law and to overrule some NLRB decisions by 
broadening the scope of consultation or bargaining in this context, to also include the broader issues 
involved.  *** That is where the real problems and the differences are between these; and the real 
reasons why I know it was difficult for many to support this legislation.55
 
The provision on consultation was removed by amendment during the House floor 
debate.  The final bill with 90-day notice requirement was rejected by 203-208.      
 
                                                 
54 Otis Elevator Company, 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).  Recited from Kovach and Millspaugh (1987). 
55 U.S. Congress. House. 99th Cong., 1st sess. 2131. Cong Rec H 9992. November 12, 1985. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office. 
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4.3.2 A new development in state courts  
While the U.S. Supreme Court kept unions out of the decision to close plants, state courts were 
eroding the employment-at-will doctrine by providing common-law protections against wrongful 
discharge during the 1980s.  These common-law protections prevent terminations of employment 
for reasons that violate a State’s public policy, terminations after an implied contract of 
continuous employment has been established, and terminations made in bad faith or malice 
intended (Muhl 2001).  Figure 10 demonstrates the proliferation of these three exceptions to the 
employment at will between 1979 and 1987.  The number of States that adopted the public-
policy exception increased rapidly from 8 to 33.  The implied-contract exception was recognized 
in only 2 States before 1980, but it was adopted in 37 out of 50 States by 1987.  The expansion 
of the covenant-of-good-faith exception was rather gradual.  This exception was recognized in 
only 8 States as of 1987. 
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Figure 10  Timing of Judicial Adoption of Wrongful Discharge Doctrines 
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Source: Walsh and Schwarz (1996) 
 
Among the three wrongful discharge doctrines, implied-contract and covenant-of-good-
faith-and-fair-dealing doctrines had important implications for plant closings because they 
represented the emerging idea that workers had property rights to the jobs they held.56  Even if 
employers have the fundamental right to make decisions over the basic allocation of capital, 
workers’ job rights might give rise to financial liability for the employees’ loss of jobs.  The 
Atari case was a notable example in which these wrongful discharge doctrines were applied to 
plant-closing situations.  In 1983, some 600 Atari employees in California were abruptly 
informed that they were being terminated due to the company’s move to Hong Kong and Taiwan 
and they were required to quit on the same day.57  The discharged workers filed a suit against 
their former employer, alleging that their discharges with no advance notice constituted wrongful 
discharge based on breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
(O’Connell, Jr. 1986: 114).  Wrongful discharge doctrines were a central feature of the Atari 
case, because there was no union contract on that situation nor plant-closing legislation in 
California.  This class action suit settled for an amount equal to four weeks wages for each of the 
537 employees who were members of the class, plus $390,000 in attorneys’ fees (Rhine 1986: 
362n).   
                                                 
56 Senator Metzenbaum, sponsor of the WARN Act, provided justification for the legislation based on the principle 
of fair dealing as follows: 
 
I have heard of instance after instance after instance where the management has walked in and said to 
the employees: “Pack up your tools, pack up your lunchbox, clean out your lockers, you are through, 
now.”  What kind of fairness, what kind of equity, what kind of decency, what kind of compassion 
would cause an employer to do that? (U.S. Congress. Senate. 100th Cong., 2nd sess. 134 Cong Rec S 
8449. June 23, 1988). 
 
57 Santa Clara Cty. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 15, 1983.  Rep. William D. Ford mentioned the Atari layoff in his letter to 
other members of the Congress.  See William D. Ford to Colleague, 14 April 1983, Box 36, William D. Ford Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 
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The role of courts in shaping employment protection during the 1980s explains why the 
United States did not adopt the German-style worker-participation model to regulate plant 
closures and mass layoff.  The U.S. Supreme Court forestalled the union drive to control the 
decision to close plants, holding that a decision on plant closures is a part of employer’s 
fundamental right to enterprise.  However, a notion of workers’ job rights based on wrongful 
discharge doctrines expanded the public sentiment that employees should be given advance 
notice of plant closures.  In the next section, I will examine how the political impact of this 
public concern for job security was limited by the role of competitive federalism. 
4.4 POLITICS OF PLANT-CLOSING LEGISLATION 
4.4.1 Interstate competition for investment  
Before the 1988 WARN Act, there were only three states that required advance notice of plant 
closings.  As competition between states and municipalities for business and jobs impeded state 
action, labor unions and state legislatures called for comprehensive federal legislation to cope 
with the problem of plant closings.58  However, inter-jurisdictional competition inherent in the 
American federal system also turned out to be a stumbling block for federal plant-closing 
legislation.   
As Figure 11 shows, changes in manufacturing jobs during the 1970s divided regions in 
the United States into two groups.  While states in the Mid-Atlantic region suffered from the 
                                                 
58 See Statement of Marc Stepp, vice president of UAW, and enclosed Senate Resolution of the State of Connecticut 
in U.S. Congress. Hearing before the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 76, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 
August 15, 1978. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
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severest job loss, all other regions except for New England, Mid-Atlantic, and East-North 
Central regions experienced job growth.  Thus, regulating plant closures became a political issue 
between two different regions: the Frost Belt comprising traditionally industrial states in the 
North and the other group of states called the Sun Belt.   
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Figure 11 Changes in Manufacturing Employment by Region, 1969-1979 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Various years. 
Note: The nine regions presented here are New England, Mid-Atlantic, East-North Central, West-
North Central, South Atlantic, East-South Central, West-South Central, Mountain, and Pacific 
regions.   
 
Economically less developed states in the Sun Belt sought to attract business investment 
by using the competitive leverages of low labor costs and weak labor unions against the Frost 
Belt.  In 1970, the state labor cost in North Carolina was merely 32 percent of that in Michigan 
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(Hansen 2004).59   Despite the lack of statutory requirement of notice, differentials in union 
power accounted for the varying degree of contractual obligation of employers to provide layoff 
notice between the Frost Belt and the Sun Belt.  For example, the average American blue-collar 
worker received only seven days’ notice and nonunion workers received only two days’ notice in 
1986 (Ford 1987: 54).  Meanwhile, states in the Frost Belt, which were industrial bases for many 
big unionized manufacturers such as steel and auto industries, tended to have union contracts that 
required more than a few months’ advance notice in case of plant closures.60   
Plant closures and mass layoffs had serious impacts on the state economy because they 
meant the decline of tax bases and the rising pressure for greater state social expenditures such as 
unemployment benefits.  Therefore, proponents of plant-closing legislation sought to stem the 
movement of jobs from the Frost Belt to the Sun Belt by making plant closures more difficult.  
Rep. William D. Ford, a long-time sponsor of plant-closing bills, revealed the motive behind his 
pursuit of federal plant-closing legislation in a letter he wrote to a local economic director in his 
district: 
This section [the National Employment Priorities Act] provides for incentives designed to retain 
industry in states such as Michigan with higher labor costs, and to discourage industries from 
relocating to states, particularly in the South, with low wage rates.61
 
Not surprisingly, this legislative initiative faced a fierce opposition from the states that 
benefited from interstate capital mobility.  They criticized legislative actions to enact federal 
                                                 
59 Hansen calculated relative labor costs across states based on average workmen's compensation benefits, percent 
union members, average unemployment benefits, average manufacturing wages, and presence or absence of right to 
work laws.   
60 Major union contracts in the electrical machinery, automobile, rubber, and meatpacking industries stipulated a 6-
month advance notice requirement in 1984 (Craft 1984: 50).  The labor contract between the steel industry and the 
United Steelworkers of America included a 90-day notice provision in 1987.  See Statement of J. Bruce Johnston, 
Executive Vice-President of USX Corporation on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers in U.S. 
Congress. Hearing before the House Committee on Education and Labor. 100th Cong., 1st sess. March 17, 1987. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.  
61 William D. Ford to Ernest H. Maddock, 17 March 1975, Box 90, William D. Ford Papers, Bentley Historical 
Library, University of Michigan. 
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plant-closing legislation as a conspiracy of Northern states to prevent corporate migration from 
the Rust Belt to the Sun Belt.  Rep. William D. Ford confessed: 
 
This traditionally industrial region finds itself trying to compete with other states which, in their 
anxiety to build up their own industrial base, started this legalized bribery to induce the location of 
new industry in their areas.  Of course, we cannot complain about anybody doing that.  I guess you are 
aware that the Alabama Industrial Development Commission has selected out this piece of legislation 
[National Employment Priorities Act] as a Communist plot to keep Alabama from developing to its 
full potential.  They have devoted attacks on the legislation, its sponsors and the whole “plot.”62   
 
When I first introduced plant-closing legislation in 1974, it was perceived as an attempt to keep jobs 
from relocating to the South from Michigan and other Northern States. Plant closings were seen as a 
“Frost Belt” problem.63
 
Facing the opposition from states that benefited from corporate migration, proponents of 
plant-closing legislation struggled to muster majority support for their bills in both Houses of the 
Congress.  But legislative actions in the Senate were considerably weaker than in the House.  
Only 15 out of 50 states lost manufacturing jobs during the 1970s, clearly outnumbered in the 
U.S. Senate.64  For 1974-1979, plant-closing bills were introduced to the Senate only in two 
Congresses, while the House held congressional hearings on plant-closing bills in every 
Congress.  The number of cosponsors in the House gradually increased from 13 in 1974 to 63 in 
1979.  However, only two Senators cosponsored the 1979 National Employment Priorities Act, 
although Democrats controlled the Senate in that year.   
Between 1979 and 1986, job dislocations increasingly became a national problem.  As a 
result, manufacturing job growth was recorded in only 13 states for this period.  Sponsors of 
plant-closing bills expected the Congress to pass them, pointing out the proliferation of worker 
                                                 
62 U.S. Congress. Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 76. August 15, 1978. 95th 
Cong., 2nd sess. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
63 U.S. Congress. House. 134 Cong Rec H 3533. 100th Cong. 2nd sess. May 24, 1988. Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office. 
64 U.S. Bureau of Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Various years.  
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dislocation.65  Despite the proliferation of plant closures and mass layoffs, there were not a 
single plant-closing bill introduced to the Senate between 1979 and 1987.66   
The Republican-controlled Senate may be the partial reason for why the plant-closing 
bills were not even proposed in the Senate during 1981-1986.  However, proponents of plant-
closing bills suffered from the lack of political support from relatively well-performing states in 
terms of job creation as the divergence of manufacturing job performances remained significant 
among states.  Figure 12 compares the changes in manufacturing job loss of each state for 
different time periods.  For the first period of 1969-1979, 33 states outperformed the national 
average.  For the second period of 1979-1986, the number of states whose job loss rates were 
below the national average decreased to 27.  However, there were still 21 states that had 
consistently outperformed the national average since 1969, compared with 10 states whose job 
loss rates had been greater than the national average throughout the periods.  These 21 states 
represented the greatest beneficiaries from the problem of economic dislocation that inflicted 
heavy job losses on the Frost Belt states.   
 
                                                 
65 U.S. Congress. Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 2847. July 25, 1983. 99th 
Cong., 1st sess. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.  See the statements of Representatives William Clay 
and William Ford on pages 1-3. 
66 Bills fared better in the House Democrats controlled, although not successful.  In 1985, the Labor-Management 
Notification and Consultation Act reached the House floor but it was narrowly defeated by a vote of 203-208.  This 
bill required employers of at east 50 full-time employees to give workers 90 days’ notice of any plant shutdown or 
layoff involving at least 100 employees or 30 percent of the workforce.  49 Southern Democrats voted against this 
bill (CQ Almanac 1985, 120-H). 
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Figure 12  Changes in Job Loss in Manufacturing Industries by State 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Various years. 
Notes:  
1. The x-axis denotes the percentage loss of manufacturing employment for 1969-1979, while the y- 
axis for 1979-1986. 
2. The higher score along the x and y axes means a greater job-loss rate.  
3. The red crossed lines represent national averages for each period.  
 
It is interesting to see that the positive relationship between state labor costs and net job 
loss became stronger during the 1980s despite the proliferation of worker dislocation over the 
1980s.  Using Hansen’s state-labor-cost scores, net job losses between 1970 and 1979 were 
marginally related to state labor costs in 1970 (Pearson’s r = 0.25).  However, net job losses 
between 1979 and 1986 were quite strongly related to state labor costs in 1979 (Pearson’s r = 
0.53).  This indicates that the problem of worker dislocation affected most states but with a 
varying degree: states with higher labor costs were hit harder.  States vying for jobs and 
investment still had the incentive to use lower labor costs to lure business.  Therefore, as Table 6 
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and 7 indicates, proponents of plant-closing legislation were forced to make compromise over 
the 1980s if they were to have any chance to see the legislation.          
4.4.2 Trade deficits and election 
The year of 1987 saw new developments.  First, now it became clear to the public that white-
collars were no longer immune to job displacements.  During the then-President Reagan term in 
office, American firms began to resort to deep corporate restructuring as a way to reduce large 
corporate debts and to maximize their shareholder values (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000).  This 
led to a gradual increase of white-collar job loss between 1979 and 1985 as shown in Table 8.  
The strong public sentiment against free layoffs resonated in a 1987 opinion poll, where 86 
percent of Americans supported mandatory advance notice.67  
 
Table 8 Increasing Risk of White-Collar Job Loss 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, various years. 
 
                                                 
67 “Happy days may be here again for labor legislation.” Business Week. June 22, 1987. p. 57. 
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Second, Democrats gained control over both Houses in 1987.  Early in that year, 
Democrats renewed their legislative campaign to pass plant-closing legislation as Rep. William 
Ford and Sen. Howard Metzenbaum respectively introduced to the House and the Senate the 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, which required employers to give 
180 days’ notice before closing down or laying off a large number of workers.   
Despite the Democratic control over the Congress, the success of this bill did not loom 
large in either House.  Therefore, Democrats maneuvered to muster congressional support for 
notice requirement.  Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy, Howard Metzenbaum, and Robert 
Byrd softened the language by reducing the notice period to 60 days and raising the small 
business exemption from firms with 50 employees to 100 employees.  Then, they incorporated 
this new language into the Omnibus Trade Act.   
Although President Reagan and many Republican legislators criticized that plant-closing 
legislation had little to do with the Trade Act, linking plant closings with trade proved to be an 
effective tactic.  The U.S. trade deficits had been exploding since the early 1980s (U.S. 
Department of Commerce), which was the chief impetus for the trade legislation.  Early in 1987, 
Democrats made passage of a trade bill a top priority for the new, Democratic-controlled 
Congress.68  Besides the notice requirement, the Senate bill included provisions requiring the 
federal government to provide relief for domestic industries affected by imports and to assist 
U.S. farmers who were victims of unfair foreign trading practices.  It also had a provision 
repealing the seven-year-old “windfall” tax on oil revenues that exceeded a statutory base price.  
Although Southern Democrats were generally cool to plant-closing legislation, they favored the 
                                                 
68 House Speaker Jim Wright of Texas said, “The first imperative in the 100th Congress will be to come to grips with 
the steady decline in American competitiveness and the corollary increase in the trade deficit.”  See CQ Almanac 
(1987: 640). 
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provisions on trade and the windfall tax on oil revenues.  The combination of the soft statutory 
language and trade linkages worked effectively for the proponents of notice requirement.  The 
Omnibus Trade Act was passed by the Senate in July 1987.  All of the seventeen Southern 
Democrats voted for the bill.   
The conference report on the Omnibus Trade Act was passed by both Houses in April 
1988 and sent to President Reagan.  The conference report added a provision on protecting U.S. 
textile industries, which weakened anti-labor sentiments among Southeastern Democrats, as did 
repealing the windfall tax on oil revenues did among Southwestern Democrats (CQ Almanac 
1988, 12-B).  However, President Reagan vetoed the bill on May 24, pointing to mandatory 
advance notice of plant closings as a major reason.69  While the House passed the bill again over 
Reagan’s veto, the Senate failed to override the presidential veto partly because of two 
Republican Senators of Alaska opposing the control over Alaskan oil export inserted to the 
conference report.  Democrats in the Senate needed more support from the other side of the aisle 
to muster the necessary two-thirds majority.   
After the Senate was unable to override the President’s veto, Democratic leaders removed 
the notice requirement from the trade bill and introduced it as a separate bill on June 16, while 
another version of the trade bill was introduced without the plant-closing notice requirement.  
The Senate overwhelmingly passed the new plant-closing bill (WARN Act) by 72 to 23, sending 
a message to Reagan that his veto would not be sustained.  Republican Presidential candidate 
George Bush and Republican leaders in the Congress urged Reagan not to veto the WARN Act 
                                                 
69 Reagan wrote in his message sent to the Congress, “The issue receiving the most attention in this bill is the 
mandatory requirement for business to give advance notice of closings or layoffs.  I support voluntarily giving 
workers and communities as much advance warning as possible when a layoff or closing becomes necessary.  It 
allows the workers, the employer, the community, time to adjust to the dislocation.  It is the humane thing to do.  
But I object to the idea that the Federal Government would arbitrarily mandate, for all conditions and under all 
circumstances, exactly when and in what form that notification should take place.”  See CQ Almanac (1988: 15-C).  
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because they feared that Reagan’s veto would reinforce the voters’ perception that Republicans 
were not interested in working people and therefore could damage Republican candidates in the 
upcoming fall election.70  Reagan withheld his veto this time and allowed the WARN Act to be 
enacted.  
4.4.3 Statistical analysis 
The theory of competitive federalism predicts that states performing well in creating jobs will 
resist federal-plant closing legislation, while states losing jobs will support the legislation.  I test 
this theory for the U.S. Senate in the 100th Congress, assuming that senators would vote on plant-
closing bills for the interests of the states they represent.  The dependent variable is individual 
senators’ binary choices between yes or no on the Omnibus Trade Act and the WARN Act.  
Congressional Quarterly Almanac provided the roll call data. 
JOBLOSS is my key explanatory variable linking interstate competition with senators’ 
votes.  It means the percentage change of net job loss in manufacturing sectors in each state 
between 1979 and 1986 (for the 1987 Omnibus Trade Act) or between 1979 and 1987 (for the 
1988 WARN Act).  My prediction is that a senator is more likely to vote for a plant-closing bill, 
if his state experienced a greater job loss rate over the period.  The level of U.S. manufacturing 
employment reached a peak in 1979 and then began to decline.  In this trend, plant closings 
increasingly became a nation-wide problem affecting some states in the Sun-Belt region.  By 
choosing 1979 as a base year, I seek to test if the geographical expansion of job dislocations 
diminished the logic of interstate economic competition.   
                                                 
70 “Reagan Is Pressed on Plant Closings.” New York Times. July 27, 1988. A1. 
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The other independent variables are IDEOLOGY, UNION, and WAGE.  IDEOLOGY is 
senator’s ideology, ranging from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative).  My hypothesis is 
that more conservative Senators are less likely to vote for plant-closing bills because they oppose 
government intervention in the economy.  The ideology data come from Keith Poole’s first 
dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores.71  UNION represents labor union’s power in each state.  
My prediction is that senators from strong union states will be more likely to support plant-
closing bills because of labor unions’ pressures.  The power of labor unions is measured by the 
percentage of union membership in total employment.  The state union membership data come 
from Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson’s database compiled from the Current Population 
Survey.72   
Finally, I specify WAGE to account for the effect of state skill profiles on the employer 
preference about long-term employment.  There is political economy literature that industries 
dependent on high-skilled labor would be more cautious to implement cutbacks because of high 
labor turnover costs (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001).  Then, states abundant with 
plants using high-skilled workers will be less sensitive to the labor-cost effect of plant-closing 
bills than states abundant with plants using low-skilled workers.73  Drawing from the economics 
literature that wages are returns to skill (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993), I use state average 
hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing sectors to measure state skill profiles.  
My hypothesis is that states in which workers are paid higher wages per hour are more likely to 
support plant-closing bills.  I use hourly earning data for 1986, which come from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
                                                 
71 The Poole database can be accessed at http://voteview.com
72 The Hirsch and Macpherson database can be reached at http://www.unionstats.com. 
73 Notice that the requirement of advance notice in the Omnibus Trade Act and the WARN Act applied to large-
scale cutbacks as well as pure plant-shutdowns.   
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Table 9 summarizes regression results of the Senate vote on the Omnibus Trade Act and 
the WARN Act.  What is common to both models is that IDEOLOGY is the most powerful and 
statistically significant predictor of the Senate vote on plant-closing bills.  For a standard 
deviation increase in IDEOLOGY, the odds of the senator voting for the bill decrease 92 percent 
for Model I and 99.6 percent for Model II.  UNION and WAGE do not have statistically 
significant effects on the voting behaviors of senators.  It seems that neither labor unions 
supporting plant-closing legislation nor low-skilled industries hostile to restrictions on layoff 
were not important factors in the passage of plant-closing bills.   
However, these two regressions produce quite different results in more details, although 
the notice requirements in the two bills are alike in principles and details and voted on in the 
same Congress.  In Model I, JOBLOSS has a positive effect on the probability of voting for the 
bill as expected and it is almost significant at the 5 percent level.  For a standard deviation 
increase in JOBLOSS, the odds of the senator voting for the Omnibus Trade Act increase 78 
percent.  The sign of UNION is consistent with the hypothesized effect, while the sign of WAGE 
is not.  The negative effect of WAGE seems to be the consequence of senators from lower-wage, 
southern states who supported the bill because of import relief and repeal of the oil windfall 
profit tax.   
In Model II, however, JOBLOSS is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
This might reflect the effect of election-year politics as an exogenous factor because all 
independent variables are either constant or have very strong temporal correlations between 1987 
and 1988.  It seems that the need to woo working-class voters was far greater to Southern 
senators than the potential effect of plant-closing legislation on the business decision to move to 
the South, now that proponents of the pending bill had already softened the language 
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significantly.  The explanatory power of IDEOLOGY is even stronger than Model I, which 
shows that the ideological opposition to the bill by a group of Republican senators became 
highly visible in 1988.  The sign of WAGE is consistent with the hypothesized effect, probably 
because as the notice requirement was detached from the trade bill the effect of trade linkages 
became attenuated and state skill structures of industrial employment became more effective.  
The negative effect of UNION is surprising.  Greater union support from his home state made 
the senator less likely to vote for the WARN Act, although the impact was not statistically 
significant.           
Table 9  Logit Regressions for the Senate Votes on Plant-Closing Bills 
 Model I: Omnibus Trade Act(Passed 71-27 on July 21, 1987)
Model II: WARN Act 
(Passed 72-23 on July 6, 1988) 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient (z 
score) 
Standard 
Factor 
Change 
Coefficient (z 
score) 
Standard 
Factor 
Change 
IDEOLOGY -6.880 (-6.27)*** 0.08 -15.932 (-4.62)*** 0.004 
JOBLOSS 0.050 (1.93)* 1.78 0.017 (0.22) 1.23 
UNION 0.004 (0.06) 1.03 -0.096 (-0.88) 0.54 
WAGE -0.615 (-1.45) 0.49 0.518 (0.84) 1.82 
CONSTANT 7.26 (1.94)* 0.04 (0.96) 
Observations 100 95 
Pseudo-R2 0.52 0.72 
Chi-square 43.04 26.54 
Percent correctly 
predicted 84 94 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable = 1 if a senator voted for plant-closing bills, 0 otherwise.  The 100 observations 
of Model I include two senators who did not vote but announced for the bill.  
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2. * = significant at the 10 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent level.   
3. I used robust estimation to get correct standard errors. 
4. I checked multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF).  A rule of thumb is that a VIF 
larger than 10 is an indication that multicollinearity may be causing a problem (Chatterjee and Price 
1991: 182).  None of the regressors above had VIFs in excess of 2. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The case of U.S. plant-closing legislation shows the extent to which the government regulation 
of layoff can be established in a political system where the strong judiciary has traditionally 
defended the managerial right to layoff and where states and municipalities are forced to 
compete with each other for business and jobs.  The 1988 WARN Act was the first federal 
legislation regulating termination of employment for economic reasons.  Considering the 
employment-at-will doctrine had been the basic rule of employment relationships in the United 
States, this legislation was apparently a victory for organized labor.   
However, the WARN Act was a very limited piece of legislation and has so far had only 
a marginal impact on the employer’s decision to close plants or implement a large scale layoff.  
The long-standing judicial view of managerial prerogatives restricted the scope of intrusion by 
the government and labor unions in the decision to close plants or implement a large-scale layoff.  
Although the notice requirement was a judicially viable option, interstate competition for 
business and jobs forestalled a swift adoption of federal legislation stipulating a longer notice 
period.  During the legislative process in the U.S. Congress, a majority of states opposed the 
introduction of any serious notice requirement because they thought it would straitjacket the 
economic development of their states.  To alleviate this concern, proponents of plant-closing 
legislation were forced to significantly water down their bills.      
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The WARN Act so enacted requires employers to provide affected workers with 60 days’ 
advance notice regardless of their length of service, which is one of the shortest among OECD 
countries.  Even this modest notice requirement is exempted for employers who are planning to 
lay off less than a third of total workforce and whose decision to close plants or lay off workers 
was unforeseeable.  According to a study of 11 states by U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO), more than half of employers employing more than 100 employees and planning to lay 
off 50 employees or more were excluded from the notice requirement under the WARN Act.74   
The WARN Act also lacked effective tools for enforcement.  Lawsuits are the only 
remedy available to workers or local communities under the WARN Act.  The GAO study shows 
that even when plant closures/layoffs appeared to meet WARN requirements, fewer than half of 
the employers provided advance notice and only 29 percent of employers providing notification 
gave the required 60 days’ notice.  Despite the possible violations of the WARN Act, few 
lawsuits were filed since the law was enacted.  The GAO study pointed out the costs associated 
with a lawsuit, the limited incentives, and the uncertainty about outcomes as major reasons why 
workers and local governments were hesitant about filing lawsuits.75            
Since the New Deal era, collective bargaining has been the major tool for organized labor 
to raise the standard of living of workers and to ensure their job security.  The introduction of the 
WARN Act formally marked an end to the laissez faire regime of employment protection.  
However, the WARN Act represents only minimal intervention by the government in the realm 
of employment protection.  This legislation stands consistent with the long-standing 
                                                 
74 Statement of Linda G. Morra. “Dislocated Workers: Implementation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act (WARN).” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources. U.S. Senate. 103th Cong., 1st sess. February 23, 1993. Gaithersburg, MD: U. S. General Accounting 
Office.  
75 Several local officials the GAO interviewed stated that they would run the risk of being viewed as anti-business, 
which could hamper efforts to lure new business investment.  Ibid., p. 5. 
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characteristic of American labor policy since the early twentieth century in that the statutory 
protection of workers against layoff provided by the WARN Act is awfully inadequate. 
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5.0  THE ORIGIN OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN 
GERMANY, 1871-1976 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Germany provides the prima facie example of employment protection legislation among 
industrialized countries.  It has the strongest legal protection of workers against dismissal among 
the three countries under the present study.  Germany’s protection of regular employment is 
higher than the average of fifteen European Union countries prior to the 2004 enlargement 
(OECD 2004).  It is not only the degree of protection it provides that renders it worthwhile to 
study Germany’s employment protection legislation.  Germany has also been a pioneer in the 
area of employment protection legislation.  The current legal system regulating employment 
protection was formed circa 1950 with an important precedent from the Weimar period on the 
basis of the Works Council Act of 1920 (Dose-Digenopoulos and Holand 1985).  Over the 
second half of the twentieth century, German employment protection laws – the Protection 
Against Dismissal Act of 1951, the German Civil Code as revised in 1964, and the Works 
Constitution Acts of 1952 and 1972 – have provided legal standards in the areas of unfair 
dismissal, advance notice, and worker participation in layoff decisions.  In particular, 
distinguished from the French system of dirigiste control over employment relations, Germany’s 
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employment protection legislation features institutional frameworks emphasizing negotiations 
between business and labor, which has been the hallmark of Germany’s social market economy.    
How could German labor have these legal shields against arbitrary layoffs by employers?  
Recently, it has become a conventional view that employment protection legislation is embedded 
in a cluster of economic institutions comprising national capitalist systems, which differentiate 
the business preferences for employment protection (Hall and Soskice 2001).  This varieties-of-
capitalism literature tends to draw upon different economic institutions to explain the strong 
employment protection in Germany (See Chapter 2).  In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the 
passage of historic legislation about employment protection in Germany was a product of the rise 
of organized labor after the collapse of dictatorship regimes and the weakness of 
countermajoritarian political institutions in the new democratic political environments.  Strong 
employment protection in Germany did not originate from employers’ support as the varieties-
of-capitalism literature argues.  Although German employers were interested in retaining skilled 
workers during economic recessions, they equally disliked the intrusion by labor into managerial 
decisions of layoffs.  However, German employers were forced to make concessions to labor’s 
demand for greater job security, when they faced either Social Democrats in power (e.g. the 1920 
Works Council Act, the 1972 Works Constitution Act, the 1976 Codetermination Act) or 
political opportunism to woo working-class voters (e.g. the Protection against Dismissal Act and 
the Codetermination Act of 1951).   
Before I enter main discussions, it seems proper to answer here whether codetermination 
as a prominent character of the German corporate governance system should be considered as 
part of employment protection.  The conventional definition of codetermination is workers’ 
representation on the management and/or supervisory boards of a company to balance 
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employees’ and shareholders’ interests. 76   Following this line, the OECD measurement of 
employment protection (OECD 2004) excludes codetermination à la board-level employee 
representation because the management and supervisory boards are company organs through 
which decision-making over conducting business takes place and as such neither poses external 
constraints on company’s decision over dismissal.   
However, I argue that codetermination at the company level is an indistinguishable part 
of German employment protection.  The OECD’s measurement ignores that board-level 
codetermination has played an important role in preventing large-scale layoffs resulting from 
corporate restructuring under increasing global business competition.  Houseman (1991)’s 
research shows that the German codetermination made German steel employers resort to other 
methods of workforce reduction than straightforward layoffs in reaction to excess steel capacity 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  German workers have held the legal right to take half of the seats 
on the supervisory board of coal and steel companies since 1951 and of large companies in other 
industries since 1976.  In addition, the German corporate governance law requires major 
corporate decisions that “fundamentally change the asset, financial or earnings situations of the 
enterprise” to be approved by the supervisory board (Commission of the German Corporate 
Governance Code 2005: 4).  Today these regulations prop up job security of workers living 
under the shadow of layoffs that have become increasingly associated major changes in 
production such as plant closings or relocations.  They extend labor participation beyond the 
plant level to the company level and strengthen the institutional foundation of employment 
relations that induce German employers to adopt competitive strategies based on “negotiated 
                                                 
76 Meanwhile, Streeck (1984) presented two dimensions of codetermination: the codetermination at the company 
level that corresponds exactly to the conventional idea of codetermination and the codetermination at the workplace 
level that refers to workers’ participation through works councils in individual plants.  
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adjustment” instead of the American-style “employer unilateralism.”77  Therefore, I will include 
codetermination in my historical analysis of German employment protection legislation.      
5.2 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN CAPITALISM  
The goal of this section is to show when the capitalist institutions of Germany as the 
variety of capitalism literature emphasizes began to rise.  Drawing upon the classification of 
economic institutions by the variety of capitalism literature, I briefly track down the historical 
development of financial systems, inter-firm relations, and vocational training and skill 
formation systems in Germany.       
5.2.1 Corporate finance  
The marriage between large commercial banks and big businesses became a major characteristic 
of the German corporate finance system at the turn of the twentieth century (Gershenkron 1962).  
Large commercial banks such as the Schaaffhausensche Bankverein, the Disconto-Gesellsschaft, 
the Darmstadt Bank für Handel und Industrie, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, the Deutsche 
Bank, and the Dresdner Bank played a central role in financing of big businesses through long-
term credits and the issue of industrial shares (Kocka 1978: 565).  These banks were not simply 
financial intermediaries but they were also active players in the daily management of their client 
corporations.  One German economic historian commented on the banks and industries of 
Imperial Germany that were bonded with each other:   
                                                 
77 I borrowed the terms, negotiated adjustment and employer unilateralism, from Wever (1995).  
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Possessed of such voting power [in shareholder meetings] and relying on their influence as 
underwriters, the banks themselves were active in industrial management, delegating their own 
officers to the board of directors of industrial corporations.  Conversely, the large industrial concerns 
were represented on the boards of the banks with which they had business connections (Stolper 1967: 
28-29). 
  
The close interrelations between banks and industries had a self-enforcing character as 
both parties were reluctant to terminate business connections once established.  Banks rarely 
switched to other industrial clients to maximize short-term profits because, as Stolper (1967: 28) 
noted, there was a keen competition among large banks for establishing intimate contacts with 
major industries.  Therefore, the large banks were prepared to accept short-term losses and did 
not withdraw their investment from industrial corporations even during the depression of 1900-
1902 to maintain the long-term relationships with their clients (Kocka 1978: 566).  Firms also 
preferred this long-term relationship with banks because of the informational advantage brought 
by insider banks well-informed of the client company’s management.   
The development during the first half of the twentieth century consolidated the original 
pattern in the bank-firm relationship.  Mergers between large banks led to concentration in 
banking, increasing the financial influence of Berlin-based large commercial banks (Stolper 
1967: 28-29).  The experience of the 1931 bank crisis discredited securities as a means of 
corporate finance and the government policy shifted to discouraging the development of stock 
markets as a source of long-term capital for industry (Vitols 2001: 186-187).  Banks remained 
the most important player in the provision of corporate finance during the postwar era, while the 
development of securities markets was very limited.  For example, the proportion of securitized 
liabilities in total liabilities of non-financial companies of Germany was limited to 21.1 percent 
in 1995, while that of the United States reached 61 percent (Vitols 2005: 388).       
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5.2.2 Corporate governance 
Frick and Lehmann (2005) present two major characteristics of the German corporate 
governance system.  First, the managers of the German firms are accountable to “stakeholders” 
including employees, shareholders, banks, and sometimes even the government, while the 
separation of ownership and control in the United States led to the system focusing on protecting 
shareholders’ interests.  Second, due to the bank-based financial system, Germany’s big, 
universal banks influence the management of their client firms.  Compared to American firms, 
German firms concentrate ownership in a few block-shareholders such as other non-financial 
firms, banks, and the government.  Here the percentage of shareholding by the universal banks 
might be small, but the actual voting power they exercise is enlarged via the proxy voting 
practice.  
 Of these two traits of the German corporate system, the role of banks is originated from 
the late nineteenth century as discussed above.  By contrast, the participation of employees in the 
management or codetermination is more recent institutional development.  Before World War II, 
large German firms did not accept codetermination.  It was by the Occupation Allies that 
codetermination was first institutionalized albeit in limited geographical areas and industries.  
Because I consider codetermination to be an important part of German employment protection 
legislation, I will deal with this issue in more detail in the subsequent sections.     
5.2.3 Inter-firm relations 
The second economic characteristic that was potentially favorable to employment protection in 
the Imperial Germany was the tendency toward cartelization, organized cooperation among 
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independent firms with an aim to control prices and quantity.  Modern cartels in Germany were 
first established in coal and steel industries during the great depression following the crisis of 
1873 and the German cartel system became a dominant feature of the German economy in the 
ensuing period.  There were only four cartels in 1875 but the number of cartels reached 385 in 
1905 (Kocka 1978: 563).78  Cartels among leading firms were found in almost every industry 
before the outbreak of the war in 1914 (Stolper 1967: 48).  The labor market effect of limited 
competition in product markets is that it protects the monopoly rents that can be shared between 
business and labor (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).  If limited competition fosters employers’ 
willingness to provide job protection because employers are able to exploit monopoly rents, we 
should see more support from German industries for making layoff difficult.   
The cartelization of German economy persisted throughout the Weimar Republic and 
reached a climax during the Nazi period.  When Germany was defeated in World War II, the 
Occupied Allies sought to sever cartels, which they thought had contributed to the rise of the 
Nazis.  They also aimed to prevent re-militarization of Germany by decentralizing Germany’s 
industrial production.  When the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949, 
Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard and his Chancellor Konrad Adenauer basically opposed 
cartels.  And yet, they also opposed Allied measures of deconcentration because it might weaken 
the productive capacity of the German economy (Nicholls 1994: 328-329).   Although cartels 
were formally banned in the FRG when the Anti-cartel Act was finally passed in 1957, this law 
was not a German-version of American antitrust law because it made too many exceptions and 
                                                 
78 The prevalence of cartels in the German economy at the turn of the century was a product of political economic 
factors.  The political coalition between the authoritarian government and big business groups played a central role 
in the growth of cartels in Germany.  The politically dependent German judiciary unable to resist the tendency 
toward cartelization delivered a decision that affirmed the legality of cartels in 1897 (Windolf and Beyer 1996: 205-
206).  In addition, Gerschenkron (1962) suggests that the bank-based financial system reinforced cartelization of 
industrial corporations because large banks did not want to see their clients compete against each other.    
 116 
was too weak to prevent collaborative practices aimed at reducing competition (Nicholls 1994: 
360).  As Windolf (2002) points out, German firms still cherish collaborative relations with other 
firms within same industries through cross-shareholdings, interlocking directorates, and 
coordination by industrial associations.  In this vein, it appears that the prewar ideal of regulated 
competition continued to be found in the structure of corporate networks in the postwar Germany. 
5.2.4 Production and skill formation systems 
The diversified production strategy based on firm-specific skills began to develop in Germany at 
the turn of the twentieth century.  During industrialization, the process of deskilling labor that 
was found extensively in the United States was very limited in case of Germany.  Although the 
gradual shift from the handicraft to factory production increased unskilled workers, the 
numerical dominance of skilled workers in manufacturing persisted during Imperial Germany.  
In 1895 there were 1.5 times more skilled and semi-skilled workers than unskilled workers in 
manufacturing (Nolan 1986: 366).  This skill composition of labor force remained fundamentally 
true in the twentieth century.  In 1933 skilled workers accounted for 48.6 percent of male 
workers in manufacturing and the share of unskilled male workers as distinguished from semi-
skilled workers was limited to 30.1 percent (Lee 1978: 447).   
Traditionally in Germany, the handicraft sector (Handwerk) comprising highly 
specialized small- and medium-sized firms had played a central role in the vocational training to 
produce skilled labor.  As industrialization proceeded, Handwerk became vulnerable to the 
market penetration and poaching of skilled workers by big businesses.  Although the 
conservative elites of Imperial Germany favored big, heavy industrialists in the areas of foreign 
trade and cartels, they were concerned about the possibility of unregulated industrialization to 
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produce a great number of proletariats out of failing Handwerker, which they saw would be a 
serious threat to their political regime (Streeck 1992: 112).  Therefore, Imperial Germany 
enacted the Handicraft Protection Law in 1897 to protect Handwerk as a conservative shield 
against socialist labor movement (Thelen 2004).  This law endowed regional handicraft 
chambers with the exclusive power to certify skills legally required in artisanal trades.  German 
industrialists were forced to contend with the handicraft sector over the production and 
certification of skills and to establish firm-based training system in cooperation with Handwerk 
chambers because German workers increasingly preferred to obtain skill certifications for their 
own careers and employers also wanted to hire more skilled workers.79  The current system of 
skill formation has been governed by the 1969 Vocational Training Act.that formally provided 
Handwerk chambers with the rights to approve and monitor in-plant training (Thelen 2004).   
In conclusion, the main features characterizing the German capitalism today are not a 
recent invention.  The bank-based financial system, collaborative intra-sectoral network, and 
relatively high density of skilled workers of the German economy dated back to the era of 
Imperial Germany.  The next question is when and how employment protection began in 
Germany. 
                                                 
79  Very interestingly, as pointed out by Thelen (2004), this institutional development unexpectedly strengthened 
organized labor as skilled workers so trained joined labor unions and influenced works councils.     
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5.3 IMPERIAL GERMANY, 1871-1918 
5.3.1 Employment protection enacted during the period 
German social insurance schemes put into place under Chancellor Bismarck are considered as 
pioneering before other industrialized countries in terms of the origin of welfare states.  During 
the 1880s, Bismarck introduced historic legislation on three areas of social security: Health 
Insurance for Workers Act in 1883, Accident Insurance Act in 1884, and Invalidity and Old Age 
Insurance for Workers Act in 1889.80  The political motivation behind making these laws is well 
known.  Having introduced the Anti-Socialist Law in 1878 to repress Social Democratic Party 
and free labor unions, Bismarck wanted to dampen the socialist appeal to the working class by 
improving the well-being of workers and making it dependent upon the state (Ritter 1983: 33-34; 
Leisering 2001: 114).81   
Compared to the areas of social security, however, the role of state in the area of 
employment protection was virtually absent during the period of Imperial Germany, in which 
there was no legislation that seriously limited the freedom of employers to dismiss workers 
(Berghahn 2005, 21).  Although in the 1890s employers began to establish works councils, a 
pivotal institution for workers’ participation on the shop floor in the twentieth-century Germany, 
their intention was to co-opt labor movement and therefore the voice of works councils was very 
limited (Dore, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 1999: 105).  For example, the imperial government 
introduced the Act for the Protection of Labor (Arbeiterschutzgesetz) in 1891 which permitted 
                                                 
80 Unemployment insurance was not introduced until 1927. 
81 In the Imperial Message of February 15, 1881 to the Reichstag, it was stated that “A remedy [of social ills] cannot 
alone be sought in the repression of Socialistic excess; there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the 
welfare of the working classes” (Dawson 1890, 110).   
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the establishment of works councils in almost all plants employing twenty or more workers, but 
it provided that employers had only to consult with workers on social matters such as health, 
safety, welfare, discipline and morale of workers, not being required to conform to workers’ 
wishes (Schuchman 1957: 17-18).  It was not until the enactment of the Works Council Act of 
1920 during the Weimar Republic that the establishment of works councils became mandatory 
and works councils played a significant role as checks on dismissals (Lorch 1943: 128).   
Employers in Imperial Germany were able to fire workers freely if they provided notice 
as the German Civil Code required (Guillebaud 1928: 161).  Section 621 of the 1896 Civil Code 
required that employers provide advance notice to terminate indefinite employment relations 
except certain circumstances that could precipitate instant dismissal.  The legal term of notice 
depended upon the mode of remuneration of the employee.  If he was paid by the day, one day’s 
notice was required; if he was paid by the week, one week’s notice was required; and if he was 
paid by the month, fifteen days’ notice was required (Loewy 1909: 153).  This notice 
requirement was not excessively encumbering businesses compared to the situations in Britain 
and the United States.  By the time when the German Civil Code was enacted, the English 
common law required reasonable notice although the length of notice not specified (DeGiuseppe 
1981: 4-6).  In the United States, where the employment-at-will doctrine became the governing 
rule of employment relationships, there was no legal obligation for employers to provide advance 
notice of layoff.  However, one study of the U.S. cotton-textile industry in 1934 shows that 
slightly more than 40 percent of 188 employers who were surveyed provided at least one week 
for advance notification of layoff as a personnel policy (U.S. Department of Labor 1936: 1484).  
Since the cotton-textile industry tends to suffer frequent and violent changes in employment due 
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to seasonal factors, heavy industries whose employment was relatively stable were likely to 
provide more generous notice periods.     
5.3.2 Employers’ attitudes toward employment protection  
Many experts on the German history agree that big, heavy industrial interests concentrated in the 
Ruhr of western Prussia supported Bismarck’s social welfare policy because they calculated it 
would serve their interests (Spencer 1979; Ullman 1981; Steinmetz 1996).  Facing the upheavals 
of revolutionary labor movements, they shared the authoritarian conviction that effective social 
control would require the combination of material benefits and repression of labor activism 
(Spencer 1979: 48).  It is even said that they provided for models of Bismarck’s social legislation 
what they had already implemented to their own employees since the mid-nineteenth century.  
McCreary (1968: 27) argued that Bismarck’s programs simply took employers’ corporate 
welfare programs such as Krupp’s, made them compulsory, and extended them to the national 
level.   
Despite the economic conditions the varieties-of-capitalism literature would see as 
favorable for employment protection, the vocal support from the Ruhr heavy industry for 
Bismarck’s social insurance laws seems completely absent when it comes to the question of 
establishing legal protection of workers against dismissal.  While heavy industries in the Ruhr 
were interested in protecting skilled workers and therefore cautiously dealt with their 
employment security through retention schemes and reduced work hours responding to 
recessions (McCreary 1968; Huberman 1997), they also desired to preserve their managerial 
prerogatives in the area of personnel policy in the face of organized labor’s pressures to regulate 
employment decisions.  German heavy industry generally displayed authoritarian labor-
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management relations based on the “Herr-im-Haus” position, i.e. employers’ claim to absolute 
rule over their employees (Jaeger 1967; Winkler 1976: 5; Eley 1989: 332).   
During Imperial Germany, German workers failed to achieve rights to participate in 
making decisions over dismissals let alone the basic right to bargain collectively with employers 
on wages and working conditions.  German employers in heavy industries opposed giving labor 
unions recognition and allowing joint regulation with workers’ representatives on employment, 
which they saw as a “political challenge to their overall power and authority in society” (Lewis 
and Clark 1981: 22).82  They were so recalcitrant that even major strikes in 1896-97 and 1905 
failed to bring employers’ concessions to militant workers (Barkin 1982).  Large employers such 
as Krupp and Siemens used every arsenal to break strikes and to avoid collective negotiation 
with unions.  They resisted any form of independent workers organizations, whether trade unions 
or works councils.  Instead, they created company-controlled unions to strengthen company 
loyalty and to weak the appeal of the trade unions (Hickey 1985: 245).  During the final years of 
Imperial Germany between 1900 and 1914, the spread of these so-called ‘yellow’ unions was 
extensively found in large business interests in the Ruhr.  
In contrast to German heavy industry’s harsh hostility toward labor unions, light and 
processing industries tended to prefer compromises and negotiations with labor unions (Jäger 
1967: 236; Steinmetz 1996: 296).  Geographically concentrated in Baden, Württemberg, and the 
Kingdom of Saxony, these industries comprised small- and medium-sized firms producing a 
variety of consumer goods based on the amalgamation of traditional handicraft and modern 
technology (Herrigel 1996).  These industries typically hired only a handful of, very skilled 
                                                 
82 In 1890 Henry. A. Bueck, General Secretary of the Central Association of German Industrialists (CVDI), said: 
“German employers will never be prepared to negotiate with workers’ organizations on an equal footing” (Lewis 
and Clark 1981: 22) 
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workers, which made them vulnerable to workers’ demands (Abraham 1980: 91).  Because of 
their production strategy focusing on specialization and export orientation, their interests were 
against cartels and protectionism of heavy industry and agrarian interests.  As heavy industry 
dominated the CVDI, they withdrew their membership to establish the Federation of 
Industrialists (BDI) as a representative organization of their interests in 1895 (Abraham 1980: 
92).  To answer whether this segment of employers and the states where they were harboring 
were able to influence national legislation, we need to examine the political system of Imperial 
Germany.   
5.3.3 A federation of undemocratic states 
Why did Imperial Germany not act to ensure social stability by providing greater job security for 
workers as it sought social insurance systems to respond to the rise of labor movement and class 
conflicts?  As previously discussed, it is in part because the German heavy industry fiercely 
resisted workers’ intrusion into managerial prerogatives.  However, despite German employers’ 
harshness toward labor unions, independent labor movements grew rapidly after the repeal of 
anti-Socialist Act and the resignation of Bismarck from the Chancellor of Imperial Germany in 
1890.  The number of total union membership was about 230,000 in 1890, but then it surged to 
one million in 1904 and 4.5 million in 1913 (Paque 1993: 210).  The vast majority of union 
members had strong ties to the Social Democratic Party whose electoral power grew in parallel 
with the rise of union membership.  The political system of Imperial Germany was not an 
autocratic regime in which popular participation was prohibited.  The political system created in 
1871 was a soft authoritarian regime based on a compromise between monarchism and 
parliamentarism (Berman 2001: 438).  The franchise of Imperial Germany – universal suffrage 
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for males twenty-five or over – was the widest in Europe and the ballot system was effectively 
secret.  Although the executive branch comprising the Kaiser, his chancellor and staffs was 
insulated from democratic control, the imperial legistaure had a supreme power in making laws 
in domsetic issues.  After 1890 the SPD became a fast-growing party in the Reichstag, 
parliament of the imperial legislature.  It gained the largest share of votes in every Reichstag 
election between 1890 and 1912 (Fairbairn 1997: 30).  The SPD won the largest seats in the 
Reichstag first in 1912 because the Reichstag was elected by a plurality system in contrast to a 
proportional representation system.  And yet, right-wing parties were not able to muster the 
majority in the Reichstag between 1890 and World War First.  Their combined share of votes 
declined rapdly from 47 percent in 1887 to 25.7 percent in 1912 (Fairbairn 1992: 24).      
Then, why did the political struggle of labor not result in any significant legislative 
victory over employers in the area of employment control?  The answer lies in the political 
system of Imperial Germany in which highly undemocratic Prussia acted as a center of political 
gravity in the federal politics by means of its influence on the Bundesrat.  In the United States, 
competitive federalism – competition on the one hand between different levels of government 
over jurisdictions and on the other among states for capital – and a strong judiciary committed to 
defend constitutionally guaranteed states’ rights constrained the rise of employment protection at 
both federal and state levels.  By contrast, the German federalism discouraged the adoption of 
imperial legislation on employment protection as well, but in quite different ways than the 
operation of American federalism.  The Bismarck constitution vested legislative powers in the 
imperial government in an extensive range of areas including labor, which clearly distinguished 
Imperial Germany from the United States of the same period although both countries apparently 
took a federal form of government (Gierke 1910: 285).  Since then, the strong federal legislative 
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power has always been a major feature of the German-style federalism (Merkl 1959: 733).  
Therefore, the imperial jurisdiction over labor laws was rarely problematic since the formation of 
Imperial Germany.  The other features of American federalism were also not present or less 
prominent in Germany.  Although important taxes on income and property remained under the 
jurisdiction of states (Renzsch 1989: 21), weak imperial regulations over employment cannot be 
seen as a result of the race to the bottom among states craving for capital as the hegemonic 
power of Prussia in Imperial Germany brought about the upward harmonization of state tax rates 
on capital (Hallerberg 1996).  While the Reichsgericht, the imperial court, was as hostile to labor 
as the U.S. Supreme Court of the same era, the impact of the Reichsgericht on the weakness of 
employment protection is dubious because it was not an independent actor.  The Reichsgericht 
was subordinate to the Kaiser and the imperial legislature, lacking the right to review the 
constitutionality of imperial statutes (Heun 2003: 1999).    
What mattered in the German federalism was a mix of undemocratic political regimes of 
constituent states, especially of Prussia, and the role of the Bundesrat, the federal chamber of the 
imperial legislature.  The main feature of the Bismarck constitution was that it effectively 
ensured the direct participation of constituent states in making imperial laws by means of the 
Bundesrat that was a federal council comprising delegates appointed by state governments 
(Lehmbruch 2000).  The Bundesrat had the absolute veto power in the passage of legislation; 
even a majority in the Reichstag was not able to push through its legislative agenda unless it 
secured the consent from the Bundesrat.   
The Bismarckian constitution of 1871 was designed to be federal because Bismarck 
aimed to preserve the feudalistic political structures within individual states against liberal and 
socialist pressures in the Reichstag (Brecht 1945: 4).  Imperial Germany was not a federation of 
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republics but a federation of monarchs and princes as the preamble of the Bismarck constitution 
indicates.83  As Fairbairn (1997: 15) noted, the universal male suffrage for the Reichstag existed 
alongside restricted state suffrages meant to protect those privileged within individual states.  
However, there was a variation of political openness among German states ranging from 
relatively liberal Baden, Bavaria, and Württemberg in southern Germany to highly undemocratic 
Prussia and Saxony (Ziblatt 2006: 113-114).  For example, the electoral system of Prussia was 
neither direct, nor equal, nor secret (Suval 1985: 233).  It retained a three-class voting system 
which divided Prussian male aged over 24 into three classes calculated by how much tax one 
paid.  This system was fundamentally plutocratic because the first class that paid the highest tax 
but comprised a handful of voters elected as many electors as the third class that paid little or no 
tax but made up of massive voters.  Although the southern states had limted suffrages as well, 
they more resembled the Reichstag suffrage system (Niehuss 1990).   
The historical literature confirms that government reactions to the rise of free labor 
movements varied according to this political nstitutional difference between Prussia and southern 
states.  While labor unions suffered malicious police harrassment in Prussia, they met with 
relatively liberal policies in southern states (Saul 1985: 338).84  The influence of the conservative 
elites in Prussia based on the alliance between heavy industry and agrarian interests was funneled 
                                                 
83 The preamble of the Bismarck constitution begins: “His Majesty, the King of Prussia on behalf of the North-
German Federation; His Majesty, the King of Bavaria; His Majesty, the King of Württemberg; His royal Highness, 
the Grand-Duke of Baden; and His Royal Highness, the Grand-Duke of Hessen and of the Rhein – the latter for the 
section of the Grand-Duchy situated south of the river Main – conclude an eternal federation to protect the federal 
territory and the law of the land as well as to promote the welfare of the German people.  This federation shall be 
known by the name of German Reich and shall have the following Constitution” (Brecht 1945: 4).  
84 Spencer emphasized the close tie between heavy inudstrialists in the Ruhr and the Prussian government.  He noted, 
“Government officials did on occasion, especially during the Ruhr coal strike of 1905, criticize the excessive rigidity 
and harshness of employer policies, which threatened to alienate workers and drive them into the arms of the 
socialists.  But on the whole, throughout the existence of the Empire, there was overwhelming agreement between 
Ruhr industrialists and Prussian officials about the nature of the employers’ role and the authority that attached to it.  
And there was further agreement between the two groups that the defense of the employers’ authority constituted a 
central element in the defense of authroity as such (Spencer 1979: 49).    
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into the realm of federal politics by means of the Bundesrat.  Prussia accounting for a three-fifth 
of the imperial population controlled seventeen votes out of the fifty-eight votes in the 
Bundesrat.  The predominance of Prussia in the Bundesrat enabled her to block proposed federal 
legislation that was against its interests (Berman 2001: 439).  For example, the Reichstag 
proposals to guarantee workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively were turned down 
because of oppositions from Prussia and the Bundesrat (Saul 1985: 350).   
5.4 THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 1919-1933  
5.4.1 The 1920 Works Council Act 
The Works Council Act was introduced in February 1920 under the National Assembly that had 
delivered the Weimar constitution.  It was the first legislation in the history of Germany that 
mandated institutions of workers representation with significant powers in the shop floor.  It 
required the establishment of works councils composed of elected workers in plants with at least 
twenty workers.  The power of works councils in the area of employment protection was so 
substantial that the works councils during the Weimar Republic were clearly differentiated from 
the shop committees of Imperial Germany, basically established by employers as a check against 
labor movement.  About this law Lorch (1943: 127) noted:  
By far the most important duties of the works councils related to the engagement and dismissal of employees.  It is 
to be noted, however, that the powers of the works councils were considerably wider with respect to dismissals than 
to engagements.     
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The protection against dismissals introduced by the Works Council Act can be 
summarized in terms of individual and collective dismissals.85  In case of the dismissal of an 
individual employee, the employee could appeal to works councils within five days after the date 
of dismissal.  If the works council considered the protest justified, it must first seek to reach an 
agreement by negotiation with the employer.  Failing to conclude an agreement within a week, 
the works council or the employee could appeal to the labor court.86  In case of the dismissal of a 
large number of employees, the employer had to notify the works council as far in advance as 
possible concerning the nature and scope of the dismissals and to discuss the means for avoiding 
hardship.87   
5.4.2 War, revolution and labor 
How could this legislative change to protect workers against dismissals happen?  The collapse of 
Imperial Germany and the ensuing regime change to the Weimar Republic played a crucial role 
to force employers’ acceptance of compulsory works councils.  Although the Anti-Socialist Act 
was repealed in 1890, employers insisted on not recognizing labor unions.  They refused to 
engage in collective bargaining with labor unions because they saw it as encroaching upon their 
autocratic position within plants.  However, the First World War rendered the repression of labor 
movement to look increasingly untenable to government officials who needed organized labor’s 
cooperation for the war economy.  In 1916 the Imperial German government introduced the 
                                                 
85 I drew upon Lorch (1946: 128-129) for the discussion of employment protection provided by the Works Council 
Act. 
86 Neither protest to the works council nor an appeal to the labor court suspended the effect of the dismissal 
(Guillebaud 1928: 162). 
87 There were no penalties for the breach of this provision, but German courts held that if the employer disregarded 
his obligation of notification and consultation, employees affected by the decision of collective dismissal were 
eligible to appeal individually against their dismissals (Guillebaud 1928: 168).  
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Auxiliary Service Act, which called for the establishment of shop committees in plants with 
more than 50 workers.  Also, there was a legislative reform to free labor unions from police 
surveillance and harassment and to allow railroad workers to join unions provided they 
renounced strikes (Bieber 1987: 76).  Nevertheless, the attitude towards labor unions remained 
virtually unchanged.  Employers refused to accept union movement and in many companies 
union members continued to be persecuted and impeded (Bieber 1987: 76).    
The real momentum to end the lack of protection against arbitrary dismissal by 
employers came with the 1918 Revolution after Imperial Germany was defeated in the First 
World War.  When the German Revolution broke out in November 1918, Workers and Soldiers 
Councils inspired by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia sprang up in major industrial 
cities and spread rapidly all over Germany.  This revolutionary movement aimed to set up a 
Soviet or Council State, emulating the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” in Russia (Guillebaud 
1928: 7).  While the Soldiers and Workers Councils obviously threatened the existence of 
business groups in Germany, they also posed a serious threat to the mainstream labor union 
movement led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and its affiliated “Free” unions.  The 
mainstream labor movements composed of the Free (Social Democratic), liberal Hirsch-
Duncker, and Christian labor unions supported parliamentary democracy to provide social 
welfare for working classes and to guarantee the collective rights of labor unions against the 
Bolshevik dictatorship (Moses 1982: 293).  They sought to provide for co-determination, parity 
with management, on the basis of the continued existence of private enterprise.  The extreme 
left-wing of the labor movement, who promoted workers self-government and socialization of 
the means of production through the Workers and Soldiers Councils, attacked the mainstream of 
the labor movement as a betrayal of the socialist idea (Shuchman 1957: 60).    
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In response to this frightening situation after the 1918 Revolution, employers seemed 
ready to make concessions to the reformist labor groups because of their fear of the radical 
movement (Thelen 1991: 67).  The Stinnes-Legien Agreement of November 1918 was a product 
of political compromise between business groups and the mainstream labor movements, both of 
whom wanted to contain communism from Germany.  In the Stinnes-Legien Agreement, 
employers agreed to grant labor unions unrestricted rights of assembly and collective bargaining 
and to establish mechanisms for conciliation and arbitration comprising an equal number of 
employers’ and workers representatives for resolving industrial disputes (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1919: 1104-1106).   
Strong political and organizational resources buttressed the power of the reformist labor 
groups in the reconstruction of Germany in the immediate years after the Revolution.  First, the 
membership of the three reformist labor unions increased rapidly from 1,181,211 in 1916 to 
3,541,197 in 1918, compared to the slight increase in the membership of radical groups (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1922: 210).  Secondly, the reformist labor groups played a major role 
in political institutions during the interim government.  The Joint Central Committee (ZAG) 
established to implement the Stinnes-Legien Agreement was composed of an equal number of 
representatives from the reformist labor groups and employers organizations (Moses 1982: 224).  
Also, the Council of People’s Representatives, the interim government of Germany, favored the 
reformist labor groups as opposed to radical labor movements, although it was based on a 
coalition between the reformist Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the radical Independent 
Social Democratic Party (USPD) (Moses 1982: 292).  After the disgruntled USPD 
representatives withdrew from the coalition in December 1918, there were uprising by 
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communists.  The interim government led by Friedrich Ebert used the army to suppress the 
uprisings (Miller and Potthoff 1986: 70).   
However, the social partnership between labor and capital formed immediately after the 
Revolution did not last long.  As political situations returned to normalcy after the initial threat to 
private enterprises following the 1918 Revolution, employers reverted to their prewar position of 
the patriarchal “Herr-im-Haus” plant relations by the time works councils were being debated in 
the constituent National Assembly.  The employers organization attacked works councils for a 
“ruinous onslaught on the essential conditions of industrial enterprise” (Lorch 1943: 118).  The 
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA) opposed the passage of the Works 
Council Act in the form that was adopted in the National Assembly (Thelen 1991: 69).  
Furthermore, the extreme left bitterly opposed the Works Council Act adopted by the Reichstag 
for betraying the ideals and hopes brought by the German Revolution.   
Despite the oppositions from both industry and radical labor groups, the Works Council 
Act was adopted in February 4 of 1920.  As Thelen (1991: 68) noted, the Works Council Act 
represented a significant triumph for the reformist labor groups.  The reformist unions supported 
industrial democracy based on works councils, but they opposed the radical idea that works 
councils should be autonomous from labor unions and eventually supersede the latter.  
Consequently, while the Works Council Act underlined the independence of works councils 
from management by describing the purpose of works councils as being “to protect the common 
interests of the employees as against the employer,” it also made works councils “subsidiary and 
subordinate organs of the Trade Unions” (Guillebaud 1928: 41).   
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5.4.3 The Weimar federalism  
The passage of the 1920 Works Councils Act was not just an outcome of the power of the 
reformist labor groups, but also reflected the fact that the political system of the Weimar 
Republic made it easier for the reformist labor groups to have their demands translated into 
national policy outcomes.  In contrast with Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic was a 
parliamentary democracy in which the head of the government, Reich Chancellor, was dependent 
upon the Reichstag majority and the Weimar constitution introduced more centripetal characters 
in the German federalism.  The result was that coalition parties controlling a majority in the 
Reichstag were able to pass any legislation once they agreed to do.  
In January 19 of 1919 there were elections to form the National Assembly that was to 
provide a constitution for the Weimar Republic.  At the elections the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) gained a majority of seats leading all other parties, as shown in Table 10.  After failing to 
reach an agreement with the radical left Independent Social Democrats (USPD), the SPD formed 
a coalition government with two middle-class center parties, the Catholic Centre Party 
(Zentrum), and the liberal Democratic Party (DDP).  These three parties known as the Weimar 
Coalition represented three fourths of the National Assembly. 
 
Table 10  The Election Result for the National Assembly 
Party Percentage of Votes Seats 
SPD 37.9 165 
Zentrum 19.7 91 
DDP 18.6 75 
DNVP 10.3 44 
USPD 7.6 65 
DVP 4.4 19 
Others 1.6 7 
Source: Miller and Potthoff (1986: 296). 
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 Since the left wing of the SPD defected to form the USPD, the Social Democrats, the 
Centrists, and the Democrats shared views on major political and social issues.  For example, all 
of them supported a republic as the post-Revolution political regime against a return to a 
monarchy.  Also, despite their different ideological origins, the Social Democrats, Roman 
Catholics, and Liberals in the Weimar Coalition held up participation by works councils in 
personnel and social questions.88  Particularly, the SPD and the Catholic Centre, two big mass 
membership parties, had common interests in strengthening the material welfare and collective 
rights of working classes because the Majority Socialist unions and Christian unions respectively 
accounted for a large chunk of electorates in each party (Manow 2005: 232). 
After the National Assembly was formed, the Weimar Coalition appointed Hugo Preuss, 
DDP Minister of Interior and liberal jurist, to draw a draft constitution.  He basically envisioned 
a decentralized unitary system and a parliamentary democracy in which the government would 
be made dependent on parliament.  Now that the German states themselves were under transition 
from monarchies to republics, they were willing to accept a parliamentary and democratic 
constitution.  But the relationship between the federal and state governments was a thorny issue.  
Preuss sought to reduce the German states to administratively autonomous units while the central 
government should be endowed with more extensive powers.  Because state governments 
diametrically opposed Preuss’s unitarist idea, the Weimar Republic had to be a federal state if 
national unity was to be maintained.   
                                                 
88 Spiro (1958) discusses these three distinct ideological origins of co-determination in Germany.  
The DDP initially opposed a more radical version of the Works Council Act, which would have allowed the more 
extensive role by works councils in economic matters.  However, as its watered-down version limited the economic 
functions by works councils, the DDP joined the other coalition parties to pass the law.   
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However, the coalition parties in the National Assembly successfully reduced from the 
Weimar Constitution much of the strong federalist character of the Imperial Constitution 
(Manow 2005: 233-235).  First, former German states, now to be called sovereignty-neutral 
Länder, were weakened considerably in their legislative and executive powers.  Most 
importantly, the power of direct taxation was centralized to the Reich government.  After tax 
revenues being pooled, they were to be shared between the Reich and Land governments.   As 
Manow (2005: 235) noted, this constitutional reform of fiscal power “gave the central 
government access to its own substantial tax revenues for the first time.”  Furthermore, the 
principal powers reserved to the Länder were limited to the administration of the courts, 
maintenance of law and order, direction of education, concern for religious affairs, and 
supervision of local government that were of little political significance (Eyke 1962: 74).  
Meanwhile, the Reich was able to intervene in key policy areas such as labor and social welfare 
through its extensive right of concurrent legislation for the purpose of enacting nation-wide 
standards (Manow 2005: 236).   
Second, the Weimar Constitution also diminished the power of the Reichsrat, the federal 
council of the Weimar legislature.  The Reichsrat consisted of delegates of Land governments as 
the Bundesrat of Imperial Germany.  However, while the consent of the Bundesrat was required 
to pass legislation during Imperial Germany, the Reichsrat only assumed a suspending veto 
power as the Reichstag was able to override the Reichsrat’s veto by a two-thirds majority 
(Manow 2005: 233).  Furthermore, the Reichsrat no longer held the exclusive right to initiate 
legislation, but it had to share the right to initiate legislation with the Reichstag.   
These centralist tendencies in the Weimar Republic made the German federal state very 
distinct from the American counterpart.  First, the Reich government of the Weimar Republic did 
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not face the degree of political activism for states’ rights that obstructed the federal intervention 
to deal with labor unions and unemployment in the pre-New Deal America.  The Reich 
government had extensive legislative powers over social welfare and labor policy.  Second, 
Länder’s fiscal autonomy was significantly compromised because the Reich government gained 
control of direct taxation.  In the United States where constituent jurisdictions have their own tax 
bases, poorer states have strong incentives to launch economic development policy, which is 
basically to create local environments favorable to business investment.  Therefore, the U.S. 
states have been very reluctant to introduce higher labor standards that businesses oppose.  
Contrary to the American federalism, poorer Länder in the Weimar Republic had limited 
incentives for using policy measures to stimulate an inward flow of capital and labor because 
their independent tax bases were scant.  Consequently the interstate competition that plagued the 
making of social welfare and labor policy in the United States was not effective in the Weimar 
Republic. 
5.4.4 Constrained judicial power  
While the judges of Imperial Germany were rejected the right to test laws for their 
constitutionality, there existed tendencies toward the acceptance of judicial control of laws 
passed by parliament in the Weimar Republic.  The National Assembly was evenly split on 
judicial review and the Weimar Constitution neither formally recognized nor expressly forbid 
judicial review (Kommers 1976: 57).  Right-wing parties, who were suspicious of democratic 
parliament because they equated parliamentary democracy with left-wing rule, argued in favor of 
judicial review to deteriorate the Weimar Constitution (Hartmann 2003: 121).  The judges of the 
Reichsgericht, the Federal Supreme Court, were the civil servants of Imperial Germany, were 
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predominantly conservative, and regarded themselves as a bastion against socialism (Stolleis 
2003: 271).  Therefore, although the judges avowed to serve the new republic loyally after the 
Revolution (Stolleis 2003: 272), there was a degree of tension between the Reich government 
and the Reichsgericht.  The Reichsgericht first asserted the right to test the constitutionality of 
federal laws in 1925 and actually exercised judicial review to void two federal laws until the 
collapse of the Weimar Republic (Dietze 1957: 545-547; Kommers 1976: 58).   
However, the judicial checks against parliament remained limited in Germany compared 
with the American case.  Judicial review was never firmly established during the Weimar 
Republic as it was hotly debated even after the Reichsgericht openly asserted the right to judicial 
review in 1925.  The judges confined judicial review to test statutes for their compatibility with 
the Weimar Constitution that could be amended by a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag.  In its 
relationship with the executive branch, the Reichsgericht was not politically strong.  The Reich 
government dwarfed the Reichsgericht in deciding upon disagreements between the Reich 
government and the Länder, which was a raison d’etre of the judiciary in the federal system.  The 
most revealing case was the inter-branch conflict that occurred in 1928 between Hermann 
Müller, Social Democrat Chancellor, and Walter Simons, President of the Reichsgericht (Simons 
1929: 767).  Four years after the Weimar Republic nationalized railroad systems that had been 
controlled by Land governments, the Reich government transformed the state-owned national 
railways into a semi-private railroad company, Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft (DRG), in 
1924.  Initially, the Reich government was engaged in an agreement with the Länder to reserve a 
seat for every Land in the board of directors of the DRG.  However, as the Dawes Plan to 
implement Germany’s war reparations forced to reduce the number of members in the board of 
directors, the Reich government reneged on its promise because it would have to decrease seats 
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for the Reich government if the initial agreement was to be fulfilled.  Therefore, the Reich 
government announced that it would appoint its own candidates to all vacant posts.  The Länder 
sued the Reich government before the Reichsgericht.  To Walter Simon’s chagrin, however, the 
Reich government disregarded the Reichsgericht and pushed the appointment of its own 
candidates before the court was convened.  Walter Simons resigned in a protest against the Reich 
government, but this could not lead to revoke their action about the DRG.      
5.5 DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
5.5.1 The collapse of fascism and the revival of German labor 
After Hitler came to power in 1933, developments in labor protection under the Weimar 
Republic were completely dismantled by the National Socialists.  Hitler severely repressed labor 
union activities and abolished the Weimar works councils.  The National Socialist “Charter of 
Labor” denied workers all rights of consultation and participation (Thelen 1991: 70).  Industrial 
relations reverted to the earlier state of employers being the masters in their plants that 
characterized the pre-World War period.   
Germany’s defeat in the two world wars brought favorable political environment to the 
German labor.  When the country’s first defeat resulted in the collapse of Imperial Germany, the 
possibility of works councils to turn into bastions for a proletariat revolution loomed large.  In 
this circumstance German employers approached to the reformist labor groups in an aim to 
forestall the deluge of radical left movements.  The 1918 Stinnes-Legien Agreement was the 
outcome of political compromise between capital and labor.  However, the shift in employers’ 
 137 
position toward recognition of labor unions was fundamentally strategic.  After the threat of 
extreme-left movements receded, German employers by and large returned to their traditional 
anti-unionist position.   
Germany’s defeat in the Second World War also played an important role in empowering 
German labor.  This time the policy of the Allied Control Council critically affected the 
evolution of laws regarding works councils and codetermination.  Immediately after the war 
works councils voluntarily sprang up to provide basic services to the Germans and restart 
production in plants (Thelen 1991: 72).  The Control Council, the military government 
comprising Britain, France, the Soviet Russia, and the United States, encouraged the 
establishment of works councils in individual firms throughout Germany and it eventually 
sanctioned them by enacting the Control Council Law No. 22 in April 1946.     
  The Law No. 22 did not make the establishment of works councils compulsory, but 
merely permitted it.  The German labor gained further momentum as the Control Council 
unveiled its industrial policy for Germany in August 1946.  The Allied Control Council had 
accused major German industrialists of being responsible for the rise of the National Socialists 
and supporting the Nazi government’s war campaign.  Therefore, the occupation authorities 
sought to dissolve cartels in a way of denazificating and demilitarizing the postwar Germany.  
The threat to dismantle German industries was biggest in the British occupation zone that 
included the Ruhr coal and steel area, Germany’s industrial heartland.  The British launched their 
decartelization program in the steel industry, “Operation Severance,” by organizing the North 
German Iron and Steel Control (NGISC) in August 1946 (Shuchman 1957: 123).  Breaking up 
the organization of their basic industries was not a popular task with the Germans.  Therefore, 
the NGISC sought the support of Hans Böckler, who led the German labor union movement and 
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eventually became the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), by offering him labor’s co-
determination in the severed companies.  At last, iron and steel companies agreed to introduce 
parity codetermination that granted works councils an equal number of seats on the supervisory 
board was established in 1947. 
Quite interestingly, even the newly founded Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the then 
largest political party in Germany, expressed their support of limiting the free enterprise in the 
Ahlen Program that was adopted in February 1947 (Carr 1987: 193).  The Ahlen Program was a 
product of power struggles between the left- and right-wing groups within the CDU.  At the 
moment the public mood against free capitalism in the immediate postwar years in Germany 
helped the left-wing group of the party become salient and prevail over the right-wing group.  By 
the time West Germany was established, however, the electoral pendulum swung right.  The 
recovery of German economy under the American tutelage based on anti-communist and pro-
free market policies favored the right-wing group of the CDU and as a result increased the 
ideological distance between the CDU and the SPD.  In the next sections I will discuss how 
political competition between these two major parties in the Bundestag affected the postwar 
development of employment protection legislation in the distinctively German political 
institutional setup.       
5.5.2 The Basic Law and the postwar German federalism 
5.5.2.1 The election of the Parliamentary Council 
By March 1948 Britain and the United States made it clear that they would push through the 
formation of West Germany by integrating their zones.  Their commitment forced the 
participation of France that had initially declined to join them because of the disagreement over 
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the political organization of West Germany. 89   The Germans objected the Allied powers’ 
decision because they feared it would make the division of Germany permanent.  However, they 
eventually accepted it, provided that the constituent assembly adopted a provisional constitution 
named Basic Law.   
In August 1948 each Landtag - the lower chamber of the Land legislature - elected 
delegates for the Parliamentary Council that was to draft Basic Law.  The Parliamentary Council 
was composed of 65 members from the Western Länder (Golay 1958: 19).  The Christian 
Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) equally 
accounted for twenty-seven representatives.  The Free Democrats (FDP) were represented by 
five and other parties by two each.  Konrad Adenauer, the Christian Democratic leader, was 
elected president of the Parliamentary Council.   
5.5.2.2 The federal supremacy in legislation 
Political parties in the Parliamentary Council were split over the form of federalism to be 
adopted.90  The Christian Democrat Union and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social 
Union, took the position of strong Land autonomy and equal powers between the popular and the 
federal chambers.  In contrast, the SPD preferred the Weimarian federalism, in which the powers 
of legislation and taxation were centralized but administration was decentralized, for their vision 
of a liberal social state.  Two small parties, the Centre party and the Free Democratic party 
                                                 
89 France preferred a loose association of the Länder to prevent Germany from rising to an aggressive power.  
Therefore, they argued for extreme decentralization of power in which authority to raise taxes was to exclusively be 
reserved for Land governments and the federal legislature was to be a unicameral body of a federal chamber.  On the 
other hand, the United States preferred a bicameral legislature to ensure both the democratic and federal characters 
of the central government and put forward the central government with sufficient powers to cope with problems 
expected to arise from the postwar economic reconstruction.  Britain was close to the American position (Golay 
1958: 8-9).    
90 For the positions of political parties, I heavily depended upon Golay (1958: 41-44). 
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(FDP), were closer to the position of the SPD than that of the CDU/CSU regarding the 
federalism issue.  Although they opposed a centralized state, they approved sufficient central 
power to ensure national unity against Land particularism.     
The Parliamentary Council essentially tilted toward the latter group and as a result the 
German federal state in the postwar era took the form that was fundamentally different from the 
American federalism.  Beside the exclusive power the federation had to legislate, the Basic Law 
gave the federal government concurrent legislative powers over a long list of matters including 
labor and social security.  Article 72 of the Basic Law stipulated that in the matters of concurrent 
legislative powers the federal laws were to preempt Land laws and this clause also broadly 
defined the legal conditions for the federal intervention.  The Allied authorities preferred to limit 
the case for federation’s use of concurrent powers, but the Germans prevailed.  The legislative 
areas under the exclusive Land jurisdiction were limited to education, regional industrial policy, 
and public infrastructures. 
While the Basic Law adopted the supremacy of the federation in legislation, the Länder 
were able to participate in making federal laws through the Bundesrat, the federal chamber 
consisting of delegates from the Länder governments.  The legislative power of the Bundesrat 
under the Basic Law was greater than that of the Reichsrat under the Weimar constitution.  
While the Reichsrat had a suspending veto for all federal laws, the Bundesrat had absolute veto 
in matters that affected administration by the Länder of federal legislation.  Although a majority 
of delegates in the Parliamentary Council rejected the proposal by CDU/CSU to bring back the 
Bundesrat under the Bismarckian constitution, the number of matters requiring the consent of the 
Bundesrat was considerably large, accounting for approximately 55 percent of all federal laws 
(Manow 2005: 234).  Thus, the Basic Law clearly rejected the American ideal of competitive 
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federalism, in which the federal and state governments claimed their exclusive legislative 
powers.  Instead, the Basic Law in practice set up the Bundesrat as a venue in which the 
federation and the Länder constantly met to negotiate and compromise over federal legislation.  
As Watts (1999: 26) pointed out, the interlocked relationship between the federal government 
and the Länder governments became a notable characteristic of the German federalism.91   
5.5.2.3      Fiscal federalism in Germany 
No other areas would reveal the extensive constitutional and political interlocking of the federal 
and state governments characterizing the German federalism better than its fiscal federalism, 
namely, a constitutional principle of how financial resources are collected and allocated to 
governments at different levels.  The German fiscal federalism established in 1949 was 
distinguished from the U.S. fiscal federalism by the centralization of tax legislation and the fiscal 
equalization scheme to correct horizontal and vertical imbalances. 
Facing the issue of how to financially organize a federal state, the founders of the Basic 
Law in the Parliamentary Council opposed the American solution that the federal and state 
governments had financial autonomy and vied for tax sources with each other (Golay 1958: 76).  
They feared that if the Länder had financial autonomy, the Länder would seek to maximize their 
narrow interests and the competition between the federation and the Länder and among the 
Länder would undermine the reconstruction of the national economy at large.  The Parliamentary 
Council saw that the new democratic federation could not afford this.  Therefore, the 
Parliamentary Council put forward a distinctive financial arrangement that concentrated powers 
to raise taxes to the federation, established a pool of collected taxes subject to a constitutional 
                                                 
91 For more treatment of German federalism from the comparative perspective, see Scharpf (1988) and Sbragia 
(1992). 
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division between the federation and the Länder, and a redistribution of taxes between rich and 
poor Länder to equalize living standards throughout West Germany.  
The Allied authorities opposed this fiscal arrangement as “insufficiently federalistic” 
(Golay 1958: 77).  They preferred the American-style fiscal federalism in which the federation 
and the Länder had dual tax powers and federal legislation on taxes were strictly limited to 
finance federal activities.  In the end, there was compromise between the Allied authorities and 
the Germans that revenues from sales tax belonged to the federation while revenues from income 
taxes to the Länder.  And yet, the Germans essentially prevailed in the question of fiscal 
federalism.   Article 72 of the German Basic Law stipulated that a federal regulation is necessary 
for the establishment of equal living conditions beyond a territory of a Land.  The constitution 
also listed policy areas where the federal government could engage in the tasks of Länder 
through concurrent legislation powers to ensure balanced regional development and uniformity 
of living conditions throughout the federation.            
Thus, the Basic Law established national uniformity in the area of fiscal legislation that 
was lacking in the American case.  The U.S. state governments have tax bases autonomous from 
those of the federal government.  States retain the right to levy taxes and to regulate the taxing 
powers of local governments.  Thus, multiple tiers of government can exploit the major revenue 
sources by tax legislation of each own.  For example, both federal and state governments may 
levy personal and corporate income taxes, and selective sales taxes.  In contrast, tax legislation in 
Germany has been placed under federal government’s exclusive mandate.  The federal 
government decides on all major revenue sources including personal and corporate income taxes 
and sales taxes while Länder collect these taxes by federal laws (Voigt 1989, 104-105).  Once 
collected, tax revenues are shared by the federal and Land governments.  They are distributed 
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vertically and horizontally in the form of fiscal equalization between states and supplementary 
federal grants to financially weaker Länder.  As a result of these gap-filling financial transfers, 
the fiscal abilities for all states are ensured to be higher than 99.5 percent of the average. 
Table 11 provides evidence for fiscal equalization among the Länder.  Without any 
financial transfers, the gap in terms of public revenue per capita relative to the average of all 
states amounts to 113.8 percent points between Hamburg and Thuringia.  However, after all 
horizontal and vertical equalization schemes are concluded, Thuringia comes to earn more public 
revenues than Hamburg by 25.5 percent points.  The principle of intergovernmental solidarity is 
effectively realized by the financial equalization scheme in Germany. 
 
Table 11   Fiscal Equalization among the German Länder, 1995 
  Relative public revenue per capita (average = 100) 
Rank 
before 
equalization Federal states 
Before 
equalization
After 
interstate 
equalization 
After 
federal 
grants 
Rank after 
equalization
1 Hamburg 157.5 102.3 93.4 15 
2 Hessen 118.7 103.5 94.6 10 
3 
Baden-
Wurttemberg 115.7 103.0 94.2 12 
4 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 114.2 102.4 93.7 14 
5 Bavaria  113.8 102.5 93.7 13 
6 Bremen  111.7 96.4 141.4 1 
7 
Schleswig-
Holstein 106.8 101.3 95.9 9 
8 Lower Saxony 96.2 97.8 92.9 16 
9 
Rhineland-
Palatine 95.7 96.8 94.3 11 
10 Berlin 93.3 95.0 111.0 8 
11 Saarland 83.5 95.0 129.2 2 
12 Brandenburg 56.4 95.0 118.6 6 
13 Saxony 50.3 95.0 117.4 7 
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14 
Mecklenburg-
West 
Pommerania 
47.0 95.0 119.8 3 
15 
Saxony-
Anhalt 44.5 95.0 118.8 5 
16 Thuringia  43.7 95.0 118.9 4 
Source: Excerpted from Spahn and Fottinger (1997: 239). 
5.5.2.4 Dampened competition among the Länder 
How did these characteristics of federalism in Germany illustrated so far affect the degree of 
government regulation over dismissal?  During the first three decades of the postwar era the 
freedom of capital to move beyond the national boundary was significantly constrained.  
However, the fact that capital was free to choose the optimal location for production within an 
integrated domestic market was a grave concern for the founders of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Golay 1958: 76).  If the power to make legislation affecting the business decision over 
plant location had been reserved to sovereign units comprising the federal state, each unit would 
have been tempted to lure business by curtailing labor and social standards to make 
environments more favorable to capital.  Now that there was no hegemonic Länder such as 
Prussia of Imperial Germany who acted as a Stackelberg leader (Hallerberg 1996), the result 
would have been a ruinous race to the bottom, that is, competitive deregulation of labor and 
social standards across the Länder.  
The political institutional design of the Federal Republic of Germany prevented 
regulatory competition among the Länder.  The centralization of legislative power in the field of 
labor made it possible to enforce uniform employment protection legislation across the nation.92  
                                                 
92 Under Article 74 (12) of the Basic Law, the federal government and the Länder governments shared concurrent 
legislative powers in labor issues, but federal legislation superceded Land legislation.  
 145 
Furthermore, while most taxes were determined by federal legislation, the extensive equalization 
of fiscal revenue among the Länder weakened the financial autonomy of individual Länder and 
thereby distorted the preferences of Länder concerning the need to stimulate the development of 
Land economy by taking advantage of differential regulations of labor across Länder. 93   
Contrary to the United States where States with lower labor costs remained active players in 
holding down federal regulation of labor after federal legislation in labor relations was accepted 
as constitutional, economically less developed German Länder found it less appealing to block 
the passage of employment protection legislation uniformly applied across the nation first due to 
their lack of financial autonomy and second due to inter-jurisdictional redistribution of revenues.  
As Scharpf (1997: 24) pointed out, these institutional arrangements were the “most clear-cut 
solution in the Federal Republic of Germany, where regulatory competition among the Länder in 
areas that might affect the location choices of capital and firms is almost totally eliminated.”   
5.5.2.5 The role of judiciary in the German federalism 
One notable change in political institutions brought to the Federal Republic of Germany was the 
significant empowerment of the judiciary in its relations with the federal legislature.  In case of 
the United States, the strong judiciary was a stubborn defender of state parochialism against the 
federal power at least before the New Deal era.  However, the German judiciary was more 
supportive of the supremacy of the federal government over the Länder in legislation.   
The Basic Law had provisions to create a special court, the Federal Constitutional Court, 
and to grant it far-reaching constitutional authority compared with the Federal Supreme Court 
                                                 
93 For example, Land works council laws before the 1951 Works Constitution Act differed significantly from each 
other in the degree of restrictions on employers’ freedom of enterprise (Fisher 1951: 4). 
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under the Weimar constitution (Leibholz 1952: 723).94  The Basic Law expressively provided 
the Federal Constitutional Court with the power of determining the constitutionality of federal 
and Land statutes and even the power of banning political parties that the Court considered 
unconstitutional.  Individual citizens were allowed to appeal directly to the Court when their 
constitutionally-ensured basic rights were infringed by a public authority.  The Federal 
Constitutional Court Act passed by the legislature in 1951 explicitly stated that it was “separate 
from, and independent of, all other constitutional organs” (Leibholz 1952: 724).  By 1951 
judicial checks by politically independent courts against the legislature were firmly established in 
the Federal Republic of Germany.   
Because of this division of powers accustomed to Americans, one might think that the 
Federal Constitutional Court could restrict the scope of federal legislative power by its 
interpretation of Article 72 concerning when a need for a federal rule existed just as the U.S. 
Supreme Court forestalled federal intervention in labor-management relations by giving a narrow 
interpretation of the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution.  However, this did not 
happen.  Although the Parliamentary Council almost unanimously agreed to give the judiciary 
the explicit power to examine the constitutionality of laws in drafting the Basic Law (Reich 
1963: 204), they sought to put some checks against the possible future interference by the 
judiciary in federal legislation.  Walter Strauss, leader of CDU, espoused that “we [the 
Parliamentary Council] were unanimous in this small circle that the constitutional court could 
examine only an abuse of discretion by the federal legislature, but not the question of the need 
                                                 
94 Regarding the origin of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Reich (1963: 204) wrote, “By 1949 the unfavorable 
lessons that the writers of a new constitution might have drawn from the record of the Weimar high court had been 
overlaid by the still less fortunate experience of government under National Socialism.  Centralization of 
governmental power and legislative supremacy had been discredited; that the restoration of constitutional 
government required, among other things, independent courts and a form of judicial review was a premise not only 
of the Allied governments of occupation but of the German draftsmen as well.”   
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for legislation, the decision as to which must be confined exclusively to the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat” (Golay 1958: 61).  Therefore, the draftsmen of the Basic Law inserted Article 74 
illustrating a long list of matters for concurrent legislative powers that were never considered as 
exhaustive.  The Federal Constitutional Court followed the will of the Parliamentary Council, 
taking the position that the decision regarding the need for federal exercise of the concurrent 
powers was solely within the discretion of the federal parliament and not by its nature a 
judiciable question (Golay 1958: 61).    
5.5.3 Government ideology, political competition, and employment protection  
5.5.3.1 The early Federal Republic of Germany 
If the Basic Law had adopted the American type of federalism, the political institutions in West 
Germany would have provided stronger safeguards against popular pressures to provide 
employment protection legislation.  Since the Basic Law adopted a fundamentally different 
federalism for the new German state and the countermajoritarian political institutions as found in 
the American federalism were less developed in Germany, the remaining factor constraining the 
popular pressures was the ideology of government parties that was in turn dependent upon the 
result of popular elections.  
In August 1949 there was the first parliamentary election under the Basic Law in which 
the Social Democrats lost to the conservative coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP.  The left wing of 
the anti-socialist camp, represented by the Christian Democratic Labor Minister Anton Storch, 
comprised members from Christian unions and they insisted making co-determination laws.  At 
the other end of ideological spectrum were members committed to a free market economy 
represented by the Christian Democratic Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard.  These neoliberals 
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endeavored to introduce an anti-cartel law to end the cartel-abundant economy of the pre-war 
period.  They did not necessarily see the freedom of union activities contradict their neoliberal 
tenets.  However, they criticized co-determination for a serious interference with the 
management right to enterprise.  Thus, they wanted to separate works councils that had 
mushroomed since the war from unions’ influences.  As a pragmatist, Chancellor Adenauer was 
more concerned with his own authority or the future of his cabinet than taking a side with any of 
the ideological camps within the coalition government (Mierzejewski 2004: 89).  In fact, he 
accepted labor unions’ demands when he found their support for his government to be necessary.   
The Protection Against Dismissal Act and the Codetermination Act, both enacted in 
1951, were the notable examples of Adenauer’s pragmatic approach to labor issues.  When West 
Germany became independent in 1949, the public perception of the day was favorable to 
providing greater protection for workers against employers’ negligence of workers’ interests in 
making personnel and economic policies as a general means of denazification because labor was 
a major victim under the Nazi dictatorship.95  The Social Democrats had been participating in 
every Land government in a coalition with the CDU and/or the FDP by the end of 1949 (Cusack 
and Fuchs 2002).  Furthermore, the strength of the German labor significantly increased when 
the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) was established to unite German labor 
movements in October 1949.  This umbrella organization included eighty-seven percent of seven 
million organized workers.  Few politicians were insulated from popular pressures for national 
legislation limiting employers’ Herr-im-Haus attitudes.  Fisher (1951: 4) noted: 
   
                                                 
95 Jackson (2005: 240) confirms this point: “After the Nazi period, codetermination reemerged during the postwar 
democratization.  Codetermination found new political legitimacy by being reinterpreted in light of Nazism and 
postwar reconstruction.” 
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In the latter part of 1949, pressure upon the Federal Government to enact a federal works council 
and codetermination law became so strong that Labor Minister Storch called for discussions between 
trade unions and employers' organizations in the hope that these two groups would agree upon a set of 
principles which could be embodied in law. 
 
When the DGB and employers representatives met in Hattenheim in January 1950 to 
discuss the future of German industrial relations, the DGB took an initiative in the issue of 
wrongful dismissal and got the employer representatives to accept the legal restrictions on 
dismissal expected to help protect unions members against anti-union employers (Seifert and 
Funken-Hötzel 2004: 490).  The Protection Against Dismissal Act of 1951 introduced the 
requirement of “socially justified causes of dismissal” to prevent dismissals at employer’s will.  
Dismissals are regarded as lawful strictly for three occasions: dismissals upon lack of capability, 
misconduct, and redundancy.   
Codetermination was a major goal the DGB sought to achieve in Hattenheim.  The DGB 
demanded recognition of workers’ right to participate in the making of economic decisions on 
the enterprise, industry and state levels (Shuchman 1957: 126-129).  Especially at the enterprise 
level, the DGB submitted to the Bundestag its proposal to fill half the members of the board of 
directors and the supervisory board in large companies with union or works council 
representative nominated by the DGB.  The DGB and employers representatives failed to reach 
an agreement on codetermination because employers strongly opposed the codetermination bill 
as threatening their freedom of enterprise.  Erhard was on the business side.  He even rejected 
labor’s request to guarantee by German law parity codetermination the British institutionalized in 
the steel industry whose ownership had been returned to the Germans (Wachenheim 1956: 118; 
Shuchman 1957: 130).  In reaction, the DGB mobilized unions’ offensive by having ninety-six 
percent of metal workers and ninety-three percent of mine workers authorize strikes in the event 
that codetermination was discontinued (Shuchman 1957: 136).   
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The deadlock between capital and labor was resolved by Adenauer’s intervention in 
January 1951.  He made a compromise with Hans Böckler to give parity codetermination in steel 
companies a statutory ground and to extend it to coal companies.  Adenauer accepted labor’s 
demand for equal representation on the supervisory board.  Although he declined to worker’s 
direct participation on the management board, he made it obligatory to add to the management 
board a labor director who was in a sense a labor’s representative because he could not be 
appointed against the majority of the labor representatives on the supervisory board.   
As Mierzejewski (2004: 95) noted, Adenauer’s concession to the DGB on 
codetermination was mainly motivated by his “placing political and Christian considerations 
above economic rationality.”  His political considerations can be elaborated in terms of domestic 
and international dimensions.  First, Adenauer was intended to buy not only social peace but also 
some of working-class votes away from the SPD (Wachenheim 1956: 119; Nicholls 1994: 339).  
For Adenauer, it was important to strengthen the political base of CDU/CSU that won the 1949 
election against the SPD by only 1.8 percent of votes (Bundeswahlleiter).   
The external factor was related with Robert Schuman, French foreign minister.  In May 
1950 he presented a proposal to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a 
supranational authority, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which Adenauer 
endorsed.  Schuman’s goal was not only to prevent remilitarization of Germany by regulating 
production by war-making industries but also to promote Germany’s role in the reconstruction of 
European economy.  Adenauer supported the Schuman Plan as an opportunity to make Germany 
an equal partner with other European countries, but he faced strong oppositions from domestic 
business groups.  The Federation of German Industry (BDI), the umbrella organization of 
German industry favoring large export interests, opposed the sectoral approach of the Schuman 
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Plan because they preferred more general economic integration including Germany’s 
internationally competitive capital goods (Moravcsik 1998: 97).  German coal and steel interests, 
who initially envisaged the ECSC to be a big cartel-like organization, switched to opposition as 
the final draft of ECSC’s constitution was much more liberal and anti-cartel (Nicholls 1994: 341; 
Moravcsik 1998: 112).   
Furthermore, the German labor was skeptical of the Schuman Plan, although not bitterly 
opposed to it.  The Social Democrats, CDU’s main political opposition, criticized the Schuman 
Plan for a French conspiracy to control core German industries (Bretton 1953: 989).  The DGB 
was worried that the breakup of German trusts the Schuman Plan aimed at would result in mass 
job loss in coal and steel industries (Warner 1996: 29).  In order to secure broad domestic 
support, Adenauer had few options but to turn to Hans Böckler and to provide workers’ 
codetermination rights in the coal and steel industry as an inducement.  Thus, Adenauer yielded 
to labor’s demand for codetermination in coal and steel industries to win labor unions’ support 
for his geopolitical agenda (Warner 1996: 52).96         
After the Codetermination Act was passed in April 1951, the DGB sought to extend 
parity codetermination to other German industries and to make works councils subordinate to 
labor unions.  However, political and economic situations were shifting to labor’s political 
disadvantage.  The postwar German economy under Erhard’s steering recovered rapidly, fueled 
by the Korean War and Marshall Plan funds.  By 1951, West Germany returned to its prewar 
levels of gross domestic product and of industrial productivity (Carlin 1996: 265).  Adenauer 
concluded the negotiations for the ECSC and got to sign the Treaty of Paris in April 1951, which 
                                                 
96 The ECSC Treaty signed on April 18, 1951 in Paris sought to provide for workers in coal and steel industries 
adequate protection against unemployment and wage increases to the highest level in the Community and to protect 
the labor interest by granting a certain degree of participation in some of the bodies of the Community in order to 
gain labor’s support for the Schuman Plan (Bebr 1954: 1008).   
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symbolized the successful rapprochement of Germany with its European neighbors.  Adenauer’s 
success in foreign affairs was also demonstrated by the negotiations with the Allies to reach an 
agreement to end the Allied occupation, which was eventually concluded in the Contractual 
Agreements in May 1952.  These political and economic developments greatly increased the 
popularity of the conservative government (Shuchman 1957: 138).     
The establishment of works councils and their functions were officially restored when the 
Works Constitution Act was passed in July 1952.  The 1952 Works Constitution Act granted 
works councils the right to participate in employers’ decisions regarding dismissals as the 1920 
Works Council Act.  It obliged employers to inform works councils before they implemented 
dismissals and to consult with works councils regarding the number and specific workers to be 
released, the method by which they were to be released, and measures to avoid undue hardship 
for those to be released (Schuchman 1957: 165).  This law also introduced company-level 
codetermination by giving workers’ representatives one third of seats on the supervisory board of 
companies with at least 500 employees.97   
In contrast to his negotiation with the DGB on sectoral codetermination in coal and steel 
industries, this time Adenauer was determined to refuse the DGB’s demands on codetermination 
in broader industries.  Compared with its Weimarian predecessor, it was a setback to labor in 
terms of the power of works councils at the workplace on three accounts.  First, while the 1920 
Works Council Act left works councils’ participatory rights open in the area of collective 
dismissals, the 1952 Works Constitution Act restricted employers’ duty to consult with works 
                                                 
97 This provision did not apply to coal and steel industries.  Co-determination in coal, iron, and steel industries was 
governed by the 1951 Codetermination Act, which provided parity representation for workers in the supervisory 
board.  The clauses on workers participation in the supervisory board in the 1952 Works Constitution Act were 
replaced by the 1976 Codetermination Act, which extended workers’ representation to one half of seats in the 
supervisory board.  
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councils to cases where “fundamental changes” in plant operations were involved (Schuchman 
1957: 165).  Second, while works councils under the old law had the right to apply to the labor 
court on behalf of dismissed employees, the new one did not mention works councils’ right to 
bring a claim to the labor court (Dose-Digenopoulos and Holand 1985: 543).  Third, as Thelen 
(1991: 75) pointed out, the languages of the 1952 Works Constitution Act stressed the 
independence of works councils from labor unions.  Therefore, labor unions’ power on the shop 
floor and their ability to control dismissals through works councils were severely weakened.           
The 1952 Works Constitution Act provided watered-down version of codetermination 
rights even compared with the provisions of some progressive Länder it replaced (Thelen 1991: 
74; Addison et al. 2004: 394).  Between April 1946 when the Allied Powers passed Control 
Council Law No. 22 that permitted works councils and 1950 six Länder adopted works council 
laws. 98   Among them, the works council laws of three Länder in the U.S. Zone (Hesse, 
Württemberg-Baden, and Bremen) significantly extended the rights of works councils from those 
of the 1920 Works Council Act.  The codetermination clauses of Hesse and Württemberg-Baden 
were the most progressive because they gave labor the right to participate in “economic” 
decisions of the company beyond codetermination in social and personnel areas.  The U.S. 
Military Government had suspended the works council laws of Hesse and Wuerttember-Baden 
until national legislation was enacted.    
After the Works Constitution Act was passed, the DGB did not choose to step up a 
national strike protest but to utilize the impending Bundestag election of 1953 to revise the law.  
However, the DGB could not have an opportunity to bring about a revision of the Works 
Constitution Act until the mid-1960s as the SPD lost five consecutive Bundestag elections since 
                                                 
98 I depended on Fisher (1951: 4) for the survey of Land works council laws. 
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1949.  During this period, the German economy was driven by Erhard’s anti-Keynesian, liberal 
economic philosophy.  Organized labor was not considered to be a legitimate partner in the 
economic policy-making at either national or company levels.  Organized labor’s hope for 
codetermination was buried.  Instead, unions were getting more interested in distributive issues 
such as wages and welfare benefits (Scharpf 1991: 118).   
5.5.3.2 Social Democrats in power 
Labor unions’ action for codetermination resumed in 1966 when Social Democrats became a part 
of the Grand Coalition with Christian Democrats.  In 1966 West Germany experienced the first 
recession in its postwar history that was precipitated by the strongly independent Bundesbank, 
the FRG’s central bank, which had tightened money supply to quell an overheated economy 
(Scharpf 1991: 118-119).  This economic recession led to a breakdown of the coalition 
government between the CDU/CSU and the FDP that had been formed in 1965 because FDP 
cabinet members resigned demanding cutbacks in the federal budget (Carr 1987: 198).  The 
CDU/CSU escaped being a minority government by making a coalition with the SPD.  However, 
SPD’s first return to power since 1930 was followed by enhanced power resources for labor 
unions.   
In response to unions’ pressures for labor relations reform, the Grand Coalition 
government established in 1968 the Federal Expert Commission to investigate the effect of parity 
codetermination in the coal and steel industry on corporate profitability and labor militancy 
(Streeck 1984: 396).  The committee concluded that while parity codetermination in the coal and 
steel industry was associated with industrial peace, there was no indication that parity 
codetermination in the coal and steel industry was incompatible with a capitalist management.  
However, Social Democrats’ wish to extend parity codetermination to general industries could 
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not be realized without obtaining its coalition partner’s agreement unless it won an absolute 
majority of Bundestag seats.  Neither the Grand Coalition nor the SPD-FDP coalition formed in 
1969 reached an agreement to extend parity codetermination to all industries covered by the 
1952 Works Constitution Act.   
As Free Democrats opposed an extension of parity codetermination to outside of the coal 
and steel industry, the SPD-FDP government decided to focus on a reform of works councils that 
was a politically less contentious issue than parity codetermination (Streeck 1984: 400).  The 
rights of works councils were significantly strengthened when the SPD-FDP government 
completely overhauled the 1952 Works Constitution Act in January 1972.  Adams and Rummel 
(1977) nicely compared works councils’ powers under the Works Constitution Acts of 1952 and 
1972.  The new law endowed works councils with a veto power in individual dismissals only to 
be superceded by the labor court while works councils’ decisions had not been able to suspend 
the effect of dismissals under the old law.  In the area of collective dismissals, although the right 
of works councils remained consultative regarding layoff decisions, the new law required 
employers to reach an agreement by negotiation with works councils over measure to protect 
workers’ interests and over compensation schemes or “social plans” for the affected workers 
before executing mass layoffs.  The failure to reach an agreement over the social plan must be 
resolved by the arbitration committee made up of equal numbers of assessors, appointed by the 
employer and works council respectively, and an impartial chairperson.  In addition, the 1972 
Works Constitution Act enhanced the influence of unions over works councils as well.  The Act 
permitted works councilors to hold union offices and granted full-time union officials extensive 
rights to participate in works council meetings.  The formal links between unions and works 
councils were greatly improved. 
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In the 1972 election the SPD emerged as the largest party in the Bundestag for the first 
time in the postwar history, partly owing to the success of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.  Especially, as a 
result of the first vote to elect one-half of the Bundestag seats directly by pluralities in single-
member districts, the CDU/CSU became southern regional interests as they won more seats than 
the SPD only in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg while the SPD became a true people’s party 
winning 152 direct seats over the CDU/CSU’s 96 (Laux 1973: 522).  After the SPD-FDP 
coalition was extended because of acrimony between the CDU and the FDP (Laux 1973: 514-
516), the two parties began negotiations to reform codetermination in general industries.  While 
the SPD was committed to a general extension of the coal and steel model, the FDP under 
pressures from business opposition was hostile to it (Streeck 1984: 401).  Finally, the coalition 
parties made a compromise.  The 1976 Codetermination Act strengthened workers’ 
representation at the enterprise level outside the coal and steel industry, providing workers equal 
representation on the supervisory board and the position of a labor director on the managerial 
board.  However, the government rejected labor’s demand to give unions the right to appoint 
representatives on the supervisory board and a labor director on the managerial board (Streeck 
1984: 401-402).   
Employers Associations bitterly opposed the passage of the passage of the 1976 
Codetermination Act (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 2006).  Even after the passage of the law, they resisted the law by challenging its 
constitutionality in the Federal Constitutional Court and also by making company by-laws to 
circumvent it.  However, the Codetermination Act of 1976 became an integral part of German 
industrial relations as the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Act was compatible with the 
constitution and that all company by-laws to circumvent the Act was void (Streeck 1984: 403).    
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the origin and development of employment protection legislation from 
Imperial Germany to the Federal republic of Germany.  The difference of employment protection 
between Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic despite their similar economic systems is 
the major finding of this chapter.  This chapter also finds that the German employment protection 
has been strengthened in the face of employers’ opposition since the first national legislation 
significantly restricting employers’ right to fire their employees was enacted in 1920.  The 
varieties-of-capitalism argument is an incomplete explanation for this longitudinal change of 
employment protection.   
While emphasizing the limitation of the varieties-of-capitalism literature in explaining the 
temporal variation of employment protection of Germany, this study confirms the cross-country 
differences drawn by the current literature about comparative capitalism.  Germany and the 
United States had a similar level of employment protection before the First World War.  Since 
the formation of the Weimar Republic, however, these two countries have followed completely 
different paths in reaction to rising democratic pressures to limit managerial prerogatives in 
employment deicisions.  Using Stepan (1999: 24)’s terminology, the democratic federalism of 
Germany that was formed in 1919 was much more “demos-enabling” than that of the United 
States.  As the previous chapter shows, the countermajoritarian political institutions of the United 
States warded off democratic pressures to increase job security.  As a result, the American 
employment protection legislation was limited to providing a minimal notice period for those to 
be laid off.  In contrast, Germans successfully institutionalized extensive workers’ rights in 
making decsions over individual and collective dismissals at the plant level, which was 
complemented by workers’ participation on the supervisory board over the management of their 
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company.  The German-style federalism featuring interlocked jurisdictions played a permissive 
role in generating statutory restrictions on dismissal.  
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6.0  CAPITALIST INTERESTS, DEMOCRACY, AND EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION IN SOUTH KOREA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Employment protection has become a major political issue in South Korea since the mid-1990s 
as changing business environment prompted Korean employers to abandon traditional lifetime 
employment.  Korean employers demanding further labor market flexibility have criticized South 
Korea’s employment protection legislation for making industrial adjustment very costly, while 
organized labor has responded that the freedom of layoff would only aggravate workers’ job 
security.   
The key legislation for employment protection is the Labor Standards Act amended in 
1998.  Rather than take a snapshot view of the 1998 Labor Standards Act, this paper examines 
employment protection of Korea “in a temporal sequence of events and processes stretching over 
extended periods” (Pierson 2004: 2).  I seek to explain the historical development of employment 
protection in South Korea from the early 1960s through today.   
South Korea is an ideal case to study the question of change in employment protection.  
During the time period under study, South Korea underwent shifts in industrial strategies, 
political regime changes, upheavals of radical labor movement and national economic crises.  
Although this chapter is a one-country case study, it enables to compare different periods within 
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one country characterized by such varied historical experiences.   
South Korea experienced the rise of employment protection through democratization as 
Germany.  Before the 1987 democratization, the government protection of workers against 
dismissal was very limited: workers were fired for union activities and workers in light industries 
mostly comprising small and medium firms were subject to abrupt layoffs at best with minimal 
severance pay when their plants were shut down as a result of decreasing demand from export 
markets.  On the other hand, workers in chaebols enjoyed considerable job security as the heavy-
chemical industrialization based on chaebols during the 1970s increased demand for skilled labor 
and tightened labor markets.  Further, because the government guaranteed the survival of 
chaebols by providing policy loans and emergency bailouts, chaebols could use expansion-
oriented business strategies that made workforce reduction unnecessary.   
In the early 1990s, chaebols began to perceive lifetime employment to be a liability rather 
than an asset, responding to challenges from international market competition and rising 
domestic labor costs.  And the 1997 financial crisis was decisive in turning chaebols against 
lifetime employment.  Since the crisis, chaebols have become increasingly in favor of flexible 
use of labor.  However, South Korea’s employment protection legislation remains resilient 
because of electoral constraints on its reform in the democratized country.   
This chapter is organized in the following order.  First, I provide a sketch of South 
Korea’s employment protection and a comparative assessment of its strictness.  Secondly, I 
critically review existing explanations for the traditional business practice of lifetime 
employment with focus on the varieties-of-capitalism perspective.  The varieties-of-capitalism 
model is appropriate to explain the Korean chaebols’ business practice of lifetime employment, 
but it is unable to explain the absence of employment protection as government regulation 
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during the dictatorship regimes and its rise and continuity after democratization.  Thirdly, I 
historically trace the rise of employment protection after 1987 and how it survived the conflict-
ridden 1996 labor law reform politics and the neoliberal economic reform after the 1997 
financial crisis.  Finally, I discuss how the 1997 financial crisis affected the business preference 
for lifetime employment and whether the cutback of employment protection will be possible in 
the near future. 
6.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN SOUTH 
KOREA 
Employment protection legislation in South Korea dates back to 1953 when President Syngman 
Rhee enacted the Labor Standards Act during the Korean War.  President Rhee wanted to show 
that the South was a better place for workers to live than the communist North.  Thus, he 
stipulated in the Labor Standards Act too idealistic labor protections for a poor agrarian economy 
such as 48 hours’ work per week, restrictions on employing minors, and minimum wages.  
Regarding employment protection, the Labor Standards Act forbade an employer to dismiss a 
worker without justifiable causes but it did not specify what “justifiable causes” meant.99  The 
statutory protection of workers against dismissal was apparently reinforced under the Park 
Chung-hee’s military government.  Immediately after the military coup in 1961, he revised the 
Labor Standards Act to introduce one month’s advance notice as a procedural requirement for 
dismissals.    
                                                 
99 The 1953 Labor Standards Act also required employers to provide one month’s average pay per every year of 
service as severance pay.  Yet this severance pay should not bee seen as an employment protection because it was 
given to those who left companies voluntarily as well as to those who were dismissed.    
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However, the employment protections in the Labor Standards Act were very limited 
throughout the dictatorship regimes.  First of all, the government did not enforce the law in the 
face of frequent violations on the employer’s side.100  Combined with the problem of weak 
enforcement, the employment protection provided by the law was largely decorative because the 
definition of “justifiable causes” for dismissal was left to administrative decrees but there were 
no government actions on this.  Employers fired or threatened to fire workers if they joined labor 
unions despite the “justifiable causes” provision in the Labor Standards Act (KCTU 2001).  
Finally, contrary to the argument that layoffs or dismissals for managerial reasons had been 
prohibited during the dictatorships (Kim 1998; Yoon 1998), layoffs due to plant shutdowns were 
commonplace even during the period of rapid economic growth (Song 2000; KCTU 2001).101  
South Korea’s small and medium firms were predominantly labor-intensive and light industry, 
exposed to strong competition in world markets.  Therefore, when they entered temporary or 
permanent plant closings during downturns, this precipitated mass layoffs in those firms.102   
Workers in chaebols were better off than their colleagues in small and medium firms.  Although 
there were no formal regulations prohibiting layoffs, the government sought to protect their job 
security by helping chaebols in deep financial trouble when the oil crises made mass 
unemployment loom large during the 1970s.   
                                                 
100 In November 1970 Jeon Tai-il, an apparel worker and labor union activist, killed himself by fire in protest of the 
disregard of the Labor Standards Act by his employer and the government (Cho 2003).  
101 In 1975 the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, a moderate umbrella union, demanded the government to 
enforce the Labor Standards Act, to eradicate mass layoffs due to plant shutdowns, and to launch anti-
unemployment measures (Song 2000: 224-225). 
102 The incident at Y.H. Trading Company, a wig firm, illustrates the job insecurity of low-wage workers during the 
1970s.  When the company announced to close as a result of the decline of wig industry and managerial corruption, 
more than 500 workers lost their jobs.  Unionists of the company entered a sit-down strike in protest of the closing 
of the company.  But the police raided the strikers, killing one union worker (Park 2006).   
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But it was only in the late 1980s that South Korea had a general rule concerning layoffs.  
In the 1989 decision, the Supreme Court provided the following four conditions for layoffs to be 
lawful103:  
• There must be urgent managerial needs for workforce reduction.   
• Employers must make every effort to avoid layoff.  The Supreme Court held that 
employers must seek to reduce workforces first through natural attrition and early 
retirement;104   
• Employers must select workers to be laid off by establishing reasonable and fair 
standards; and  
• Employers must have sincere consultation regarding measures to avoid layoff and 
standards of the selection of workers to be laid off with employees’ representatives. 
 
 
Since this ruling was rendered, the meaning of “urgent managerial needs” has been hotly 
debated and accordingly the position of the Supreme Court has changed.  The 1989 Supreme 
Court ruling interpreted this term very narrowly in a way that layoffs must be allowed only to 
prevent bankruptcy.  Since then, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of managerial needs 
(Kim 2004: 545).  For example, it held in 1991 that managerial needs were acknowledged if 
workforce reduction was not only necessary to prevent bankruptcy but it had “objectively 
reasonable reasons” such as an improvement in productivity, a change in work organization to 
make the business more competitive, and a change of industrial structure due to technological 
innovation.105   
These four judicial principles were first codified in the Labor Standards Act in March 
1997, but their implementation was delayed for two years.  The Labor Standards Act was put 
into effect in February 1998.  It required at least 60-day’s prior consultation with workers and 
                                                 
103 Ruling No. 87DaKa2445 (S. Korea Sup. Ct. May 23, 1989).  
104 Ruling No. 92Da14779 (S. Korea Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 1992).  
105 Ruling No. 91Da8647 (S. Korea Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 1991); Ruling No.92Nu3076 (S. Korea. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 
1993). 
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acknowledged that transfers, mergers, acquisitions of business due to its continued deterioration 
constituted a urgent managerial need.  The layoff regulations in the 1998 Labor Standards Act 
are fairly strict compared to other OECD countries.  The OECD Employment Outlook of 1999 
ranked South Korea as most difficult to dismiss full-time, permanent employees except for 
Portugal.  The OECD Employment Outlook 2004 revised the strictness of South Korea’s 
regulations on layoff it originally measured in 1999.  It ranked South Korea as tenth most 
difficult to dismiss full-time, permanent employees among twenty-eight OECD countries, 
pointing to the information that what was called “severance” pay was in fact a payment made to 
every worker who left the firm, voluntarily or involuntarily, and judicial practices had been 
relatively permissible.   
6.3 LABOR POWER VERSUS CAPITALIST INTERESTS  
What theory best explains both the level and the change of employment protection in South 
Korea?  Is the rise of employment protection after 1987 a result of strong labor power or 
employers’ self-interested behaviors?  According to power resources theory (Korpi 1983; Huber 
and Stephens 2001), strong labor groups are necessary to bring employment protection because 
capitalists generally oppose it.  However, the South Korean case does not support this 
antagonistic theory of capital-labor relations.  South Korea lacks traditionally important labor 
factors such as union density, bargaining structures and electoral strength of left parties.  Its 
union membership has reduced to eleven percent of total private employment as of 2004 (Korea 
Labor Institute), major unions are organized at company levels similarly to American labor (Park 
2001), and no social democratic parties in South Korea won seats in the National Assembly 
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before 2004.   
A more sophisticated power-of-labor argument is that Korean labor can exercise 
significant bargaining power by using a threat to strike in chaebols, South Korea’s family-owned 
business conglomerates, because union membership is concentrated in those big corporations, 
which account for much of export in the export-oriented economy (Mo 1996; Kim 2003: 62).  
Individual labor unions in chaebol sectors, unions of standard workers, have been quite 
successful in extracting wage concessions from their employers using the threat of strikes.  
However, South Korean labor unions lack the ability to initiate progressive welfare state reforms 
because of a weak social democratic party, comparatively low union membership, and divided 
labor movements.   
Contrary to the power-of-labor resource model, the employer-centered explanation 
focuses on the business interest in social protection.  First, there is an argument that large, 
monopoly firms are generally more favorable to social policy than small firms.  Swenson (2002: 
22-23) argues that capitalists are more likely to support progressive relations with their 
employees when they face less competition in sales markets.  In her comparative analysis of 
social insurances, Mares (2000, 2003) suggests that since large firms have power to set their 
prices, they can more easily shift the cost of social insurance onto consumers. 
Traditionally, the high degree of economic concentration in chaebols was a major 
characteristic of the South Korean economy (Gereffi 1990: 96).  In 1973 the fifty largest 
chaebols accounted for 32 percent of GDP and in 1980 they accounted for 49 percent of GDP 
(Haggard and Moon 1990: 218).  However, this argument does not explain why employment 
protection was weak in the period before South Korea was democratized in 1987 despite the 
overwhelming economic power of chaebols and severely distorted market competition.  
 166 
Although chaebols were interested in lifetime employment as an implicit business practice over 
the period, they did not support the introduction of employment protection as public policy.     
Another school of the employer-centered approach is the varieties-of-capitalism 
perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001) that emphasizes national differences rather than sectoral 
differences of business interests in social policy.  It suggests that employment protection is 
embedded in complementary economic institutions: employment protection will be strong (or 
weak) if the entire capitalist economic system where it belongs rewards (punish) long-term 
employment relations.  To test this argument in the Korean context, we need to examine the kind 
of capitalist model that prevailed in Korea in the time between the early 1960s and the 1997 
financial crisis.   
6.4 THE KOREAN ECONOMIC MODEL, 1961-1997 
The political economy of South Korea has been widely known as a follower of the Japanese 
model, a prime example of a “coordinated market economy” along with Germany, mainly thanks 
to the developmental state literature (Johnson 1987; Kohli 1994; Kim 1997).  From the 
autonomy of penetrating state over the society underpinned by efficient bureaucracy, state 
control over finance, government-business risk partnership, to group-oriented business networks 
every major character of the Korean economic model seems to display the Japanese influence.  
However, a closer look at the Korean capitalism during the period of high economic growth runs 
counter to this commonly held idea.  The Korean capitalism is not a copy of the Japanese model 
as opposed to the Anglo-American liberal market economy, but it has a more complicated nature.  
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I will examine the characteristics of the Korean economic model before the 1997 financial crisis 
from the varieties-of-capitalism perspective.   
6.4.1 Institutions of skill formation 
Empirical research about the skill formation in Korea shows that firm-specific training has been 
very limited as in the United States (Park 1992; Yoon 1996).  Even the engineering industry that 
required the most skilled labor determined the skill level not by tenure but by years of schooling 
at the point of entrance (Yoon 1996).  Except for the shipbuilding industry where employers 
introduced in-plant training programs in the early stage of industrial development during the 
1970s (See Noh 2004), most firms resorted to external labor markets in which they imported 
skills from advanced countries and poached skilled workers from other firms rather than creating 
internal labor markets for skill formation.   
While small and medium firms were not interested in firm-based training because of the 
low skill requirement and high potential cost (Kang et al. 2001), even large employers in heavy 
industry did not seriously invest in the formation of firm-specific skill.106  The major domestic 
source of skills needed for industry was technical high schools, junior colleges, and university 
engineering schools that dictatorship governments promoted with vigor (Lee et al. 1999; Cho et 
al. 2002).  These three education levels reflected segmented career paths: graduates of technical 
schools would become factory workers, graduates of junior colleges technicians, and university 
graduates professional workers.  As years of schooling of a worker increased, so did the level of 
his skill and pay.  As in Japan, Korean firms had seniority-based wage systems.  However, the 
                                                 
106 Park (1992)’s survey of an engine manufacturer’s plant employing more than 2,000 workers revealed that this 
company spent only 0.2 percent of its total sales for training workers. 
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crucial difference was that in Korea the wage system was rigidly seniority-based: individual 
worker’s wage was not linked to his training and skill development.  As in the United States, 
manual workers were rarely advanced to white-collar positions.  Therefore, talented youths were 
more attracted to university-bound school education with great encouragement, or pressures in 
many cases, from their parents than to vocational training.     
6.4.2 Inter-firm relations 
As in Germany before the postwar period, South Korea did not have competition policy during 
the period before the early 1980s.  Chaebols expanded their businesses through cross-
shareholdings and cross-debt guarantees among affiliated firms that were often monopolists or 
oligopolists (Chang and Jung 2005).  Cartels mushroomed to maintain prices during downturns.  
Therefore, Park Chung-hee controlled prices between 1975 and 1979 because he attributed 
rampant inflation to the anti-competitive behaviors of chaebols.  However, his attempt to control 
chaebols’ behaviors only aggravated market distortions (Lee 2002: 67-68). 
The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (Fair Trade Act) enacted in 1980 was a 
watershed in the competition policy of South Korea.  Chun Doo-hwan, who seized power 
through a military coup, introduced this law as a way to gain regime support from the media and 
consumer organizations who were critical of the economic concentration in chaebols.  This law 
does not regulate firms for the fact that they had dominant market shares but it focuses on the 
abuse of their market-dominant positions.  In that respect this law follows the European model 
rather than the U.S. anti-trust law (Chang and Jung 2005: 174).   
The Fair Trade Act prohibited formal cartels and cartel-like concerted activities to 
substantially restrict market competition.  However, it provided several exemptions for cartels 
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that were conducted for the purposes of industrial rationalization, research and technology 
development, overcoming economic depression, industrial restructuring, rationalization of trade 
terms and conditions, and enhancement of competitiveness of small and medium enterprises.107  
In view of these exemptions, the Fair Trade Act resembled the German competition law of 1957 
that outlawed cartels in principle but left many exemptions (See Giersch, Schmieding, and Paqué 
1992: 85).       
However, there is a notable difference in business networks between Germany and South 
Korea.  While industry-level business networks played a central role in joint research, product 
development, and the diffusion of new technologies in Germany, Korean firms lacked close 
inter-firm collaboration for R&D.  Kim (1999)’s study shows that in South Korea purchasing 
technology licenses and poaching professionals from abroad were the major vehicles used to 
acquire new technologies needed to start up light industry in the 1960s and also heavy industry in 
the 1970s.  His study finds that the transfer of more innovative technologies such as semi-
conductor since the 1980s have come through enhanced research efforts by academic 
universities, government research institutes, and individual firms.  In case of Korea, business 
networks were based on chaebols in which affiliated firms were interconnected through cross-
shareholdings and cross-debt guarantees across different industries.  Except for chaebol 
networks, inter-firm relations in Korea were driven by competition.   
6.4.3 Financial system 
In sharp contrast to the market-based financial system of the United States, the Korean financial 
                                                 
107 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. <ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/monopoly.doc>. 
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system was predominantly bank-based as in Germany.  However, German banks were very 
powerful actors autonomous from the state.  By contrast, the government-controlled banking 
sector was an essential tool of state-led industrialization in South Korea.  As Woo-Cumings 
pointed out, the state control of finance was the “most important aspect of state intervention in 
economic development” (Woo-Cumings 1999: 11).  Banks were used to funnel financial 
resources to selected industries and to bail them out when they were in financial trouble.   
The state control over finance in South Korea was established during the early period of 
Park Chung-Hee’s rule (Cho and Kim 1995: 30-31).  After General Park Chung-Hee seized 
power in 1961, the military government nationalized commercial banks in an attempt to 
confiscate illicitly accumulated wealth by industrialists linked to former dictator Rhee Syng-
Man.  In 1962 the military government revised the Bank of Korea Act to transfer monetary 
policy authority from the Bank to the Ministry of Finance.  Therefore, this revision deeply 
weakened central bank independence, making the Bank of Korea subordinate to state-led 
development finance.  
Although the military government introduced state control over finance during the first 
two years after the coup, it failed to formalize plans on how to use this state-controlled financial 
system as a conduit for export-driven economic development. Until 1963 South Korea was still 
dependent upon primary import substitution based on basic consumer goods and foreign aid was 
the biggest source of finance in importing production goods (Haggard and Cheng 1987: 87).  
President Park amended the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966) to shift 
national economic development strategies toward export-promotion based on labor-intensive 
goods (Oh 1998).  This shift in development strategies was backed by the state intervention in 
finance.  First of all, the Park government directed state-owned banks to provide credits to 
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exporters according to their export performances (Lim 2003: 44).  Although export credit 
programs had existed in South Korea before 1963, the Park government streamlined and 
expanded those programs between 1963 and 1965.  Furthermore, lower interest rates on export 
loans were introduced in 1965, which as Amsden put it was “getting the price wrong” to create 
an incentive structure for exporters.  The government also supported exporters wishing to borrow 
from foreign lenders by guaranteeing repayment (Haggard and Cheng 1987: 112).   
The risk partnership between government and business worked well and successfully 
increased the volume of economy during the second half of the 1960s.  As can be seen from 
Table 12, gross domestic product expanded by average 10 percent per year, exports increased by 
average 37.3 percent per year, and gross fixed capital formation increased by average 34.4 
percent per year. 
Table 12  The Success of Korean Economic Development Model Before 1970 
Variables GDP growth Export growth Gross fixed capital formation 
Unit annual % annual % annual % 
1965 5.2  35.8  27.2  
1966 12.7  42.3  59.6  
1967 6.1  32.7  22.6  
1968 11.7  39.5  37.4  
1969 14.1  36.2  24.8  
1970 8.3  13.8  1.0  
1971 8.6  15.1  3.0  
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. 2003. 
This rapid economic growth was mainly financed through debt, which made the Korean 
financial system vulnerable to external shocks.   As Table 13 shows, the rapid growth in output 
came with high inflation reaching average 13.4 percent a year.  The overshooting of economy 
also led to the financial disarray in corporate and banking institutions.  Bank loans increased to 
41.5 percent of GDP and total foreign debt snowballed to 24.4 percent of GDP by 1969.  The 
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debt-equity ratio of manufacturing firms increased rapidly from 92.7 percent in 1965 to 270 
percent in 1969.  
 
Table 13  South Korea’s Debt-Laden Economy 
Variables Inflation 
Domestic credit 
provided by 
banking sector 
Total foreign debt
Debt-equity ratio, 
manufacturing 
firms 
Unit annual % as % of GDP as % of GDP % 
1965 6.4  19.9  6.9  92.7 
1966 14.0  20.0  10.5  117.7 
1967 16.1  25.4  13.9  151.2 
1968 16.0  34.1  20.4  201.3 
1969 14.6  41.5  24.4  270.0 
1970 18.4  42.1  25.6  328.4 
1971 14.2  43.1  30.0  394.2 
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. 2003; Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics System. 
These economic ramifications of rapid growth developed into a financial crisis as the 
Korean economy experienced a major economic slowdown in 1970 following the economic 
recession in industrial economies.  As Table 12 show, GDP growth dropped from 14.1 percent to 
8.3 percent and export growth plunged from 36.2 percent to 13.8 percent in 1970.  The Korean 
government sought to halt on the deterioration of export growth by devaluating its national 
currency by 7.7 percent in 1970 and 11.9 percent in 1971 (Bank of Korea).  However, this 
devaluation brought many firms into deeper financial trouble, because their burden of debt grew 
heavier.  As of 1971, total foreign debt reached 30 percent of GDP and manufacturing firms’ 
debt ratio became 394.2 percent.   
Since banking sectors already held large non-performing loans, many firms turned to the 
informal curb market to meet their short-term financial needs, although firms had to pay higher 
 173 
interest rates to curb lenders than interest rates on bank loans.108  As of August 1972, total 345.6 
billion won in curb loans were reported, equivalent to 42 percent of total bank loans (Kim 1994: 
72).  Curb lenders often withdrew their loans abruptly when there were signs of borrowers 
having a credit crunch, which forced many firms to go bankrupt.  According to a survey by a 
Korean newspaper in August 1971, 20-30 percent of textile and clothing producers, South 
Korea’s major exporters at the time, were being closed.109   South Korea fell to the second 
financial crisis in its modern history.   
The Federation of Korean Industries comprising big businesses supplicated the 
government to relieve their financial distress (Kim 1994: 67).  In August 1972 Park Chung-Hee 
chose to bail out the debt-laden companies by issuing the Emergency Decree for Economic 
Stability and Growth.  This Decree placed an immediate moratorium on the payment of all 
corporate debts to curb lenders, and called for an extensive rescheduling of bank loans at a 
reduced interest rate.110  In details, the Decree stipulated that after three years’ moratorium debts 
from curb lenders would become five-year loans at an annual interest rate of 16.2 percent while 
the prevailing annual interest rate on curb loans was 39 percent in 1972.     
As Lim (2001) argues, the August 3 Decree of 1972 was a critical decision that 
established the precedent for the government intervening in the financial sector to relieve 
corporate debt when deemed necessary.  By making the bailout decision, the government did not 
just signal businesses its willingness to prevent their bankruptcy.  The government also made the 
owners of large firms believe that they would not be held responsible for their mismanagement 
                                                 
108 In 1970 annual interest rate on bank loans was 24 percent while annual interest rate on curb loans was 50.16 
percent (Lim 2001: 12). 
109 Daily Hankook. August 17, 1971. p. 3. 
110 Daily Hankook. August 3, 1972. p. 1. 
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of debt.  Therefore, the moral hazard for chaebols came to take root in the debt-laden Korean 
economy.   
The ensuing heavy chemical industrialization (HCI) that was officially implemented in 
1973 further distorted South Korea’s financial system.  The government provided policy loans at 
a negative real interest rate for the six key industries – nonferrous metal, steel, machinery, 
shipbuilding, chemicals, and electronics – selected for rapid growth.  Since 1967 government 
corporations had undertaken the construction of Pohang Integrated Steel Mill and Ulsan 
Petrochemical Complex.  And yet, the HCI based on state-owned enterprises was not acceptable 
to Park Chung-Hee because of his anti-communist ideology.  He preferred the familiar 
development model that seemed to work well with the export drive based on labor-intensive 
industries: government controlled finance and private firms produced goods.  Thus, sector-
oriented preferential policy loans were used to induce chaebols to enter these new businesses 
requiring greater fixed capital investment and longer waiting period for return on investment 
than labor intensive industries.  As Figure 13 shows, bank loans to manufacturing firms 
expanded by more than 500 percent between 1973 and 1979.  
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Figure 13 Bank Loans to Manufacturing Sectors 
Source: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics System. 
 
Wary of chaebols’ heavy reliance on debt finance, the government sought to control debt 
growth in chaebols by introducing three measures.  First, the government passed the Law on 
Facilitating the Opening of Closed Corporations in December 1972 (Kim 1994: 73).  Its purpose 
was to force corporations to increase their equity relative to debt by raising more funds through 
stock markets.  The government also introduced a credit control system to limit bank loans to 
chaebols and improve financial structures of chaebols in July 1974 (Nam and Kim 1994: 453).  
The credit control system consisted of the designation of business groups whose total credit from 
banks exceeded a certain amount and their principal transactions banks.111  The main function of 
                                                 
111 Nam and Kim (1994: 485-486) nicely compares the Korean principal transactions bank system with the Japanese 
main bank system.  Both systems have the government intervention in financial markets to provide credits to 
preferred industries at lower interest rates.  Where they differ is the bank-business relationship.  The Japanese main 
bank system emerged with the historical formation of keiretzu, Japan’s business conglomerates.  As a major 
component of keiretzu, a main bank established a long-term, committed relationship with their client firms within 
keiretzu.  It played a crucial role in maintaining keiretzu through mutual equity ownership with client corporations 
and helped protect their ownership against hostile mergers and acquisitions.  In contrast, principal transactions banks 
of Korea were not within chaebols’ corporate governance structure.  It was the creature by government to control 
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a principal transactions bank was to supervise the overall credit to its client chaebols and to make 
sure the observance of credit ceilings.  The credit control was enforced through agreements 
among banks with the administrative guidance from the government during the 1970s, but it was 
officially incorporated into the Banking Act in 1982.  Finally, the Chun Doo-Hwan government 
privatized commercial banks by selling government-owned shares of the banks during 1981-
1983 (Hahm: 2003: 81).  This measure aimed to reduce government control of banks while 
keeping chaebols from the ownership of newly privatized banks.    
Neither of these measures led to the fundamental change of government-controlled 
financial system.  Although the law on opening corporations successfully increased the number 
of listed companies from 66 firms in 1972 to more than 300 firms in 1979 (Kim 1994: 73), it had 
little impact on chaebols’ financial structure.  These family-owners of chaebols were not willing 
to share ownership and control with shareholders outside the family (Lim 2003: 46).  Rather than 
reduce a reliance on debt, the opening of firms strengthened chaebols’ existing ownership 
structures.    
The credit control over chaebols could not end the government control of banks.  
Principal transactions banks lacked the autonomy of loan-making decisions on chaebols’ 
investment projects (Nam and Kim 1994: 475-476).  The government continued to intervene in 
rationing credits, making principal transaction banks mere administrative agencies controlling 
credit supply and gathering and reporting information on chaebols’ financial situations.  
Furthermore, while chaebols’ ownership of banks was prohibited, Chun Doo-Hwan 
allowed chaebols to own non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as insurance companies 
and investment and finance companies.  Chaebols used these NBFIs as financial intermediaries 
                                                                                                                                                             
credits to chaebols from outside.  Because of their lack of autonomy, principal transactions banks rarely took 
responsibility of rescuing and liquidating financially troubled chaebols.       
 177 
mobilizing domestic capital and borrowing from foreign financial institutions and lending them 
to chaebols.  Between 1980 and 1990, the share of loans from NBFIs in total loans to private 
firms increased from 38.7 percent to 58.3 percent (Bank of Korea).   
In conclusion, there were only timid efforts to bring chaebols in a market-oriented 
financial system.  The dilemma of government was that the collapse of a large chaebol might 
cause the downfall of the entire financial system because of huge non-performing loans.  
Therefore, the government was obliged to provide an implicit guarantee of the survival of 
chaebols, which induced them to undertake risky investment (Lim 2004: 156).  This state control 
over finance continued until the 1997 financial crisis.  As a result, chaebols’ debt snowballed to a 
dangerous level.  As Figure 14 shows, the debt-equity ratio of large manufacturing firms reached 
390 percent in 1997.  In that year, the average debt-equity ratio of the top thirty chaebols was 
519 percent (Lim 2004: 158).  
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Figure 14  Debt-Equity Ratios of Large Manufacturing Firms, 1990-1997 
Source: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics System. 
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6.4.4 Corporate governance 
Large firms in the United States disperse corporate ownership but concentrate corporate control 
in the executive; large firms in Germany are owned by large block-shareholders and corporate 
control is exerted jointly by the executive and supervisory boards.  The traditional corporate 
governance structure of chaebols was characterized by the high concentration of control in 
family-owners, the lack of protection of minority shareholders, and the insulation of the 
management from takeovers.  Chaebols were typically controlled by their founding families that 
were also the largest shareholders of their companies.  The corporate governance system was so 
concentrated that it was called “imperial management” (Lee 2003).  The unconstrained 
managerial power in chaebols played an important role in the acquisition of new assets as a way 
to expand the business groups and to spread risks across affiliated firms.  However, because 
financially strong subsidiaries were forced to bail out their sister companies in trouble through 
cross-shareholdings and cross-debt guarantees, this strategy usually ran counter to minority 
shareholders’ interests (Claessens and Fan 2002: 81).     
The government-controlled financial system encouraged this internal structure of 
chaebols.  Because firms relied on banks as a main conduit of corporate finance, domestic 
financial markets were not developed.  Shareholdings by foreigners were prohibited during the 
period before the 1990s and remained under government restrictions until the 1997 financial 
crisis.  Chaebols’ owner/managers were not monitored by outsiders in securities markets as in 
the United States or by insiders representing client banks and employees via the supervisory 
board as in Germany.  In South Korea government played a more important role in monitoring 
chaebols’ performances.  And yet, this monitoring by government was not done in a strictly 
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performance-based way except for during the 1960s, but it was often linked to money politics 
between business leaders and the governing political party.  
6.4.5 Lifetime employment as a business practice 
Lifetime employment has both efficiency and cost to employers.  Lifetime employment is 
economically efficient in a sense that guaranteeing job security may decrease turnover costs, 
bring employees’ loyalty, encourage employees to invest in firm-specific skills, and eventually 
increase labor productivity (Lazear 1979).  On the other hand, lifetime employment raises labor 
costs because employer’s commitment not to lay off workers makes difficult the flexible use of 
labor in response to business cycles.   
South Korea’s big businesses heavily reliant upon debt finance used expansion-oriented 
strategies.  The number of chaebol subsidiaries increased rapidly during the 1970s.  The 
expansion of chaebols continued during the 1980s and the 1990s (Lim 2003: 39-41), although 
Korean manufacturing firms earned less profit than the opportunity cost of capital during much 
of the period from 1967 to 1997 (Lim, Haggard and Kim 2003: 14-15).   
The continued expansion of chaebols made layoffs virtually unnecessary and even 
undesirable because the labor market situation was tight.  Employers found it increasingly 
difficult to replace workers and thus they considered the advantage of lifetime employment to 
outweigh its cost.  The willingness of employers to establish lifetime employment is revealed in 
the fact that a majority of them voluntarily established mandatory retirement system based on 
age in their employment contracts.  A mandatory retirement system is double-edged (Cho and 
Kim 2005).  By guaranteeing employment until the worker reaches a fixed retirement age, the 
mandatory retirement system can promote job security and generate worker loyalty toward the 
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company.  On the other hand, this system can be used as a means of workforce reduction by 
retiring the aged labor force.   
Empirical evidence shows that the mandatory retirement system became prevalent when 
the Korean economy was growing so fast that mass layoffs were rare and large firms did not 
experience considerable personnel bottlenecks.  According to a survey conducted by the Korea 
Employers Federation during 1987-1988, 93 percent of 622 firms implemented mandatory 
retirement at age 55 (Bahng et al. 2005: 88).  This survey also shows that 43.3 percent of the 
companies with a mandatory retirement system introduced this system during the 1970s and 34.6 
percent between 1980 and 1988.112  This indicates that Korean employers might have adopted 
the mandatory retirement system mainly to promote lifetime employment rather than to reduce 
workforces.   
However, it should be noted that the implicit employment contract in which a company 
offers lifetime employment and receives worker loyalty was not prevalent throughout all 
occupations and all firms.   It seems lifetime employment contracts were limited to large firms 
and they mainly applied to white-collar employees rather than blue-collar workers.  A former 
CEO of LG Electronics said:  
 
Chaebols guaranteed lifetime employment for managerial workers.  They did not guaranteed 
lifetime employment for production workers but they refrained from laying them off.  The rapid 
economic growth of Korea would not have been possible without the loyalty of employees, especially 
white collars, who identified themselves with their companies.113   
 
There is an argument that South Korea has never developed the Japanese-style lifetime 
employment system, where employers and employees established a mutual commitment to 
permanent employment relationship (Kim 1981; Lindauer 1984).  This line of argument points to 
                                                 
112 Firms with fewer than 100 employees accounted for 15.4 percent of the sampled 622 firms. 
113 I interviewed him in Seoul on July 26, 2005.  
 181 
the data showing that the average monthly quit ratio of Korean workers in manufacturing firms 
during the 1970s was 5.2, which was higher than Japan’s 1.8 and even the United States’ 4.1 
(Kim 1981: 68).  The gap of quit ratio between Japan and Korea continued in the 1980s, 
although it narrowed (Yoon 2005: 223).  Lindauer concludes, “A commitment to maintain 
skilled workers is likely to be a feature of many Korean firms but the absence of worker 
commitment to the firm signals the limited role of lifetime contracts currently in use in Korean 
enterprises” (Lindauer 1984: 60). 
However, Lindauer’s argument that worker commitment to the firm was absent is 
misleading for a couple of reasons.  First, it is hardly meaningful to make cross-sectional 
comparisons between Korea, Japan, and the United States, because of the different level of 
economic development in Korea.  During the 1970s and the 1980s when Korea experienced 
rapid economic growth, industrial changes were so dynamic that very few small- and medium-
sized firms had stable labor-management relations.  It would make more sense to compare Korea 
in the 1970s with Japan during the interwar period.  Japan’s quit ratio between 1924 and 1931 
was actually as high as that of Korea in the 1970s (Kim 1981: 68).           
Second, other quit ratio data that reflect occupational differences show that blue-collar 
workers tended to quit more frequently than white-collar workers before the 1997 financial crisis 
(Eoh 1993; Cheon 2002).  For example, the monthly quit ratio of blue-collar workers in 
manufacturing industry was 2.88 in 1990, more than twice higher than white-collar workers’ 
1.38 in the same industry (Eoh 1993: 42).  In Korea white-collar workers tended to be more loyal 
to their employers than blue-collar workers, while in Japan blue-collar workers usually had a 
longer tenure than white-collar workers (Park 1992: 61-62).  Low wages and poor working 
conditions prompted less skilled workers to leave companies occasionally (Park 1994).  
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Authoritarian industrial labor relations ruled out these workers making voices on wages and 
working conditions within the company.   In addition, rapid industrialization made skilled labor 
very scarce.  Especially the heavy-chemical industrialization drive during the 1970s increased 
demand for skilled manual workers and labor mobility became a credible option for them.  
Employers of heavy-chemical industries often poached skilled manual workers from other firms 
(Kim 1994: 195).   
However, the blossoming of labor movement after 1987 and the stabilization of industrial 
structure resulted in a significant drop of labor turnover.  For manufacturing companies with 
more than 500 employees, the average monthly quit ratio decreased from 4.5 in 1980 to 2.4 in 
1990 (Yoon 2005: 223).  Although the 1990 quit ratio was still twice as high as that of Japan for 
the same year, the trend clearly shows that the overall employment relationship including all 
occupations had been considerably stabilized over the 1980s.        
6.4.6  Conclusion 
The conventional wisdom has portrayed South Korea as a developmental capitalist state very 
similar to Japan.  However, our investigation of the pre-1998 Korean economic model leads to 
conclude that heterogeneous elements from liberal, coordinated, and state-centered market 
economies were mixed in the institutional arrangements of the Korean capitalism.  To sum up:   
 
• As in the United States, the skill formation in Korea depended on school-based training 
which emphasizes general school education, not tenure, as the most important factor in 
determining the level of skill.  Generally, even large firms did not invest much in firm-
based training to upgrade the skill of their own workers.   
• The business network in Korea was historically cartel-ridden as in Germany, but since the 
Fair Trade Act was established in 1980 there has been sharp competition among different 
firms in the same industry.  Korea resembled the Japanese model based on keiretzu.   
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• Although Korean firms relied on bank-based financing and therefore they had high debt 
ratios as German firms, Korea had a fundamentally state-centered financial system.  
Financial institutions were merely administrative arms of the state-led industrialization 
policy.   
• The internal structure of chaebols was highly concentrated in family owners.  While 
markets for corporate control were not developed, chaebols’ owner-manager system was 
not subject to effective monitoring by insiders, that is, representatives of principal-
transaction banks and employees.  
 
These heterogeneous parts produced contradictory effects on the business preference for 
lifetime employment.  The weakness of firm-based training and inter-firm collaboration could 
have encouraged labor turnover, but it seems to me the labor market effect of state-controlled 
financial system was overwhelming.  Although labor protection might not have been a factor 
government considered in establishing the state control of finance, the national structure of 
finance had an important ramification for workers’ job security in two ways.  First, the state 
control of industrial finance freed employers from the pressures of stockholders or securities 
analysts to cut jobs in the period of decreasing demand.  Second, state-controlled financial 
system induced firms to maximize expansion rather than profits because it socialized the risk 
engaged in capital investment.  Since employers at large wanted their employees to be loyal and 
productive, employers using this expansion-oriented business strategy were likely to engage in 
long-term employment relations with their employees without having to worry about the labor 
cost effect of such commitment.   
However, although the varieties-of-capitalism perspective provides a useful account for 
the business preference about lifetime employment, it does not explain the change in the 
stringency of legal protection of workers against dismissals.  The first real employment 
protection in South Korea was established in 1989 by the Supreme Court following 
democratization and rising labor activism.  And yet the Korean capitalism remained constant 
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during the period of turbulent political and legal changes.  Now I will examine historical events 
that led to the adoption of rules governing dismissals.  
6.5 REPRESSION AND COOPTATION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS 
During the period between 1961 and 1987 South Korea was ruled by right-wing dictatorships.  
Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987) oppressed labor’s collective 
actions to prevent labor unions from becoming powerful interest groups and to contain the wage 
growth in export industries.  Between 1961 and 1963, Park Chung-hee outlawed other unions 
than the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), prohibited political activities of labor 
unions, and required local unions to get approvals from both FKTU and government before 
entering strikes (KCTU 2001: 43-44).  In October 1972, Park Chung-hee declared martial law, 
removed free election ballots from the political scene, and introduced the Yushin Constitution to 
stay in power permanently.  Under the Yushin regime government labor policy became more 
repressive as Park Chung-hee’s emergency decrees rendered virtually every strike unlawful.  
Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows that labor unions gained more membership throughout the 1970s as 
the heavy chemical industrialization gave rise to large-scale factories. 
Park Chung-hee’s Yushin regime ended in Park’s assassination by the head of national 
intelligence agency in October 1979.  After his assassination, General Chun Doo-hwan seized 
power through a military coup in December 1979 and was elected President by a government-
appointed electoral college in August 1980.  He was the sole candidate running for the 
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election.114   
Repressive labor policy was continued during Chun’s government.  Figure 3 shows that 
union membership increased rapidly since the beginning of heavy chemical industrialization in 
1973.  However, Chun revised labor laws to further control labor unions in December 1980.  The 
new Labor Union Law prohibited unions at the industrial level to prevent the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) from becoming a stronghold for labor movements.  Unions must 
be established only at the company level and they could be disbanded by government orders.  
The new Labor Dispute Law prohibited any third-party intervention in labor disputes in an 
attempt to block the intervention by the FKTU.  The new Labor Dispute Law also made 
government approval mandatory for labor unions to initiate collective bargaining.  Chun Doo-
hwan enacted the Labor-Management Council Law, which required the establishment of labor-
management councils in individual companies to eventually replace unions.  Accordingly, the 
Korean labor substantially lost its organizational power under the Chun regime as the union 
membership decreased from 16.8 percent in 1979 to 11.7 percent in June 1987 as can be shown 
in Figure 15. 
                                                 
114 Daily Donga, August 27, 1980. p. 1. 
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Figure 15 Labor Unions Membership (percentage of total employment) 
Source: Korea Labor Institute. KLI Labor Statistics. 2005. 
 
The state corporatism literature argues that dictatorships use seemingly contradictory 
measures of constraints and inducements to gain control over labor groups (Collier and Collier 
1979).  According to this argument, dictatorships might provide individual workers with a degree 
of social protection, which is deemed necessary to maintain social stability, while they repress 
collective rights of labor.  We know from the Bismarckian social legislation of Germany that 
dictatorships do make some efforts to provide social protection.  To what extent did the two 
Korean dictators from the military display benevolence toward workers?     
The dictatorships conducted social policy fundamentally as a way to divide and rule 
workers.  They sought to stabilize their political regimes by appeasing high-skilled workers in 
chaebols at the expense of low-skilled workers in smaller companies.  For example, mandatory 
health insurance for employees and their dependents was introduced first in firms with more than 
500 employees in 1977, firms with more than 300 employees in 1979, and firms with more than 
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100 employees in 1981 (Lee 2003).  Park Chung-hee also cared about the job security of workers 
in chaebols.  When oil price shocks hit the Korean economy in 1973-74 and 1979-80, the 
government urged leaders of big business to make efforts to avoid mass layoff and to stabilize 
employment. 115   In contrast, social protections for lower-class workers were weak during 
dictatorships.  The Minimum Wage Act was put into effect in 1989.  Public pension for workers 
other than teachers, soldiers and public servants was first introduced in 1988.  Unemployment 
insurance did not exist during the period before 1995.   
Even the employment protection for workers in chaebols would not have been effective if 
business had lacked the capacity and willingness to retain redundant workers.  In this vein, the 
employment protection policy under Park and Chun regimes should be seen as the product of the 
interplay between the state seeking to buy the consent of middle-class workers and the big 
businesses willing to provide lifetime employment.  It seems that business leaders were not 
forced to retain excess workers by government so much as they were willing to keep them.  For 
example, the Federation of Korean Industries, a business association consisting mostly of 
chaebols, declared in 1974 that its members would not implement mass layoffs but reduce hiring 
in response to the economic recession following the first Oil Shock (FKI 1975).   
                                                 
115 Maeil Business Newspaper. December 13, 1974. p. 7; Daily Chosun. July 13, 1979. p. 1; Daily Chosun. 
September 8, 1979. p. 1; Kyunghyang Newspaper. July 26, 1980. p. 1. 
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6.6 DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICS OF LABOR LAW REFORM (1987-1997) 
6.6.1 Democratization and the return of the old cadre 
After a quarter of century in which only two figures reined the government, South Korea 
embarked on its shift to democracy on June 29 in 1987 when President Chun Doo-hwan accepted 
the demand of citizens and opposition groups for the constitutional amendment as to the election 
of president.  The new constitution of October 1987 introduced a direct popular election of 
president without a runoff system.  The term of president must be one-time 5 years and a change 
to this shall not affect the incumbent.  The constitutional rule banning reelections was established 
to prevent presidents from seeking prolonged assuming of power.   
Also, there was a change in legislative election rules.  Since the beginning of the Yushin 
regime, the government had been using two-member district plurality to guarantee the ruling 
party a majority in the National Assembly.  For instance, in the National Assembly election of 
1985, the ruling Democratic Justice Party won only 35.3 percent of the popular vote, but its share 
of seats in the National Assembly was 53.6 percent (Brady and Mo 1992: 412).  In 1987, this 
rule gave way to single-member district plurality.  The single-member district plurality rule was 
advantageous to two opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, each of whom had 
strong regional bases.   
In the December presidential election of 1987, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung ran 
for the presidency after they failed to unify the candidacy representing democratic opposition 
groups.  This division within the pro-democracy group led to the election of Rho Tae-woo, Chun 
Doo-hwan’s military cohort, who won only 36.6 percent of total votes.  However, the April 
legislative election of 1988 cost Rho’s Democratic Justice Party (DJP) a majority in the National 
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Assembly, as single-member district plurality translated opposition party leaders’ strong regional 
support to their electoral success.  The ruling DJP gained only 125 seats among 299 seats in the 
National Assembly.  Thus, newly democratized Korea began with a divided government and a 
multi-party system. 
6.6.2 The majoritarian state under the conservative mood 
South Korea has the most centralized political system among the three countries under study.  
Between 1961 and 1987 South Korea followed an authoritarian-capitalist developmental strategy 
based export-promotion in which the executive of the central government controlled the 
commanding height.  This long-term pattern of centralized fiscal and legislative powers did not 
change even after Korea was democratized in 1987.  The 1987 Constitution provides a unitary 
political system.  Article 117 of the Constitution reads, “Local governments shall deal with 
matters pertaining to the welfare of local residents, manage properties, and may establish within 
the purview of the laws and decrees, rules and regulations regarding local autonomy” [Italics by 
author].116  The Korean people have elected governors of provinces and mayors directly since 
1995.  However, subnational governments in South Korea are still subject to strong fiscal and 
legislative control by the central government.  The Local Autonomy Act stipulates in the Articles 
15 and 16 that local governments and councils are allowed to make local ordinances only “within 
the scope of the national laws and presidential (administrative) orders.”  Local governments can 
operate in areas only explicitly permitted by the national laws or delegated by the central 
government (Seong 2000).  Besides the legislative constraints, weak fiscal autonomy severely 
                                                 
116 Here “local” represents both provincial and city/county levels, although the normal usage of the term in the 
American context applies to city or county levels. 
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constrains the competence of local governments.  Currently all income taxes and value-added 
taxes are classified as the national taxes, while local government can raise property taxes and 
several special taxes.  This leads to a serious fiscal imbalance between the central and local 
governments: the central government accounted for 71.7 percent of total tax revenues in 2001 
(Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs).  
Judicial independence was restricted under dictatorships, although the constitution had 
recognized judicial review of constitutionality of laws since 1961.  Between 1961 and 1972 the 
Supreme Court held legislation unconstitutional in only one instance, which resulted in the 
dismissal of all the judges who had agreed on the unconstitutionality of the law after the Yushin 
regime was established in 1972 (Yang 1993: 1-2).  Between 1972 and 1987 judicial review was 
nominally maintained under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Committee without a single 
case being referred to it (Yang 1993: 2). 
There have been significant improvements in judicial independence after 
democratization.  The 1987 Constitution introduced a dual structure in which the Constitutional 
Court was to decide on the constitutionality of laws, while putting the judicial review of 
presidential decrees under the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  Between 1988 and April 1990 the 
Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutionality of legislation in 37 cases, in which it held 
unconstitutional in fourteen (Yang 1993: 3).   
Although institutionally independent, the Korean courts have tended to make rulings that 
reflected the majority public opinion of the time on politically sensitive cases.  During the 
immediate years after democratization, middle-class workers who played a decisive role during 
the civil demonstrations against the authoritarian regime in June 1987 were generally 
sympathetic to labor unions’ demands for the increase of wages and the prohibition of unfair 
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dismissals.  A January 1989 survey shows that 67 percent of the public thought those demands 
were appropriate (KLI 1990, Table 2-11).  At this backdrop, the Supreme Court delivered the 
famous ruling on the four conditions of redundancy dismissals in May 1989.  It was a clearly 
pro-labor decision, compared to what the Labor Standards Act had provided.  
However, as the middle classes increasingly became wary of violent tactics of labor 
unions, the public opinion had already begun to turn around.  The same January 1989 survey 
reports that 81.7 percent of the public thought labor unions’ current behaviors were radical (KLI 
1990, Table 2-13).  The dissident labor unions deliberately violated labor laws that restricted 
collective rights of labor as a tactic to force legislative changes, but the government did not 
enforce the laws in the time before June 1989.  However, after an opposition legislator was 
arrested in June 1989 for his illegal traveling to North Korea to meet Kim Il-sung, the public 
opinion increasingly became conservative and critical of labor unions’ strikes and illegal 
practices.  The conservative turnaround of the middle classes culminated in a National Assembly 
re-election held in August 1989 in which the ruling party solidly won a heavily middle-class 
district (Koo 1991: 498).   
As the government began to prosecute union activists involved in illegal labor disputes, 
the Supreme Court upheld the government hard-line policy toward dissident unions in most cases 
(Mo 1996: 298).  The Constitutional Court held constitutional the ban on third-party intervention 
in 1990 and declared the Teachers’ Union as illegal in 1992.  During the early 1990s, the 
Supreme Court subsequently changed its interpretation of the requirement of “urgent managerial 
need” to a more permissive view.  If those judicial conditions had not been codified in 1997, the 
regulation of layoffs could have been much less restrictive than present, considering the 
liberalizing trend in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of lawful layoffs.  
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6.6.3 Labor’s discontent  
The relaxation of political control following June 1987 led to the upheaval of hitherto repressed 
labor movement.  As can be shown in Figure 15, union membership increased by more than 50 
percent in two years after June 1987.  While there were 1,433 labor disputes between 1980 and 
1986, there occurred as many as 3,749 labor disputes in the year of 1987, most of which 
happened after June (Kim 1994: 638-639).   
During the interim period after June 1987, there was limited improvement of collective 
labor rights.  The 1987 amendment of labor relations laws lifted the ban on unions at the 
industrial level and some other restrictions on union organizations (Lee and Yoo 2000: 46).  
However, there remained substantial limitations on labor unions such as the bans on multiple 
unionism, third party intervention in union activities, unions of public employees including 
teachers, and unions’ political activities.    
Many workers were discontent with the monopoly of representation by the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU).  Criticizing the FKTU for being corporatist, they sought to build 
new left-wing labor organizations.  The democratic union movement led to the formation of the 
Korean Trade Union Congress in 1990, which developed into the Korean Council of Trade 
Union Representatives in 1993.  The democratic labor movement ended with a singly nation-
wide organization, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in 1995. 
Those democratic labor unions were unlawful and therefore the labor disputes they 
initiated were also unlawful.  And yet, the Rho Tae-woo government could not enforce laws 
because democratic labor movements became nation-wide and uncontrollable by government.  
After the legislative election of 1988, two opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-
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jung, sought to amend labor relations laws using their majority in the National Assembly.117  The 
ruling party and business groups resisted any policy changes to strengthen labor unions.  The 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions demanded further liberalization of labor activities but it 
opposed the recognition of multiple unions.  In March 1989, the National Assembly passed a set 
of bills that freed multiple unions, third-party intervention, public employee unions, and union’s 
political activities.  However, none of these bills were enacted because President Rho vetoed 
against them.   
In January 1990, there was a major change in the political landscape of Korea.  The 
ruling Democratic Justice Party merged with two opposition parties led by Kim Young-sam and 
Kim Jong-pil, excluding Kim Dae-jung’s party.  The new Liberal Democratic Party assumed 
more than two-thirds of seats in the National Assembly, which meant it could initiate 
constitutional amendment.  The 1990 Interparty Merger dampened political debates on the labor 
law reform.   
6.6.4 Declining business support for lifetime employment 
It was not only organized labor that was discontent, but business was also dissatisfied with the 
status quo.  In the late 1980s, South Korea experienced a sharp slowdown in export growth as it 
faced growing international market competition.  The annual average growth rate of export was 
13.6 percent between 1980 and 1987, but it was only 4 percent during the next three years 
                                                 
117 Labor groups generally opposed the banning of third party intervention because it prohibited any help from 
outside the company regarding union organization, collective bargaining, and strikes.  However, labor groups were 
divided on the issue of multiple unionism.  The democratic union groups that ended up with the formation of the 
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions in 1995 were most strongly concerned about the recognition of multiple 
unions because otherwise they would remain outlawed organizations.  In contrast, the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions was less sanguine about multiple unionism. 
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(World Bank).  Two factors deserve mentioning here: the rise of Chinese export and real wage 
growth.  The Chinese manufacturing industry was making inroads into the share of Korean 
products in the U.S. market.  Between 1989 and 1996, the U.S. market share of Korean 
manufactured goods decreased from 5.3 percent to 3.5 percent, while the U.S. market share of 
Chinese manufactured goods increased from 2.6 percent to 6.7 percent (Kwon 1999: 13-14).  
The Chinese competition had greater impact on labor-intensive goods such as toys, shoes and 
garments, where the U.S. market share of China increased from 9.4 percent to 23.2 percent but 
that of South Korea plunged from 10.7 percent to 2.7 percent.  The other factor was the rise of 
labor cost after 1987.  The real wage in manufacturing firms rose by average 7.5 percent per year 
between 1985 and 1987, while it increased to 13.5 percent per year between 1988 and 1990.  
This sharp increase in real wage undermined the international competitiveness of Korean 
exports.   South Korea was experiencing a demographic change as well.  The post-Korean 
War baby boomers, who were born between 1955 and 1961, began to enter labor markets during 
the 1980s.  Chaebols had absorbed the large influx of these new entrants because they continued 
to expand but later they came to face overstaffing and personnel congestion problems.  
According to the Korea Employers Federation’s survey of 1997, 22.1 percent of 233 firms that 
responded answered that they had a serious redundancy problem (KEF 1997: 40-43).118  The 
redundancy ratio was highest in white-collar jobs in large firms.  37.5 percent of large firms with 
more than 1,000 employees answered that they employed excess workforce.  Almost three times 
more companies felt the excess workforce to be in managerial and clerical positions than 
production lines.   
                                                 
118 This survey was conducted on randomly chosen 1,000 firms with more than 100 employees during February to 
March in 1997, which was before the financial crisis. 
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 In respond to the change in the social and economic environment, Korean employers 
began to consider lifetime employment to be a liability.  They did not seek to sever redundant 
employment relationships unilaterally but they used early retirement as a means of employment 
adjustment.119  In the forementioned Korean Federation of Employers’ survey, the companies 
that had introduced early retirement amounted to 18.1 percent of total respondents and most of 
them first adopted early retirement in the 1990s.   
However, chaebols were still timid in reducing abundant employees.  Many of the early 
retirement plans undertaken before 1997 were limited to banks and state-owned companies (Kim 
1996: 8).  Major chaebols such as Daewoo, Hyundai, LG, and Samsung pledged that they would 
not introduce early retirement for fear of the deterioration in employee morale and their 
corporate reputation.120   
6.6.5 The Labor Law Review Committee, 1992-1994 
South Korea became a member of the International Labor Organization in December 1991.  The 
ILO conventions and recommendations were in conflict with the government policy prohibiting 
multiple unionism, third party intervention in union organization and collective bargaining, and 
unions’ political activities (Yoo and Choi 2000: 151-152).  Thus, South Korea’s entry into the 
ILO rekindled the political debates on labor law reform.  In April 1992 the Ministry of Labor 
established the Labor Law Review Committee (LLRC), whose aim was to produce a draft on the 
                                                 
119 Most of OECD countries have also experienced the development of early retirement in recent decades as a result 
of the strengthening of social security systems (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1997).  However, such a use of early 
retirement by employees as seeking leisure at older ages makes a striking difference from the use of early retirement 
by employers as a means of workforce reduction in Korea. 
120 Daily Donga. September 25, 1996. p. 19; Seoul Newspaper. September 26, 1996. p. 8; Kyunghyang Newspaper. 
September 26, 1996. p. 9. 
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direction of labor law reform for the government.  The LLRC was the first social dialogue 
committee in Korea that officially included business and labor to discuss labor policy issues.  
The eighteen committee members consisted of twelve experts on labor relations, three business 
representatives, and three officials from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. 121   The 
outlawed Korean Trade Union Congress were excluded from this committee.  Therefore, it 
actively used non-institutional channels such as petitions to the ILO (Yoo and Choi 2000: 158-
161).  
While business previously tended to avoid being engaged in any political debates over 
labor law reform, this time it began to demand policy changes in a bid to promote labor market 
flexibility.  Employers found the labor law provided excessive protection with individual regular 
employees, which they considered to forestall industrial adaptation to rapidly changing business 
environment.  Since the Labor Standards Act discouraged the use of non-regular employment to 
protect regular employees, employers demanded the government to legalize the use of dispatched 
workers by manpower supply agencies and to relax the restrictions on hiring part-time workers.  
They also urged the government to permit the use of a flexible work hour system in which if a 
worker agreed, a company could have him or her work in excess of legal working hours (8 hours 
a day and 44 hours a week) on the condition that the average work hours did not exceed the legal 
working hours (KFE 1993: 158-167).   
However, there is little evidence that chaebols demanded government to tackle 
restrictions on layoff at that time.  Although the Labor Standards Act had been silent about 
whether employers might legally dismiss workers for managerial reasons, it was not impossible 
to lay off workers.  The Supreme Court decision of 1989 already set the conditions for layoffs to 
                                                 
121 Seoul Newspaper. April 25, 1992. p. 2. 
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be lawful.  Moreover, judicial practices on layoff became more permissible in the early 1990s.  
The Supreme Court ruled that urgent managerial needs were not limited to the circumstances 
where layoffs were necessary to avoid bankruptcy but that they included broader situations such 
as employers seeking to improve productivity, to introduce new production technologies, and to 
implement business rationalization.122  The Ministry of Labor changed its guideline for layoff in 
accordance with this new court decision.123  It was labor that demanded to tighten restrictions on 
layoffs.  Labor groups urged government to require unions’ approval of layoff and to extend 
advance notice periods from 30 days to 90 days.124   
In December 1992 Kim Young-Sam, who joined the interparty merger in 1990, was 
elected President.  For the first two years of his term, the LLRC labored through conflicts 
between business and labor and failed to produce an agreement except for the law on the 
National Labor Relations Commission.  Finally, it went adrift at the end of 1994.  The failure of 
LLRC reflected the longstanding confrontation between business and labor in South Korea.  
During dictatorship regimes, normal labor-management relations were replaced by state control 
over labor.  Therefore, business did not consider labor unions to be their partners except for a 
few enlightened managers.  This lack of mutual trust between business and labor made labor 
unions more militant, which in turn made labor relations more confrontational.  As a result, as 
Table 14 shows, South Korea suffered deep labor unrest during the first half of the 1990s, which 
caused considerable economic losses compared to advanced democracies.  
 
                                                 
122 The Supreme Court ruling. 91 Da 8647. December 10, 1991; 90 Nu 9421. May 12, 1992. 
123 Daily Chosun. January 13, 1992. p. 22. 
124 Hankyoreh Newspaper. June 10, 1992. p. 12. 
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Table 14  Workdays Lost due to Strikes and Lockouts per 1,000 Employees 
 Korea Japan Germany 
United 
States 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
409.8 
279.6 
128.3 
109.5 
118.9 
30.4 
67.7 
3.0 
1.9 
4.5 
2.2 
1.6 
1.4 
0.8 
14.2 
4.6 
47.2 
18.4 
7.2 
7.7 
3.1 
54.7 
42.8 
36.9 
36.3 
44.7 
50.5 
42.1 
Source: Korea Labor Institute (KLI). Foreign Labor Statistics. 2004. p. 93. 
 
6.6.6 The Labor Relations Reform Commission, 1996-1998 
In May 1996 President Kim Young-sam established the Commission for Labor Relations Reform 
(CLRR) to expedite the labor law reform process.  Kim Young-sam considered labor reform to 
be the most important part of his overall reform drive, saying “We must boldly break away from 
the backwardness in labor-management relations if we want to make Korea an advanced nation 
in the world.”125  He desired to see the labor law reform complete by the end of 1996 because the 
next year was a presidential election year.   
The CLRR was not an apparatus under the Ministry of Labor like the LLRC, but it was 
under the immediate control of the President.  Other than that, there was much continuity 
between the LLRC and the CLRR.  The CLRR followed the social dialogue framework of the 
LLRC, comprising ten social figures, ten from the academic circle, five from management and 
                                                 
125 “Kim Calls for End to Backward Labor-Management Relations.” Korea Times. May 10, 1996. p. 2.  
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business associations, and five from labor groups.126  Park Se-Il, former LLRC member, had 
been appointed Senior Secretary to the President for Social Policy in December 1995 and he led 
the formation and operation of the CLRR.  Four other former LLRC members were appointed 
public interest members in the CLRR to chair subcommittees (Yoo and Choi 2000: 200).    
The major issues over which business and labor conflicted can be summarized as Table 
15.  Business insisted that the stringent protection of individual worker be lifted but restrictions 
on labor union activities be maintained.  In contrast, labor urged government to upgrade 
collective rights of labor to international standards, while they opposed reducing individual 
worker protection for fear of employers’ abuse (Park 2000: 13-14).   
 
Table 15  Major Issues That Divided the Commission for Labor Relations Reform 
Three Least Protected Areas Three Most Protected Areas 
Multiple unionism Dismissal for managerial reasons 
Third party intervention Flexible working hour system 
Unions' political activities Manpower supply business 
Source: Park (2000: 13-14) 
 
It was a new development that the CLRR discussed the legalization of dismissal for 
managerial reasons.  This redundancy dismissal was not clearly stipulated in the Labor Standards 
Act, although it had been allowed by judicial decisions.  Table 16 shows how the CLRR was 
divided as to redundancy dismissal.  Labor groups did not oppose codifying it but they demanded 
to put substantial restrictions to prevent abuse by employers.  The Korea Federation of 
                                                 
126 Daily Chosun. May 9, 1996. p. 2.  The twenty social figures and scholars were called “public interest members” 
as opposed to business and labor interest members.  Two of the five labor members belonged to the outlawed 
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions.   
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Employers (KFE) insisted on incorporating the more permissive conditions set by the 1991 
decision of the Supreme Court and leaving procedural regulations to judicial judgment.      
 
Table 16  Different Views on Lawful Layoffs within the CLRR 
 FKTU KCTU KFE Public Interest Members 
 
Definition 
of “urgent 
managerial 
need” 
 
 
Same as present 
 
 
 
Limited to 
prevent 
bankruptcy 
[the Supreme 
Court ruling of 
1989] 
 
Objectively 
reasonable 
reasons; not 
limited to 
economic losses 
[the Supreme 
Court ruling of 
1991] 
No further 
specifications 
 
 
Procedural 
conditions 
 
Extended 
advance notice; 
Efforts to avoid 
layoffs; 
Consultation with 
unions; 
Provision of 
layoff 
compensation 
Extended 
advance notice; 
Efforts to avoid 
layoffs; 
Agreement with 
unions; 
Government 
approval 
No statutory 
requirements 
specified 
 
 
60-days’ advance 
notice; 
Efforts to avoid 
layoffs; 
Consultation with 
unions 
 
Source: CLRR. The Present Situation of Discussion on Labor Laws and Institutions. August 1996.  
 
The CLRR failed to conclude formal agreements in any of the six contended issue areas 
in Table 15.  However, business and labor had been converging to the idea of public interest 
members on the two major questions of multiple unionism and layoffs.  Although multiple 
unionism was bitter to business, business groups except for more anti-union companies such as 
Samsung were aware that the spread of democratic labor unions under the umbrella of KCTU 
had become a reality and at any rate employers would be forced to recognize the KCTU.127   
                                                 
127 An interview with a former public interest CLRR member.  This interview was conducted in Seoul on June 15, 
2005.  
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Regarding employment protection, the public interest members’ idea was to codify the 
“urgent managerial needs” requirement but to leave it unspecified as in Table 16.  Business 
supported the codification of layoff as a way to bring legal clarity about when and how layoffs 
could executed, to prevent unnecessary disputes over layoffs between business and labor, and to 
see the managerial right to layoff publicly declared by the law.128  It was their misjudgment that 
they were content with this symbolic effect and did not negotiate harder for more permissive 
statutory conditions for layoff.  A former public interest CLRR member commented on the 
employers’ position about layoff regulations: 
 
At first, business demanded to ease the condition of urgent managerial need. However, public 
interest members suggested that business focus on the symbolic meaning of the codification of layoff 
rather than seeking the relaxation of legal requirements.  Business also found it significant that the 
state officially recognized the managerial right to layoff.  It seemed to me the business demand for the 
codification of layoff was less driven by the immediate need to implement mass layoffs than by the 
leverage that the codification of layoff would give to employers in labor-management relations.129     
 
In November 1996, after the CLRR presented a final report to President Kim Young-
Sam, the government embarked on making draft labor bills.  Jin Nyum, Minister of Labor, and 
Park Se-Il, Senior Secretary to the President for Social Policy, advocated the labor law reform 
within the administration.  However, they faced strong opposition from the conservative group 
comprising Minister of Finance and Economy, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Senior 
Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs, who were strongly business-oriented and critical 
against new labor relations (Park 2000: 41).  As can be seen in Table 17, the government bill was 
a considerable retreat from the CLRR proposal in the labor’s view because it delayed the 
recognition of multiple unions at firm levels for five years.  The government bill underwent 
                                                 
128  Statement of Cho Nam-hong, Vice-president of FKI, The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 
Committee on Environment and Labor Record. February 20, 1997. p. 30. 
129 Same interview as in note 128. 
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another major revision during the consultation period between the administration and the ruling 
party.  In the final bills delivered to the National Assembly, the recognition of multiple unions 
was not only delayed at the firm level but also at the industry level for three years, which echoed 
the voice of conservatives in the administration.   
 
Table 17   Making Laws on Multiple Unionism and Layoff 
 CLRR Draft (Public Interest Members) Government Bill 
Final Act Passed 
December 26, 
1996 
 
Multiple Unionism 
 
 
 
Immediate and full 
liberalization on 
condition of unitary 
collective bargaining 
channels 
Immediate liberalization 
at industry level; 
Postponed for 5 years at 
firm level 
 
Postponed 3 years 
at industry level 
& 5 years at firm 
level 
 
Definition of 
“urgent 
managerial 
need” 
 
 
 
No further 
specifications 
 
 
Continued deterioration 
of business, business 
restructuring to improve 
productivity, 
technological innovation, 
change of business, 
transfer/merger/acquisitio
n due to continued 
deterioration of business  
 
 
Same as 
government bill 
 
 
Layoff 
 
 
 
Procedural 
conditions 
60-days’ advance 
notice; 
Efforts to avoid 
layoffs; 
Consultation with 
unions 
 
 
Same as CLRR 
 
 
Added mandatory 
approval by the 
Labor Relations 
Commission for 
certain layoffs 
Source: Yoo (2000: 291, 312) 
 
In contrast to multiple unionism, the layoff provisions in the government bill was not a 
setback to labor.  It accepted all the procedural conditions for layoffs established by the 1989 
Supreme Court ruling.  The government bill specified what constituted “urgent managerial 
needs” as presented in Table 17.  Although it rejected the bankruptcy-prevention view of the 
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1989 Supreme Court ruling on the interpretation of “urgent managerial need,” it also left out the 
expression of “objectively reasonable cutback” that was a major theoretical development adopted 
by the 1991 Supreme Court ruling.  Further, the National Assembly passed a motion that 
required approval by the Labor Relations Commission, a quasi-judicial government body in 
which members for workers and employers had an equal number.  There were even concerns 
within the business community that the new layoff-related clauses under this revision was more 
prohibitive than permissive.130  The final outcome of 7-month-long tug-of-war over labor law 
reform was a virtual replication of the old regime.    
The ruling party forced the passage of the labor bills through the National Assembly in a 
surprise, predawn session on December 26, 1996.  The passage of labor bills led to the fierce 
protest by labor groups.   The KCTU was especially enraged at the legislative outcome because 
they were forced to remain an outlawed organization for the next three years.  Both the FKTU 
and the KCTU entered general strikes in protest against the new labor laws on the day the labor 
bills were passed.  The general strike rapidly spread to 652 unions of 310,000 workers in two 
days.131   
To the government’s dismay, the general strike gained strong popular support because the 
passage of labor bills aroused middle-class workers’ concern about their job security because of 
the legalization of layoff.  On January 6, 1997 white-collar unions including banking and 
financial industry unions, journalist unions, and government research institute unions joined the 
                                                 
130  Statement of Cho Nam-hong, Vice-president of FKI, The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 
Committee on Environment and Labor Record. February 20, 1997. p. 30.  Another FKI official also commented that 
the revised Labor Standards Act provided stricter conditions for layoffs than the judicial precedents.  See “Interview: 
Lee Dong-ung, International Director of FKI.” Hankyorhe 21. January 30, 1997.  
131 Daily Chosun. December 28, 1996. p. 3. 
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general strike.132  According to an opinion poll, a majority of workers regardless of occupations 
supported the general strike.133  In this poll, almost 70 percent of the workers answered that they 
were more concerned about the impact of the codification of layoff on job security than any other 
issues in the labor bills.  The participation of white-collar workers in the general strikes was 
parallel to the mass rallies of June 1987 that led to the retreat of dictatorship regime.  
Why were there massive labor protests in reaction to the revised labor law even if the 
final act passed by the National Assembly largely followed the judicial precedents and some FKI 
officials held that it was a revision for the worse?  First, the economic situation during the mid-
1990s was underlying the public resentment linked to the revised labor law.  Many Koreans had 
perceived the early retirements of white-collar workers in their middle ages as signaling the 
demise of lifetime employment.  At this backdrop the new provisions on layoff exacerbated the 
public concern about the deterioration of job insecurity although their real impact on job security 
remained doubtful.  Many Korean workers feared that the codification of layoff would bring 
mass layoff and job insecurity – later labor groups took advantage of this public fear as a tactic to 
force down the revised labor law.  They tended to believe that the legalization of layoff was to 
make possible layoff that had been previously prohibited.  But this general perception of the 
public over the codification of layoff was largely unfounded because layoff had been possible by 
judicial decisions and the statutory conditions for layoff were stricter than judicial precedents.   
Second, the long-standing lack of trust between business and labor aggravated the labor’s 
fear of potential mass layoffs.  Although there were substantive and procedural restrictions on 
layoffs in the revised labor law, labor groups did not trust that employers would sincerely 
                                                 
132 An official of Professional Workers Union said, “This general strike is being led by employees at their forties.  
They are worried that the introduction of layoff could cost their jobs without receiving severance pay.” Daily Segye. 
January 6, 1997. p. 20.  
133 Hankyoreh Newspaper. January 13, 1997. p. 4. 
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observe the rules.  They saw that employers would circumvent the rules to abuse layoffs.      
The development of the general strike shaped the strategies of opposition leaders and the 
KCTU.  Kim Dae-jung’s National Congress for New Politics and Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal 
Democrats, had not been active players during the legislative period.  Their dilemma was that 
they needed both business and labor support in the 1997 presidential election.  Thus, they simply 
reiterated the principle that the government and the ruling party should do the labor law reform 
on the basis of dialogue and compromise.134  After the general strike expanded to white-collar 
workers, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil expressed support for the general strike on January 15, 
1997 and began to organize mass rallies against new labor laws, which was a dramatic 
turnaround from their ambiguous positions.135  The KCTU strategically adjusted its focus to 
attacking the legalization of layoff to continue to hold public support for labor groups when it 
announced that it was willing to accept the delayed recognition of multiple unions if the 
government renounced the legalization of layoff. 136   At that point, the KCTU was seen to 
represent broader interests rather than act like a special interest group.   
President Kim Young-sam finally yielded to democratic pressures as public opinions 
turned against him.137  On January 21, 1997 he said to opposition leaders he wished the labor 
laws would be revised through negotiations in the National Assembly.138  In March 1997 the 
ruling party agreed to accept multiple unionism at the industry level without delay while 
postponing multiple unions at the firm level until 2002.  Instead, the ruling party also agreed to 
make the justifying reasons of layoff as strict as the Supreme Court decision of 1989, although 
                                                 
134 Daily Hankook. December 28, 1996. p. 4.  
135 Daily Hankook. January 16, 1997. p. 2. 
136 Daily Hankook. February 23, 1997. p. 2. 
137 Total 3,206 labor unions and 3,597,011workers were reported to participate in the general strike that had 
continued until the end of January 1997 (Park 2004). 
138 Daily Hankook. January 22, 1997. p. 2. 
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the Supreme Court decision of 1990 had a more permissive view on when business could dismiss 
workers for managerial reasons, and to postpone the implement of layoff until March 1999.139   
From the business view, this compromise on layoff was a retreat even from the proposal 
by the CLRR’s public interest members.  However, the biggest loser in the politics of labor law 
reform was President Kim Young-sam.  The success of the general strike was the reversal of 
policy decisions he made.  At least until the end of 1996, President Kim Young-sam had 
exercised command of government and politics.  And yet, only in a few months, he became a 
lame duck president.      
To sum up, the 1997 general strike became a success to labor groups because the 
legalization of layoff was at stake.  Labor groups could muster broader popular support for the 
general strike by taking issue with the legalization of layoff and its potential impact on job 
security.  Although the new labor bill only accommodated the pre-existing judicial practices 
established since 1989, the government was compelled to put off the implementation of layoff 
for two years.  The legalization of layoff threatened workers who had been accustomed to 
lifetime employment relationships as these workers were acutely concerned about their job 
security.  Vote-maximizing politicians were not able to ignore the opposition from the 
constituents of employment protection.   
                                                 
139 Daily Chosun. March 9, 1997. p. 3. 
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6.7 THE IMPACT OF THE 1997 FINANCIAL CRISIS  
6.7.1 The evolution of the crisis 
After currency turmoil erupted in the Southeast Asian region between July and October1997, 
foreign investors wary of the debt situation of South Korea withdrew from the Korean financial 
market and several decades’ outstanding economic performance of Korea finally ended up with 
the third major financial crisis in the Korean history.140  Table 18 suggests the depth of the 
financial crisis Koreans suffered.  The massive outflow of foreign capital caused the freefall of 
the value of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar.  Foreign lenders’ rush to demand repayment 
pressed domestic intermediaries to tighten credits, which led to a sharp increase of market 
interest rates.  And the ensuing credit crunch forced many firms to go bankrupt.  Thus, the 
financial crisis became an industrial and economic crisis.  Between 1997 and 1998 the real GDP 
growth plunged from 4.7 percent to -6.9 percent and unemployment rates increased from 2.6 
percent to 7 percent.   
 
Table 18  The Macroeconomic Consequences of the 1997 Financial Crisis 
Variables 
Exchange Rates, 
Average 
Market Interest Rates,
Overnight 
Bankruptcy Ratio, 
Nation-wide 
Unit Won/Dollar Percent Percent 
                                                 
140 I will not discuss the causes of the Korean financial crisis here.  Readers might find the following literature useful.  
IMF Staff (1998) provides a nice, general review of the causes of East Asian financial crisis with more emphasis on 
domestic factors.  Lim, Haggard, and Kim (2003) focus on the chaebol problem of Korea.  Wade (1998) attributed 
the financial crisis to the global financial system lacking adequate regulatory regimes over global investors.  
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August 1997 
September 1997 
October 1997 
November 1997 
December 1997 
January 1998 
 
      896.55 
      910.15 
      926.19 
    1033.23 
    1499.38 
    1701.53 
 
      12.39 
      13.17 
      13.56 
      14.00 
       21.29 
       25.34 
 
       0.21 
       0.31 
       0.43 
       0.38 
       1.49 
       0.53 
 
Variables 
Real GDP Growth, 
Annual 
Unemployment Rates,
Annual 
Unit Percent Percent 
1997 
1998 
           4.7 
          -6.9 
      2.6 
      7.0 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Korea. Economics Statistics System. 
 
The Kim Young-sam government asked the International Monetary Fund for bailing out 
its troubled economy on November 21, 1997.  On December 4, 1997, the IMF approved Korea’s 
request for a three-year stand-by credit equivalent to about 21 billion US dollars in support of the 
government’s economic reform program as can be shown in Table 19.   
 
Table 19  The Structural Reform Program Concluded between South Korea and the IMF (except for trade 
liberalization) 
Financial Restructuring Corporate Restructuring Capital Market 
Liberalization 
Labor Market Reform 
Enhanced central bank 
independence & 
financial supervision 
 
Exit or re-capitalization 
of troubled financial 
institutions 
 
Bank requirement of the 
BIS capital ratio (8%) 
 
Elimination of 
government intervention 
in bank management & 
lending decisions 
Improvement of 
transparency of 
corporate balance sheets 
 
Reduction of 
dependence on debt-
financing 
 
No government 
subsidies to bail out 
individual corporations 
Liberalization of foreign 
direct investment 
 
 
Liberalization of foreign 
ownership of stocks & 
bonds 
 
 
 
Strengthening of 
employment insurance 
system 
 
Improvement of labor 
market flexibility  
Source: Republic of Korea. IMF Stand-By Arrangement. December 5, 1997. 
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6.7.2 Structural reform under the Kim Dae-Jung government  
On December 18, 1997 the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung was elected President.  Most of 
structural reform measures were undertaken by Kim Dae-jung’s transition team and his 
administration.141  The reform program focused on reconstructing Korea’s financial system.142  
The government-controlled financial system had left corporations and banks in a deep debt 
trouble.  At the end of 1997, the debt-equity ratio of large firms reached almost 400 percent 
(Bank of Korea) and non-performing loans of commercial banks accounted for 22.6 percent of 
total loans (Kataoka 2000: 267).   
Kim Dae-jung pursued the reconstruction of the financial industry by using a twin-
pronged approach.  On the one hand, he sought to resolve the enormous debt.  Approximately 
82.9 billion dollars of public funds were injected into the financial system through the Korea 
Asset Management Corporation established in November 1997 (Kataoka 2000: 268-271).  This 
money from the government budget was used for repaying deposits of failed or exited banks, 
recapitalizing fragile banks, and purchasing non-performing bank loans.  On the other hand, he 
opened capital markets to foreigners and encouraged a wave of exits and mergers of commercial 
banks and other financial institutions in a bid to make the Korean financial industry competitive.  
By the end of 1998, 135 financial institutions including 5 commercial banks were closed and 20 
were merged (Ahn 2001: 456).  Three commercial banks, Koram Bank, Korea First Bank, and 
Korea Exchange Bank, were sold to foreign investment companies.  The cap on foreign stock 
ownership was raised from 20 percent to 50 percent in December 1997 and it was finally 
                                                 
141 For the reform legislation passed during 1997-1998, see Haggard (2000: 102-103). 
142 At a press conference on December 5, 1997, First Deputy Managing Director of IMF Stanley Fischer said, “The 
heart of the program is in the area of financial restructuring… I don’t think this restructuring would be possible 
within the Korean model.”  [Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1997/tr971205.htm ]. 
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removed in May 1998.   
The government enhanced central bank independence by revising the Bank of Korea Act.  
Previously, the Bank of Korea (BOK) lacked political independence under the government-
controlled financial system because its main function was less price stability than money creation 
and credit allocation to finance rapid economic development.  The Monetary Board, BOK’s 
decision-making body, had been composed of nine members, six of which had been from the 
government.  In December 1997, the Bank of Korea Act was revised such that central bank 
independence was officially confirmed, price stability took the first priority, and the number of 
government seats in the Monetary Board was reduced.   
For the corporate sector restructuring, the government used different approaches, 
depending on firm size (Park 2003: 181).  For the largest five chaebols, the government adopted 
the so-called Big Deals program, in which the government called on them to exchange 
subsidiaries and to concentrate on fewer business activities.  For the sixth through sixty-fourth 
chaebols and other independent firms, the government applied workout programs, in which 
creditor banks rescheduled or reduced debt in return for corporate restructuring.  Firms were let 
go bankrupt if they failed to implement restructuring programs.  
6.7.3 Implementing layoffs  
In March 1997 layoff was legalized but the implementation of the clause permitting layoffs was 
delayed for two years.  The IMF saw that the lack of flexibility in the Korean labor market was a 
problem obstructing financial and corporate sector restructuring.  Therefore, the Korean 
government agreed to ease restrictions on dismissals for mergers and acquisitions and corporate 
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restructuring to receive the stand-by credit.143  The Korea Federation of Employers also asked 
the government to implement the provisions on layoff early and to ease the restrictions on the 
conditions of lawful layoff.144   
To implement the IMF agreement on layoff the government had to revise the Labor 
Standards Act enacted only nine months ago.  Before elected President, Kim Dae-Jung opposed 
early implementation of the provisions on layoff. 145   Instead, he promised a six-month 
moratorium on layoffs.146 But soon after his election, he admitted layoffs were inevitable and 
pledged to implement the agreement on layoff as concluded with the IMF.147  On December 27, 
1997 President-elect Kim Dae-jung proposed to establish a tripartite committee to discuss broad 
reform issues including layoff.  Han Kwang-ok, vice-chairman of the ruling party and Kim Dae-
jung’s lifetime confidant, was appointed to be the chairman of the committee.   
Facing Kim Dae-jung’s proposal, both the FKTU and the KCTU openly opposed any 
meetings offered to discuss the introduction of layoff.  Considering that rank-and-files were 
highly concerned about their job security under the IMF restructuring programs, FKTU and 
KCTU leaders were hesitant about participating in the tripartite committee.  However, union 
leaders implicitly acknowledged that layoffs were inevitable to overcome the economic crisis, 
but they wanted to ensure that labor did not make all of the sacrifices.148  Meanwhile, Kim Dae-
jung elevated this committee to a high-level commission composed of leaders from business and 
                                                 
143 “IMF Approves SDR 15.5 Billion Stand-by Credit for Korea.” Press Release Number 97/55. December 4, 1997. 
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund [Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9755.htm]. 
144 Hankyorhe Newspaper. November 27, 1997. p. 1. 
145 Hankyorhe Newspaper. November 28, 1997. p. 6. 
146 Hankyorhe Newspaper. December 6, 1997. p. 9. 
147 Daily Chosun. December 23, 1997. p. 1. 
148 “Korea Braces for Layoffs Despite Labor Impasse.” Wall Street Journal. December 31, 1997. p.1. 
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labor associations and political parties as well as economic and labor ministers.149  This decision 
helped to reduce labor groups’ suspicion that the government sought to utilize the committee to 
force labor to sacrifice.  Finally, labor chose to fight for workers’ interests within the Korea 
Tripartite Commission.    
On February 6, 1998 labor agreed to the immediate implementation of provisions for 
layoff.  The revised Labor Standards Act followed all the procedural restraints of layoff except 
for the requirement of approval by the Labor Relations Commission that business opposed.  
Instead, the “urgent managerial need” term was left unspecified as labor groups demanded – 
giving the impression that the theory of bankruptcy prevention could be invoked again by judges 
– although transfer, mergers, and acquisitions of business due to its continued deterioration were 
still recognized as lawful.  In its attempt to appease labor, the government promised to expand 
unemployment insurance to all firms regardless of their size.  Labor’s collective rights were also 
strengthened.  Public employees and teachers unions became lawful and the restrictions on 
unions’ political activities were also lifted.   
Despite the legal clarity that this revision was aimed at, however, implementing layoff 
turned out to be less straightforward because political concerns confounded the exercise of 
management right to layoff.  Shortly after the Labor Standards Law was revised, Hyundai 
Motors attempted to reduce its workforce.  The case of Hyundai Motors was a test for the new 
provisions permitting employers to lay off.  Before Hyundai Motors acted, thirty-three 
companies had made announcement of layoff since the revision of the Labor Standards Act but 
there were only three minor subsidiaries of the top-30 chaebols.150  Other big corporations were 
hesitating because they were concerned about labor unions tenaciously opposed to layoff and the 
                                                 
149 Hankyorhe Newspaper. January 7, 1998. p. 5. 
150 Daily Hankook. May 21, 1998. p. 29. 
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government policy of layoff as the last resort.   
Before implementing layoff, Hyundai Motors offered an early retirement scheme to 
managerial employees and later extended it to all employees.  However, as the Hyundai Motors 
union declined the offer, the company announced on May 29 to lay off 8,189 employees, which 
amounted to 18 percent of the entire workforce.151  The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU) organized two-day’s general strikes in protest against the Hyundai Motors layoff plan.  
Upon the labor protest, Hyundai Motors extended the application of early retirement schemes.  
However, it finally submitted a formal notice to the Ministry of Labor on June 29 that it would 
dismiss 4,800 employees.152  
The Hyundai Motors union and the KCTU launched a series of strikes in July, demanding 
the company to renounce its layoff plan and to use work sharing in place of job cut as a means of 
employment adjustment.  Hyundai Motors responded to the strikes by shutting down factories on 
July 21.  The Tripartite Commission fell into disarray as both labor and business parties deserted 
the organization.  The Ministry of Labor held the view that the labor dispute at Hyundai Motors 
should be resolved through the negotiation between labor and management, which came to a 
deadlock by mid-October.  At last, politicians were impelled to intervene in the dispute.  Leaders 
of the ruling party conducted political arbitration and settled the dispute in four days dispute after 
they came in.153  The struggle by labor unions was not fruitless.  The final layoff plan agreed on 
August 23 limited the number of dismissals to 277 employees, significantly watered down from 
the company’s initial target.                   
                                                 
151 Daily Chosun. May 20, 1998. p. 1. 
152 Hankyorhe Newspaper. June 30, 1998. p.1  
153 Hankyorhe Newspaper. August 24, 1998. p. 1. 
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6.7.4 Changes to the traditional financial system 
The structural reform after the 1997 financial crisis ended the government-controlled financial 
system established in the early 1960s.  It is important to examine whether South Korea adopted 
the market-based financial system characterizing the United States or the bank-based financial 
system as can be found in Germany through the structural reform program.   
The standard political economy literature suggests that national financial systems can be 
distinguished by how corporations raise business funds (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1999; Vitols 
2001, 2005).  As Table 20 shows, Japan and Germany are considered to have bank-based 
systems because firms tend to raise funds mainly through loans from banks (indirect finance), 
while the United States is classified as a market-based system country because of firms’ heavy 
dependence on financing through securities markets (direct finance).   
 
Table 20  Percentage of Securitized Liabilities in Total Financial Liabilities of Nonfinancial Enterprises, 1995 
Japan Germany United States 
15.4 21.1 61 
Source: Vitols (2005: 388) 
 
However, comparable data do not explain well the type of financial system in South 
Korea.   Figure 16 presents the securitized liabilities of Korean nonfinancial corporations since 
1975.  I have argued that South Korea had a government-controlled financial system before the 
1997 financial crisis.  For the period after the crisis, the data clearly show that the share of 
securitized liabilities in total corporate liabilities decreased from the pre-crisis level except for 
1998 and 2001 when bank loans plunged because of credit crunches.  One might want to 
interpret this trend as a sign of rising German- or Japanese-style bank-based system.  However, 
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the data in Figure 16 do not account for the changing nature of the relationship between banks 
and corporations after the crisis.  It is that South Korea has experienced the proliferation of 
transaction-oriented banking as opposed to relationship banking (Kim 2002; Kang 2005a, 
2005b).   
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Figure 16  The Share of Securitized Liabilities in Total Liabilities of Non-financial Corporations, 1975-2004 
 
Note: Securitized liabilities comprise commercial paper, corporate bonds, and stocks.   
Source: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics System. 
 
According to Boot and Schmeits (1998), relationship banking focuses on lending to 
corporations based on the insider information about the client firms they obtain through dense 
networks linking banks and corporate managers.  In this case, the bank-borrower relationship is 
likely to be rigid and intimate because it is costly to switch to other banks or borrowers.  In 
contrast, transaction-oriented banking is characterized by the diversification of business activities 
to maximize profits.  Banks divert funds to lending to households and investing in securities and 
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other financial derivatives.  Banks do lend to corporations but their decisions to make loans are 
based on public information about the client firms such as balance sheets.  In this case, the bank-
borrower relationship is likely to be liquid and arm’s length.        
Kim (2002) demonstrates the proliferation of transaction-oriented banking in Korea by 
using a couple of indicators.  First, bank’s holding of securities gradually increased from 6.3 
percent of total bank portfolios in 1981 to 12.4 percent in 1996 and jumped to 26.5 percent in 
2001, while the share of loans in total bank portfolios was stagnant over the same period.  
Second, there is a growing importance of non-corporate loans in the composition of bank loans.  
The share of corporate loans decreased from 82.6 percent in 1985 to 75 percent in 1996, and then 
it fell to 48.7 percent in 2001.  Meanwhile, the combination of household and mortgage loans 
increased from 8.6 percent in 1985, 22.1 percent in 1996, to 49.5 percent in 2001.  The 1997 
financial crisis clearly accelerated the existing trends except for the stagnant share of bank loans 
in total bank portfolios.      
The economic literature maintains that the concentration and globalization of the Korean 
banking sector has been structural causes driving the trend toward transaction-oriented banking 
(Kang 2005a, 2005b).  After a series of mergers and acquisitions among banks, the Korean 
banking industry has become more concentrated in a few giant banks.154  It has been argued that 
giant banks prefer standardized procedures of lending review to reduce agency cost and therefore 
relationship banking is unlikely with larger banks (Berger and Udell 1996).  Also, as a result of 
financial liberalization, foreign stock ownership in commercial banks increased to 59.74 percent 
on average by September 2004 (Kang and Kim 2005: 7).  The huge influx of foreign capital into 
                                                 
154 In June 2002 the four largest banks accounted for 64.5 percent of total assets, 67.2 percent of total loans, and 63.8 
percent of total deposits.  “Banks Are Giant, But Not Strong Enough” [in Korean]. Monthly Shin-Donga. January 
2003. pp. 286-299. 
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the Korean banking sector exposed banks to globally accepted operation standards of 
management and financial investment.   
However, the agency cost of a giant bank regarding lending review will be less severe if 
the bank deals with a giant corporations or large chaebols such as Hyundai, LG, and Samsung.  
Thus, the concentration argument does not explain why big banks and chaebols did not engage in 
a relationship based on financial commitment.  Furthermore, although the concentration and 
globalization of banking sector is a cross-country phenomenon, national responses are varied.  
While Germany and Japan have introduced elements of transaction-oriented banking without 
changing their traditional relationship banking systems, South Korea has undergone a 
revolutionary process or big bang in the banking industry.  Why is Germany (or Japan) so 
different from Korea? 
South Korea never had the German-type relationship banking under a state-controlled 
financial system and because of this lack of prior experiences banks and chaebols chose 
transaction-oriented banking when they faced the concentration and globalization of banking 
industry.  The state control over finance deprived banks of lending autonomy.  Banks were 
merely regulatory agencies of the government implementing government’s credit allocation 
policy.  While the main actors consisting of risk partnership in Germany and Japan were banks 
and firms, they were government and firms in South Korea.  While bank managers sat in the 
supervisory boards of their client firms and this invited employee representation to establish 
horizontal networks among stakeholders of the firms in Germany and Japan, the corporate 
governance of chaebols was hierarchical and solely concentrated in the hands of family owners, 
the largest shareholders, in South Korea.   
Therefore, the reason why South Korea failed to institutionalize relationship banking 
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after the 1997 crisis seems less because of the attributes of banks than because of the historical 
pattern in which the bank-chaebol relationship developed.  In this vein, the institutionalization of 
transaction-oriented banking in South Korea seems to be a case for path dependency.     
6.7.5 The retreat of business support for lifetime employment 
One pundit was pointing to a business reality when he said: “Corporations can’t provide their 
workers with economic security if the companies’ own future is highly insecure.”155  Chaebols’ 
support for lifetime employment was conditional on the stability of the government-controlled 
financial system, which guaranteed their survival.  Despite their high leverage, top-30 major 
chaebols were not let go bankrupt before 1997 thanks to the state-controlled financial system.156    
As the 1997 financial crisis and the IMF program forced the Korean government to adopt 
market-oriented principles to deal with debt-laden firms, chaebols were obliged to work out their 
own survival.  South Korea’s corporate restructuring was very successful.  The debt-equity ratio 
of large firms sharply decreased from 390 percent in 1997 to 91.7 percent in 2004 (Bank of 
Korea 2005).  In terms of debt-equity ratio, the financial soundness of Korean corporations 
surpassed that of the United States (141.2 percent), Germany (241 percent), and Japan (145.4 
percent).  In the process, more than twenty chaebols have been bankrupt and dissolved.  With the 
exit of those chaebols also vanished the belief that chaebols were too big to fail.157    
As the Korean economy was getting restructured, macroeconomic indicators improved, 
                                                 
155 Paul Krugman. “Age of Anxiety.” New York Times. November 28, 2005. p. 19. 
156 Kookje and Woosung are exceptions.  Kookje, bankrupt in 1985, was the seventh largest chaebol.  However, it is 
well known that the exit of Kookje was politically motivated by Chun Doo-Hwan who wanted to establish a 
showcase of his power to punish chaebols.  Therefore, Woosung was the only top-30 chaebol bankrupt before 1997 
for economic reasons.  Woosung was the twenty-seventh largest chaebol when it was collapsed in January 1996.      
157 A notable example was the collapse of Daewoo, the second largest chaebol, in 1999.  
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compared to the situation in 1998.  Between 2000 and 2004, the annual average GDP growth was 
5.4 percent and the annual average unemployment rate was 3.6 percent (Bank of Korea).  In 
addition, the rise of returns to investors was remarkable.  For example, the annual average 
dividend ratio of large manufacturing firms was 5.18 percent for the period between 1990 and 
1997, but it increased to 7.7 percent between 1998 and 2004 (Bank of Korea).     
 However, ordinary workers were not the beneficiaries of this development.  After the 
financial crisis, Korean firms have sought to raise shareholder value while jettisoning job 
security for their employees.  As can be seen from Figure 17, the number of involuntary job 
separations sharply increased in 1998 and has been increasing ever since.  In other words, more 
workers have been forced to leave their companies year after year.  Although economic growth 
recovered from the deep depression of 1998, the impact of the financial crisis on workforce 
reduction has not disappeared.  This shows that employment adjustment by firms has become a 
usual business practice quite independent of business cycles.  The impact of the financial crisis 
was not simply about economic contraction but it was also structural in that it shaped business 
preferences against lifetime employment.   
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 Figure 17  Trend of Involuntary Job Separators, monthly averages 
Note: Early retirement as a means to workforce reduction belongs to the category of Retirement for 
Company’s Circumstances. 
Source: Korea Work Information Center, Monthly Statistics of Employment Insurance, Various Issues. 
  
There are two interesting facts linked to Figure 17.  First, Figure 17 shows that Korean 
employers have been heavily dependent on early retirement for employment adjustment rather 
than redundancy dismissal of the Labor Standards Act (LSA).  The proliferation of early 
retirement can be attributed to the stringent provision of layoff in the LSA, because the LSA 
requires employers to make every effort to avoid layoff and courts have interpreted this effort as 
including early retirement.  Also, large employers tend to see early retirement as attractive 
because they expect to buy unions’ consent on workforce reduction through early retirement 
schemes.158    
                                                 
158 KT Corp, South Korea’s largest fixed-line telecom provider, cut its workforce by some 5,500 through early 
retirement in October 2003.  KT Corp offered early retirees 45 months’ wages plus other financial benefits in 
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Second, according to a Korea Labor Institute survey of 300 nonagricultural private firms, 
white-collar workers accounted for the sharp increase of job displacements between 1997 and 
1998.  Table 21 shows that while all occupation groups experienced an increase of the number of 
job displacements except for upper-blue-collar early retirees, the share of white-collar job 
displacements increased from 49.7 percent to 76.4 percent for early retirees and from 49.3 
percent to 71.7 percent for those laid off.  Although large firms were overrepresented in the 
sample of the survey, the result appears to reflect the overall trend of declining white-collar job 
security.  
Table 21 Job displacements by occupation 
Units: persons (percent) 
   Early retirements Redundancy dismissals 
 Occupations Jan. - Nov. 1997 
Dec. 1997 - 
Mar. 1998 
Jan. - Nov. 
1997 
Dec. 1997 - 
Mar. 1998 
Clerical and 
managerial 
workers 
589 (34.3) 2,324 (60.6) 256 (32.6) 1,234 (44.7)
Professional 
& technical 
workers  
71 (4.1) 371 (9.7) 83 (10.6) 460 (16.7) 
Sales workers 193 (11.3) 232 (6.1) 48 (6.1) 284 (10.3) 
White-
collar 
White-collar 
total 853 (49.7) 
2,927 
(76.4) 387 (49.3) 1,978 (71.7)
Blue-collar 
Technicians, 
equipment 
operators & 
assemblers 
635 (37.0) 433 (11.3) 398 (50.7) 644 (23.3) 
                                                                                                                                                             
addition to their legal severance pay (“Korean Telco KT Corp to Cut Workforce by 5,500.” Asia Pulse. October 1, 
2003).  A middle manager at Doosan, top-20 chaebol, said, “Korea has a very rigid labor market, so unilateral 
dismissal results in a strong rejection by employees and unions.  But such an early retirement system with job-
transfer and special bonuses causes not so much opposition” (“Korean Firms Use Early Retirement as Tool Against 
Recession.” Yonhap News. October 3, 2003). 
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Simple 
laborers 227 (13.2) 474 (12.4) 0 140 (5.1) 
Blue-collar 
total 862 (50.2) 907 (23.7) 398 (50.7) 784 (28.4) 
 
Notes: The figure inside each parenthesis denotes the percent of early retirees (or those dismissed) in the general 
occupations for a specific period. 
Source: Choi and Lee (1998: 25, 28) 
6.8 CONCLUSION  
The 1997 financial crisis heralded an era in which the government would not able to bail out 
chaebols through its control over financial sector.  This had a profound impact on chaebol’s 
behaviors.  As the restructured banking sector is proliferating transaction-oriented banking and 
being driven by short-termism, the bank-firm relationship is becoming increasingly arm’s length.  
Instead, exposed to investors’ pressures to maintain dividends and high credit evaluation, 
chaebols have switched their business strategies from expansion to profit maximization.  In this 
vein, South Korea can be said to approach the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism.  Chaebols 
turning against lifetime employment is a product of this great transformation after the 1997 
financial crisis. 
However, the shift of chaebols’ interests in lifetime employment has not led to the 
removal of employment protection yet.  Although business associations have asked the 
government to ease the legal restrictions on layoff and economic ministries are supportive of 
their request, politicians are not willing to accept the proposed reform because layoff is a 
politically sensitive issue.  A recent poll shows that a great majority of Korean lawmakers 
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oppose making layoffs easier.159  155 out of 299 lawmakers responded to the survey and 67.7 
percent of the 155 lawmakers disagreed to ease legal restrictions on layoff.  Even lawmakers 
from the center-right Grand National Party were almost evenly split between 27 that agreed and 
26 that disagreed.  More recently, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy sought to 
erase the urgent managerial need condition for layoff and to reduce the 60-days’ consultation 
period with employees.160  However, this proposal has been significantly watered down in later 
discussions.  The government is currently negotiating with labor over the reduction of mandatory 
consultation period from 60 to 30 days.161
All in all, there is obviously a growing pressure from capitalists to reduce layoff costs in 
Korea.  Firms have used more extensively non-regular workers comprising part-time, temporary, 
and casual workers partly because of the layoff costs related to employing full-time, permanent 
workers.162  However, the lesson from the process of labor law reform during the 1990s is that 
easing dismissal regulation will require extraordinary political resources in a country where the 
public concern about job security is immense.        
                                                 
159 “Survey for the Seventeenth National Assemblymen on Labor Law Issues.” Labor Today. June 8, 2004. 
160 Hankyorhe Newspaper. February 1, 2005. p. 2. 
161 Kyunghyang Newspaper, November 12, 2005. p. 3. 
162 The share of non-regular workers in total employment increased from 27.3 percent in 2001 to 37 percent in 2004.  
National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey. Various issues. 
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7.0  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
7.1 BEYOND THE VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM PERSPECTIVE 
The so-called “new institutionalist approach” to welfare capitalism is in vogue (See Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  This approach places the welfare state in the web of economic institutions 
making up the production regime.  The nature of skill formation, corporate finance, and inter-
firm relations determines the kind of welfare state that employers would support: if firms invest 
in training their own employees, building intimate, long-term relationships not only with banks 
as main financiers but also with other firms in the same industry, then they are more likely to 
support the German-style welfare state characterized by layoff restraint and generous social 
security.  Conversely, if firms invest little in training their own employees, have at-arm’s-length 
relationships with their main financiers, and play in the very competitive product market, they 
are more likely to support the American-style welfare state characterized by flexible layoffs and 
lean social security.  This theory’s implication for globalization and capitalism is clear: because 
employers in each model find their national model to be economically rewarding, the 
convergence between different capitalist models will not occur.  
This varieties-of-capitalism approach has been presented as a strong alternative 
explanation for the welfare state against the power resource theory.  As an institution-based 
model that stresses the role of economic institutions in shaping employers’ self-interest about 
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labor protection, it is diametrically differentiated from the interest-based, class-conflict model of 
the power resource theory.  Along with the model focusing on the cross-class alliance between 
capital and labor (Swenson 2002; Mares 2003) the varieties-of-capitalism model has formed a 
firm-oriented approach to the welfare state. 
However, this dissertation reveals that employers tend to oppose employment protection 
legislation even if long-term employment benefits their production regime.  As Chapter 4 on 
Germany demonstrates, while German big business expected works councils to play as a shield 
against radical labor movement, they disliked them to have substantial power in personnel and 
economic issues.  They subverted the new industrial relations based on the role of works councils 
during the Weimar Republic in favor of Nazism.  In the postwar period, they were forced to 
abandon the traditional Herr-im-Haus position in labor-management relations under the 
Occupied Allies that recognized collective rights of labor as a part of the de-nazification plan.  
However, they were reluctant to give works councils and workers’ representatives on the 
company board greater power to limit the management right to dismissals.   
This dissertation also shows that the institutional complemetarity thesis of the varieties-
of-capitalism model does not explain the change of employment protection within individual 
cases.  The investigation of the German case reveals that employment protection under 
dictatorships was very weak although the then-German economy was characterized by the kinds 
of economic institutions supposedly favorable to employment protection such as the dominant 
role of big commercial banks in corporate finance, the prevalence of cartels in major sectors of 
the economy, and strong business interests in plant-based training.  Imperial Germany required 
employers to give only 15-days’ advance notice to workers if they were paid by month.  The 
Weimar Republic mandated works councils to serve as important vehicles to check dismissals, 
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but all the progressive achievements in labor-management relations during the Weimar Republic 
were wiped out under the Nazi Germany.  Rather than complementary economic institutions, the 
hegemonic power of Prussia governed by a right-wing dictatorship in the federal politics of 
Imperial Germany and the more extreme right-wing dictatorship under Hitler explains the low 
level of employment protection during these two periods.  Therefore, the transition to democracy 
that took place in 1919 and 1945 brought important effects on employment protection, but these 
impacts relied upon the nature of political institutional arrangements under the new democracies.   
7.2 BRINGING POLITICS BACK IN 
The varieties-of-capitalism theorists claim that their major theoretical strength consists in the 
account for why employment protection varies across nations and why the cross-national 
difference continues to hold although markets are increasingly being integrated.  However, for 
them politics do not play a role, as can be seen in their assertion that each capitalist model 
pursues a distinct path of institutional development and the logic of institutional development is 
basically functionalist: Germany has stronger employment protection than the United States 
because employment protection is economically efficient in the German capitalism but not in the 
American capitalism.  But, is strong employment protection purely a product of favorable 
economic institutions?    
This functionalist account has difficulty in explaining employment protection as 
government regulation.  Business preferences shaped by economic institutions should be closely 
related with business decisions on lifetime employment.  By contrast, employment protection as 
a political decision is not a mirror of business preferences, but it is an outcome of political 
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struggles between coalitions of actors with divergent preferences.   This dissertation suggests an 
alternative explanation accounting for the role of politics.  While economic institutions shape the 
interests of employers who make decisions on employment and production by taking economic 
institutions as external constraints, their effects on political actors might not be equal to those on 
economic actors.  Politicians whose prime goal is to win elections rather than to maximize profits 
would perceive political institutions rather than economic institutions as fundamental constraints 
on their decisions.  If politicians find that the introduction of employment protection will help 
win elections, they are likely to support employment protection even when it is not deemed as 
economically efficient in their capitalist system.   
My investigation of the U.S. case shows that business opposition to employment 
protection was not a crucial factor that frustrated pro-employment protection politicians.  They 
lost political struggles over employment protection mainly because of strong counter-
majoritarian political institutions.  The popular pressure for employment protection followed a 
distinct pattern in the United States.  While in Germany the SPD and the DGB launched and 
steered the public campaign toward codetermination, the popular pressure for employment 
protection in the United States existed without similar organizations to serve as strategic 
strongholds for employment protection.  The electoral insignificance of social democratic parties 
led to the prevalence of business unionism that directed labor groups to focus on collective 
agreements rather than legislation as a vehicle to protect workers’ job security. Opposed to 
Germany, white-collar unions were dwarf.  The rising risk of job displacements after the 1970s 
played a more important role in the formation of popular pressures in the United States.  When 
the tidal wave of plant closings led to an across-the-board deterioration of workers’ job 
insecurity, politicians sought to respond to the demand for employment protection.   
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This study observes two major periods when unemployment shocks hit both blue-collar 
and white-collar workers.  The Great Depression provided a first opportunity for introducing 
employment protection.  In the face of fierce opposition, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his 
Democratic colleagues instituted the New Deal programs, which constituted a watershed in the 
history of U.S. social policy.  However, they failed to curb employers’ freedom of layoff because 
the federal regulation of employment contracts was deemed unconstitutional.  The Wisconsin 
idea of dismissal compensation was rejected in the course of congressional debates that ended up 
with the adoption of unemployment insurance program in 1935.         
A second opportunity for introducing employment protection came in the 1970s and ‘80s.  
These two decades were a period of intense industrial restructuring in American firms.  The tidal 
wave of plant closings due to relocations, mergers-and-acquisitions, and recession spawned 
massive job dislocations unmatched by any time in the U.S. history.  The growth of federal 
power since the New Deal era made federal intervention to regulate layoffs constitutionally 
acceptable.  However, inter-state competition for investment made it extremely difficult for 
states in diverse economic conditions to consent to higher standards on layoffs.  While 
politicians from job-losing states strived to limit mass layoffs, they faced strong oppositions from 
job-gaining states that criticized plant-closing bills for the plot of industrially-developed, high-
labor-cost states to keep jobs from moving to less-developed, low-labor-cost states.  Thus, 
sponsors of employment protection were forced to water down their bills remarkably in order to 
secure a majority in the Congress before making it legislation.        
Although the adoption of employment protection in Germany was partly linked to 
unemployment shocks as during 1948-50 and 1975-76, the rise of political power of labor 
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profoundly influenced the establishment of employment protection laws. 163   The popular 
pressure for employment protection in Germany was not only better organized but it was also 
steadier than that in the United States because it was propelled by the SPD and the DGB (or 
formerly Socialist unions) that presented the idea of codetermination in the form of an 
ideological program to bring industrial democracy rather than ad-hoc solutions to economic 
crises.  The German federalism played an important role in channeling this popular pressure for 
employment protection into the political system and making it the law of the land.  Germany 
represents a distinct model of federalism where labor legislation is centralized and subnational 
governments rely on extensive measures of fiscal equalization. In this type of federalism voters 
can readily attribute the responsibility of providing job security to the central government. 
Therefore, the German federalism has not provided effective checks on the popular pressure for 
employment protection.        
Similar to Germany, South Korea experienced the rise of employment protection as a 
result of democratization.  Dictatorships’ approach to workers job security was politically 
expedient and discriminating against workers in small-medium firms.  Park Chung-hee did not 
introduce formal regulations of layoff but he induced chaebols to restrain layoffs by providing 
informal administrative guidance when the oil crises caused liquidity problems during the 1970s.  
He did not ban or limit dismissals of workers.  Unfair dismissals for union activities were 
commonplace.  Employers could lay off workers freely when there was a permanent or 
temporary shutdown of a plant.  Job security became a political issue only when national 
economic crises forewarned mass layoffs in chaebols, and then Park Chung-hee promised to bail 
out chaebols to ward off the need for slashing payroll.  Therefore, it would be misleading to 
                                                 
163 The 1920 Works Council Act is a notable case where the passage of employment protection legislation was less 
linked to unemployment shocks than motivated by the ideology of the Weimar coalition.  
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assert that his dictatorship regime provided strong employment protection without considering 
the structured relationship between the government and big business linked by the state control 
over financial institutions.   
The Supreme Court of Korea established four conditions for lawful layoffs in 1989, 
which were the first employment protection law regulating layoffs.  As the strong expansion of 
the Korean economy ended in the early 1990s, Korean firms suffered overstaffing problems, 
especially with white-collar workers.  The Supreme Court began to interpret the condition of 
“urgent managerial need” for redundancy dismissals in a more permissive term from 1992.  
During this period, commercial banks and big business began to reduce their white-collar 
workers through early retirement plans.  Although the overall unemployment rate was still low, 
Korean middle-class workers who had believed their jobs were permanent came to realize they 
might be forced to leave their companies for lump sum compensations.  The year of 1996 was a 
critical moment for employment protection because the Kim Young-sam government brought 
labor law reform to the fore.  The Korean bureaucracy was divided on employment protection.  
The market-oriented group fought for a significant liberalization of legal conditions for layoffs, 
while the other group advocated the wholesome codification of the 1989 judicial principles.   
South Korea in 1996 was similar to the United States with respect to the structure of labor 
movement and the electoral power of left party.  Union membership had declined to 12 percent 
and there was no social democratic party that had elected representatives in the legislature.  
While the political power of Korean labor was very limited, the public perception of declining 
middle-class job security became a major source of popular pressure for employment protection 
as in the United States.   
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On the other hand, South Korea had a very important difference from the United States: it 
was a strongly unitary political system with the executive branch superior to the others.  
Therefore, although there was a group of bureaucrats in favor of reducing employment 
protection, the Korean government was responsive to the public concern about rising white-
collar job insecurity.  Labor groups took advantage of this political circumstance and won a 
significant concession from the government on employment protection.  The outcome of the 
politically contentious labor law reform was that the 1989 judicial principles of layoffs were 
codified into the Labor Standards Act with major provisions virtually intact, and moreover the 
implementation of those provisions was suspended for two years.  Although the financial crisis 
forced the early implementation of layoff provisions, the impact of this legislation on the 
business practice of workforce reduction has been very limited.  Table 22 summarizes the 
comparisons among the United States, Germany, and South Korea on key variables.  
 
Table 22   Comparing the United States, Germany, and South Korea 
 United States Germany South Korea 
Power resources of 
labor Weak Strong 
Weak (some strong 
unions at firm-
level) 
Middle-class job loss 1929-32; since the 1970s 
1929-1932;  
recent years  Since 1996 
Counter-majoritarian 
political institutions Strong Weak Weak 
Employment 
protection for regular 
workers, current 
Weak 
(28th of OECD) 
Strong 
(6th of OECD) 
Moderately strong 
(10th of OECD) 
Key legislation 
Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining 
Notification Act 
(1988) 
Works Council Act 
(1920), 
Codetermination Act 
(1951, 1976), 
Protection Against 
Dismissal Act (1951), 
Works Constitution 
Act (1952, 1972) 
Labor Standards 
Act (1997; enforced 
in 1998) 
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7.3 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS 
The varieties-of-capitalism literature ignores other political economic systems than advanced 
industrial democracies.  This dissertation unveiled how dictators dealt with workers’ job security 
by examining two right-wing authoritarian regimes in Germany and South Korea.  Dictators’ 
essentially conservative motive explains the early development of the welfare state in Imperial 
Germany and South Korea under dictatorships.  Just as Bismarck instituted social security to 
dampen the socialist zeal among workers, so did Park Chung-hee introduced laws on national 
health care and national pension schemes during the 1970s because he was concerned that 
economic and social inequality might cause many workers to feel more sympathetic toward the 
communist regime in North Korea.  But these two right-wing dictatorships acted somewhat 
differently on the issue of employment protection.  While Imperial Germany enacted very 
inadequate employment protection provision in the German Civil Code, the Park regime induced 
big business to restrain layoffs by administrative guidance when the Korean economy suffered 
foreign currency crises in 1973 and 1979.    
Measuring the level of employment protection during the Park regime is not 
straightforward because the government used an informal pressure on big business rather than 
enacting legislation.  But it should be noted that the informal pressure by the government to keep 
redundant workers could not have been successful without providing a huge government 
patronage for big business as a way to prevent mass layoffs.  Korean dictatorships controlling the 
banking sector guaranteed the financial survival of big business during intermittent crises, which 
led to the bailout expectation on the business end.  When big business realized they were too big 
to fail, there was no need to cut back labor force even during economic downturns.  Rather, 
Korean big business pursued operational expansion and diversification.  It would be misleading 
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to assert that his dictatorship regime provided strong employment protection without considering 
this structured relationship between the government and big business linked by the state control 
over financial institutions.     
This state-controlled financial system makes a stark difference from Germany’s bank-
based financial system.  Although banks were important vehicles to provide corporate finance in 
both systems, Korean banks were merely administrative arms of state-led industrialization 
whereas it was German big banks that led industrialization through the merger between financial 
capital and industrial capital and gave rise to a myriad of cartels in the German economy.  
Bismarck could have done more to protect workers’ job security if he had possessed the financial 
instrument that was available to Park Chung-hee.       
7.4 A FUTURE PROSPECT FOR KOREA IN THE VARIETIES-OF-CAPITALISM 
PERSPECTIVE 
I have shown that the varieties-of-capitalism perspective is limited in explaining the rise of 
employment protection as government regulation.  However, the institutional arrangements 
comprising a specific type of capitalism are still a powerful predictor of the business preference 
for self-restraint of layoffs as a corporate practice, which is well-addressed in Hall and Soskice 
(2001).  However, the existing varieties-of-capitalism literature focuses on advanced capitalist 
systems, and it does not answer the question of whether the varieties-of-capitalism perspective 
could be used to account for capitalist systems in less-developed countries.  Although the main 
goal of this study is to criticize the varieties-of-capitalism argument by demonstrating that its 
lack of political theory makes it impossible to make causal inference about employment 
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protection as government regulation, this study also seeks to complement the varieties-of-
capitalism perspective as a descriptive framework of economic systems by extending it to a less-
developed country, South Korea.  
During the 1970s and ‘80s, South Korea was fundamentally a developmental capitalist 
state characterized by the active role of state in organizing industries and allocating financial 
resources.  As Chapter 7 indicates, the Kim Dae-jung government adopted liberal market reforms 
as a way to crack the state-centered capitalism to which many experts attributed the 1997 
financial crisis.  In particular, the restructuring of financial system was a crucial part of the 
reform program.  In response to the IMF recommendations attached to its bailout program, the 
Korean government liberalized domestic financial markets rapidly, including the removal of the 
longstanding administrative control over commercial banks and restrictions on foreign ownership 
of financial and non-financial corporations.  In the process the Anglo-American capitalist model 
has strongly influenced the Korean economy in the following ways.   
First, what replaced the government-administered financial system that broke down amid 
the financial crisis was transaction banking with foreign capital dominating the banking sector.  
Consolidated banks after the financial crisis have sought to maximize short-term profits out of 
consumer lending rather than building close relationships with industrial clients to ameliorate 
their liquidity constraints (Chang and Shin 2003).  Second, the current corporate governance 
system of big business is under mounting attack from foreign investors.  As the previous chapter 
presents, the traditional corporate governance structure of chaebols is characterized by the high 
concentration of control, the lack of protection of minority shareholders, and the insulation of the 
management from takeovers (Lee 2003).  Chaebols were controlled by their founding families 
that were also the largest shareholders of their companies.  The corporate governance system was 
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so concentrated that it was called “imperial management” (Lee 2003).  This unconstrained 
managerial power was exercised in a way to benefit affiliated firms on average at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan 2002: 81).  However, as the foreign ownership of 
major Korean corporations increases, they face unprecedented challenges from foreign 
investors.164  Currently, foreign investors account for greater than 50 percent of shareholding in 
major chaebols such as Samsung and Hyundai.   
Some commentators have argued that South Korea rushed into Americanizing its 
economy after the 1997 economic crisis at the risk of systemic disorder.  For example, Myers 
warns that “most optimistic analysts are ignoring the extent to which the IMF-Kim Dae-jung 
‘free market’ solution is at odds with the Korean economic traditions of mercantilism and the 
chaebol” (Myers 1998).  However, as Table 23 shows, the Korean capitalism before the crisis 
had already much resembled the American model except for the financial system.  First, South 
Korea lacked the tradition of stakeholder capitalism in which workers’ participation in 
management gained legitimacy.  Although the separation of ownership and management as in the 
United States was rare in South Korea, family-owners as largest shareholders kept strong grip on 
the management of their firms without being monitored by their employees or client banks.  
Second, as in the United States, South Korea lacked employers’ associations with strong 
competencies at industrial level.  Thus, the inter-firm relations in the same industry have been 
competitive and poaching skilled workers was a prevailing practice in Korean businesses, while 
inter-firm collaboration was easily found across different industries in the same chaebol.    
                                                 
164 Two recent incidents are worth being mentioned.  Between 2003 and 2005 Sovereign Asset Management, the 
largest shareholder of SK Corporation, sought to oust the chairman of the company because of his conviction for 
accounting offences.  Carl Icahn’s attempt to control KT&G in 2006 was the first hostile takeover bid for a major 
Korean company.  Although both were unsuccessful, they were emblematic of rising shareholder activism in South 
Korea (Financial Times 2006).            
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Third, the Korean education system has stigmatized vocational training as in the United 
States.  Considering the level of economic development, the preference for higher education 
among Korean people has been outstandingly strong.  As shown in Table 23, the gross 
enrollment ratio at tertiary level in South Korea in 1996 was 60 percent, which is higher than that 
of Germany in 2003.  The gross enrollment ratio at tertiary level in the United States reached 60 
percent only in 1985 (UNESCO).  Traditionally, as in the United States, vocational education 
tracks were shunned from most talented youths in South Korea.  But this pattern was reinforced 
by a change in education policy during the mid-1990s.  The-then Kim Young-sam government 
liberalized regulations of establishing tertiary schools, which led to an increase of colleges and 
universities.  This policy change brought more middle-school graduates to enter university-
bound high schools and also induced more technical high school students to opt for academic 
careers instead of industrial careers (Lee et al. 1999).  As a result, the gross enrollment ratio 
increased rapidly from 39 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 1996 (UNESCO).  Currently, the 
gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education in South Korea is 89 percent, higher than that of the 
United States.      
Firm-based skill formation has been also limited.  Hong and Ryoo (1999)’s study of 
Hyundai Motors’ Ulsan plant find that the production system of this company is based on the 
Taylorist principle of rationalization.  In Hyundai Motors, skill formation has depended on “on-
the-job training” combined with job circulation, in which the company does not bear training 
costs.  “Off-the-job training” has been concentrated in ethic education rather than skill formation 
(Jo 2004).     
Thus, it appears that the government-directed financial system was the decisive, but the 
sole factor that differentiated the Korean capitalism from the Anglo-American liberal market 
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capitalism.  In coordinated market economies different kinds of social fabrics have constrained 
the economic dependence on the free market for coordination.  In Germany they were strong 
peak associations representing business and labor.  In Japan they were bonded relationships 
between employers and workers as expressed in lifetime employment.  By contrast, the 
development of these non-market coordination mechanisms in South Korea was extremely 
limited except for corporate finance.  Now that the government-directed financial system has 
been replaced by market-based one, it is natural the Korean economy is being increasingly 
Americanized. 
This economic transformation leads us to predict that Korean employers will become 
more reluctant to provide long-term employment to their employees and will increasingly 
substitute non-regular workers for regular workers whose employment is protected by law.  As 
suggested in Figure 17, this is exactly what has happened in South Korea since the financial 
crisis.  In particular, the growing number of non-regular workers has recently become a political 
issue.  Between 2001 and 2004 the proportion of non-regular workers in total employment 
increased rapidly from 26.8 percent to 37 percent.165  Those non-regular workers’ pay is on 
average 60-65 percent of that of regular workers.  Considering the weak firm-based skill-
formation system and the production system based on the rationalization of process that prevail 
in the current Korean economy, it is not surprising that more Korean employers would seek the 
price-efficient strategy of replacing regular workers by non-regular workers on same jobs.   
How will this booming non-regular employment affect the political support for 
employment protection in South Korea?  Non-regular workers would demand to improve 
                                                 
165 The proportion of non-regular employment slightly decreased to 36.6 percent in 2005 and 35.5 percent in 2006.  
The relevant data can be retrieved from the website of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Labor at: 
http://www.molab.go.kr/issue/issue00/sub01_02.jsp. 
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employment protection for themselves, which helps the cross-class alliance between non-regular 
and regular workers, or between periphery and core workers, to continue.  But at the same time 
non-regular workers might criticize stringent employment protection for regular workers for a 
major institutional source of the economic differentials of wages and working conditions 
between regular and non-regular workers.  Thus, the increasing non-regular employment 
associated with the attrition of middle-class workers could destabilize the cross-class coalition 
for employment protection.  Dolado, Garcia-Serrano, and Jimeno’s study of surging temporary 
jobs in Spain since 1984 (2002) shows that non-regular workers disgruntled with the high level 
of employment protection for regular workers favored the employment protection legislation 
reform during the 1990s.  A lesson from the Spanish case is that the cross-class coalition within 
labor for employment protection is not set in stone.  When the excessive dualism between 
protected insiders and vulnerable outsiders in labor markets turns most non-regular workers and 
the unemployed against regular workers, someday we might observe that low-class workers and 
employers become allied to retrench employment protection for regular workers.    
 
Table 23   A Glance at the Varieties of Capitalism 
 United States (2005) 
Germany 
(2005) 
South Korea  
(1996) 
South Korea 
(2005) 
Type market-based bank-based government-directed 
market-
based 
 
Stock market 
capitalization, 
percentage of 
GDP1)
135 43.7 29 72.9 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
ys
te
m
 
Financial assets 
of institutional 
investors, 
percentage of 
GDP2)
191 81 57.3 77.2 
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Debt/equity 
ratios3) 141.2 241 317.1 100.9 
Proportion of 
securitized 
liabilities in total 
financial 
liabilities of 
nonfinancial 
firms4)
61 21.1 35.2 34.9 
Corporate Governance5) outsider system 
insider 
system 
imperial 
management  
burgeoning 
outsider 
system  
Inter-firm Relations 
within Industry competitive collaborative competitive competitive 
Production System mass production 
diversified 
quality 
production 
mass 
production 
same as 
before 
Key Institutions 
of  
Training for 
Skilled  
Manual Workers 
ordinary high 
schools and 
community 
colleges 
firms and 
public 
training 
schools 
technical 
high schools 
and junior 
colleges 
same as 
before 
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
Sy
st
em
 
 
 
Enrollment 
Ratios at  
Tertiary Level6) 
 
82 51 60 89 
Notes:  
 
1) Data are from World Bank (2007).  
2) Figures as of 2001 except for South Korea in the fourth column.  Data are from OECD (2004). 
3) Figures for the United States and Germany are as of 1995 and provided by Schroeder and Schrader 
(1998).  The Korean data are from the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics System. 
4) Figures for the United States and Germany are as of 1995 and are provided by Vitols (2001).  The 
Korean data are from the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics System. 
5) The descriptions for the United States and Germany are from Schroeder and Schrader (1998).   
6) The gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education is the total enrolment in tertiary education 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the five-year age group following on 
from the secondary school leaving age.  The U.S. figure is as of 2004, the German figure as of 2003, 
and the Korean figure in the last column as of 2004.  Data are from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
Global Education Digest, various years. 
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APPENDIX 
LABOR POWER AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
A.1 UNION DENSITY AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION  
DENSITY
100806040200
EP
L
4
3
2
1
0
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .035 .001 -.065 1.03331 
Predictors: (Constant), DENSITY 
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Coefficients 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 2.008 .531   3.783 .002 
  DENSITY .002 .012 .035 .134 .895 
Dependent Variable: EPL 
 
A.2  BARGAINING LEVEL AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION  
 
BARGAIN
6543210
EP
L
4
3
2
1
0
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .349 .122 .063 .96883 
Predictors: (Constant), BARGAIN 
 
Coefficients 
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Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 1.278 .597   2.139 .049 
  BARGAIN .264 .183 .349 1.443 .169 
Dependent Variable: EPL 
 
A.3  POLITICAL POWER OF LEFT PARTIES AND EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION  
 
LEFT
. 8. 6. 4. 20 . 0-. 2
EP
L
4
3
2
1
0
 
 
Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .429 .184 .130 .93391 
Predictors: (Constant), LEFT 
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 Coefficients 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.572 .353   4.450 .000 1 
LEFT 1.509 .820 .429 1.840 .086 
Dependent Variable: EPL 
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